262
Burma
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Burma Watch.
97 International news
agencies were also fi ltered by Yatanarpon Teleport, including the Web sites of CNN,
the Times of India , and the Financial Times . Both MPT and Yatanarpon Teleport also
blocked regional news Web sites and forums, including Asian Tribune and Asia
Observer, and independent Burmese media organizations, including The Irrawaddy,
Mizzima News, and the Democratic Voice of Burma.
Yatanarpon Teleport continues to block a number of Internet tools such as multimedia-sharing Web sites (http://youtube.com, http://fl ickr.com, etc.) and social-media
Web sites (http://twitter.com, http://mybloglog.com, etc.). Yatanarpon Teleport also
heavily fi lters free Web-based e-mail services, anonymizers and circumvention tools
(http://proxify.com, http://psiphon.civisec.org, http://tor.eff.org, etc.), and blogging
services Web sites (http://blogger.com, http://livejournal.com, http://wordpress.com,
etc.).
Conclusion
Despite the fact that less than 1 percent of Burma has access to the Internet, the
Burmese military junta has targeted online independent media and dissent with the
same commitment it has demonstrated to stifl ing traditional media and voices for
reform. The government has demonstrated that it is willing to take extreme steps to
maintain its control over the fl ow of information within and outside its borders,
including shutting down Internet access entirely. Cyber attacks on opposition groups
are frequent and occur at strategic moments. Although a lack of evidence makes state
attribution diffi cult, these attacks remain consistent with the regime ’ s interest in controlling information, as well as an overall pattern of ongoing attacks against opposition groups.
The Internet in Burma remains tightly controlled through state control of ISPs, state
intervention through content fi ltering and various laws and regulations, and statesanctioned surveillance. Despite the ability of a small group of Internet users to continue to disseminate information online, the pervasive climate of fear has compelled
many to engage in self-censorship.
Notes
1. Seth Mydans, “ Steep Rise in Fuel Costs Prompts Rare Public Protest in Myanmar, ” New York
Times , August 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/23/world/asia/23myanmar.html?scp
=1 & sq=myanmar%20fuel%20price%20hike%20protest & st=cse.
2. “ In Broken Economy, Burmese Improvise or Flee, ” Washington Post , August 16, 2008, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/15/AR2008081503655.html.
Burma
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Burma Watch.
97 International news
agencies were also fi ltered by Yatanarpon Teleport, including the Web sites of CNN,
the Times of India , and the Financial Times . Both MPT and Yatanarpon Teleport also
blocked regional news Web sites and forums, including Asian Tribune and Asia
Observer, and independent Burmese media organizations, including The Irrawaddy,
Mizzima News, and the Democratic Voice of Burma.
Yatanarpon Teleport continues to block a number of Internet tools such as multimedia-sharing Web sites (http://youtube.com, http://fl ickr.com, etc.) and social-media
Web sites (http://twitter.com, http://mybloglog.com, etc.). Yatanarpon Teleport also
heavily fi lters free Web-based e-mail services, anonymizers and circumvention tools
(http://proxify.com, http://psiphon.civisec.org, http://tor.eff.org, etc.), and blogging
services Web sites (http://blogger.com, http://livejournal.com, http://wordpress.com,
etc.).
Conclusion
Despite the fact that less than 1 percent of Burma has access to the Internet, the
Burmese military junta has targeted online independent media and dissent with the
same commitment it has demonstrated to stifl ing traditional media and voices for
reform. The government has demonstrated that it is willing to take extreme steps to
maintain its control over the fl ow of information within and outside its borders,
including shutting down Internet access entirely. Cyber attacks on opposition groups
are frequent and occur at strategic moments. Although a lack of evidence makes state
attribution diffi cult, these attacks remain consistent with the regime ’ s interest in controlling information, as well as an overall pattern of ongoing attacks against opposition groups.
The Internet in Burma remains tightly controlled through state control of ISPs, state
intervention through content fi ltering and various laws and regulations, and statesanctioned surveillance. Despite the ability of a small group of Internet users to continue to disseminate information online, the pervasive climate of fear has compelled
many to engage in self-censorship.
Notes
1. Seth Mydans, “ Steep Rise in Fuel Costs Prompts Rare Public Protest in Myanmar, ” New York
Times , August 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/23/world/asia/23myanmar.html?scp
=1 & sq=myanmar%20fuel%20price%20hike%20protest & st=cse.
2. “ In Broken Economy, Burmese Improvise or Flee, ” Washington Post , August 16, 2008, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/15/AR2008081503655.html.