256
Burma
actions of “ netizens ” demonstrated that the tools of information technology can have
a strong impact on the global coverage of events as they unfold. The subsequent
Internet shutdown was the government ’ s most direct and drastic option to cut off this
bidirectional fl ow of information, to keep the picture of reality distorted for people
both within the Burmese border and outside.
Although the Burmese ruling elite perceives the Internet as a source of instability
and goes to great lengths to control access and content, they also see the Internet as
an enabler of economic development. After signing the 2000 e-ASEAN Framework
Agreement, Burma formed the e-National Task Force to support the development of
information and communications technologies (ICTs).
42 Set to become Burma ’ s largest
IT development, Yatanarpon Cyber City in Pyin Oo Lwin is part of an ICT development master plan under the Initiative for ASEAN Integration.
43 The development of
Yatanarpon Cyber City and the country ’ s Internet infrastructure illustrates the regime ’ s
commitment to economic development in the realm of ICTs.
At the same time, some sources have charged Yatanarpon as being part of a plan
to tighten control over the country ’ s Internet and prevent users from gaining access
to or distributing information critical of the regime.
44 In October 2010, Yatanarpon
Teleport, the fi rst Myanmar national Web portal, was launched in Yatanarpon. Its
creation marked a major change in Burma ’ s ICT development.
Prior to the launch of the national Web portal, the country ’ s two ISPs were the
state-owned MPT and the privately owned Yatanarpon Teleport (or Myanmar Teleport,
formerly known as Bagan Cybertech), which was controlled by the Ministry of Communications, Posts, and Telegraphs. Internet requests would have to go through each
of the ISPs, through the security gateway, and then through the military-controlled
Hantharwaddy National Gateway before accessing the global Internet through the
SEA-ME-WE 3 and China-Burma cross-border fi ber-optic cables.
45 Under this system,
all Internet requests were required to go through proxy servers located in Rangoon.
Because military and government users shared ISPs with private users, Internet requests
from military and government users also went through the Rangoon proxy servers,
creating a bottleneck for government and military users.
46
After the launch of Yatanarpon Teleport, the two main servers were no longer MPT
and Yatanarpon, but MPT and a newly created Ministry of Defense ISP. Naypyitaw (a new
ISP) and Yatanarpon Teleport are now under the Myanmar Post and Telecommunications ISP. Under this new ISP system, the Ministry of Defense ISP will serve only Ministry
of Defense users, while the Naypyitaw ISP will serve other government ministries, and
Yatanarpon will serve private civilian users. This new ISP system will minimize loading
on the National Gateway as well as the main ISP, but Internet requests will have to pass
through more ISPs servers — thus placing users under more screening and controls.
47
As one report pointed out, segregating users into separate groups accessing the Internet through differentiated servers means that users will be subject to more screening
Burma
actions of “ netizens ” demonstrated that the tools of information technology can have
a strong impact on the global coverage of events as they unfold. The subsequent
Internet shutdown was the government ’ s most direct and drastic option to cut off this
bidirectional fl ow of information, to keep the picture of reality distorted for people
both within the Burmese border and outside.
Although the Burmese ruling elite perceives the Internet as a source of instability
and goes to great lengths to control access and content, they also see the Internet as
an enabler of economic development. After signing the 2000 e-ASEAN Framework
Agreement, Burma formed the e-National Task Force to support the development of
information and communications technologies (ICTs).
42 Set to become Burma ’ s largest
IT development, Yatanarpon Cyber City in Pyin Oo Lwin is part of an ICT development master plan under the Initiative for ASEAN Integration.
43 The development of
Yatanarpon Cyber City and the country ’ s Internet infrastructure illustrates the regime ’ s
commitment to economic development in the realm of ICTs.
At the same time, some sources have charged Yatanarpon as being part of a plan
to tighten control over the country ’ s Internet and prevent users from gaining access
to or distributing information critical of the regime.
44 In October 2010, Yatanarpon
Teleport, the fi rst Myanmar national Web portal, was launched in Yatanarpon. Its
creation marked a major change in Burma ’ s ICT development.
Prior to the launch of the national Web portal, the country ’ s two ISPs were the
state-owned MPT and the privately owned Yatanarpon Teleport (or Myanmar Teleport,
formerly known as Bagan Cybertech), which was controlled by the Ministry of Communications, Posts, and Telegraphs. Internet requests would have to go through each
of the ISPs, through the security gateway, and then through the military-controlled
Hantharwaddy National Gateway before accessing the global Internet through the
SEA-ME-WE 3 and China-Burma cross-border fi ber-optic cables.
45 Under this system,
all Internet requests were required to go through proxy servers located in Rangoon.
Because military and government users shared ISPs with private users, Internet requests
from military and government users also went through the Rangoon proxy servers,
creating a bottleneck for government and military users.
46
After the launch of Yatanarpon Teleport, the two main servers were no longer MPT
and Yatanarpon, but MPT and a newly created Ministry of Defense ISP. Naypyitaw (a new
ISP) and Yatanarpon Teleport are now under the Myanmar Post and Telecommunications ISP. Under this new ISP system, the Ministry of Defense ISP will serve only Ministry
of Defense users, while the Naypyitaw ISP will serve other government ministries, and
Yatanarpon will serve private civilian users. This new ISP system will minimize loading
on the National Gateway as well as the main ISP, but Internet requests will have to pass
through more ISPs servers — thus placing users under more screening and controls.
47
As one report pointed out, segregating users into separate groups accessing the Internet through differentiated servers means that users will be subject to more screening