Asia Overview
231
countries challenging the accessibility of content on BlackBerry devices. Research in
Motion agreed to implement a content-fi ltering system in Indonesia to ensure compliance with the country ’ s antipornography laws.
61 Similarly, BlackBerry users in Pakistan
reportedly found content inaccessible as the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority
ordered blasphemous material blocked.
62
The practice of “ just-in-time ” blocking has also been prevalent in the region. During
anniversaries of highly sensitive events, such as the 60th anniversary of the founding
of the People ’ s Republic of China, the 50th anniversary of the Tibet Uprising, and the
20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre, China has seen increases in the level of
blocking.
63 Thailand also experienced an increase in blocking during the 2010 red shirt
demonstrations. Following the introduction of a state of emergency in April 2010, the
government introduced strict measures to control the media, including Internet
content, particularly content related to opposition parties or sympathetic to protesters.
OpenNet Initiative testing confi rmed that Thai ISPs targeted a selection of the 36 Web
sites ordered blocked by the government during this period.
64
Filtering is often not applied consistently within countries. Different ISPs sometimes fi lter different content, or do not fi lter content at all times. For example, ONI
testing in Thailand found that fi ltering between the two tested ISPs, TRUE and TOTNET,
was inconsistent, with neither provider blocking all the sites on the government block
list. Internet service providers tested in Indonesia showed a similar lack of uniformity,
with blocked content differing across providers. While there were some variations in
the number of sites fi ltered by ISPs in countries such as Pakistan and India, the content
was similar in nature. Providers tested in Burma showed a distinct difference in the
precision of their fi ltering — testing results showed that Myanmar Post and Telecommunication (MPT) blocked specifi c pages while Yatanarpon Teleport (or Myanmar
Teleport, formerly known as Bagan Cybertech) often blocked entire domains. Filtering
has also been intermittent in countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Thailand
where censorship occurs in response to a crisis or controversy.
The degree of transparency about blocking that users experience also varies between
countries. China ’ s system of IP blocking combined with keyword fi ltering, which is
unique in the world, can resemble network problems. When accessing a blocked site,
users receive a network-timeout error page, leaving them uncertain about whether
content is in fact blocked. Other countries, including South Korea and some Indonesian ISPs, explicitly inform users that the content they are trying to access is blocked
by government order.
Surveillance
Internet service providers in Asia are increasingly required to monitor their users ’
access and retain information about their usage. This practice can be seen most
231
countries challenging the accessibility of content on BlackBerry devices. Research in
Motion agreed to implement a content-fi ltering system in Indonesia to ensure compliance with the country ’ s antipornography laws.
61 Similarly, BlackBerry users in Pakistan
reportedly found content inaccessible as the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority
ordered blasphemous material blocked.
62
The practice of “ just-in-time ” blocking has also been prevalent in the region. During
anniversaries of highly sensitive events, such as the 60th anniversary of the founding
of the People ’ s Republic of China, the 50th anniversary of the Tibet Uprising, and the
20th anniversary of the Tiananmen Massacre, China has seen increases in the level of
blocking.
63 Thailand also experienced an increase in blocking during the 2010 red shirt
demonstrations. Following the introduction of a state of emergency in April 2010, the
government introduced strict measures to control the media, including Internet
content, particularly content related to opposition parties or sympathetic to protesters.
OpenNet Initiative testing confi rmed that Thai ISPs targeted a selection of the 36 Web
sites ordered blocked by the government during this period.
64
Filtering is often not applied consistently within countries. Different ISPs sometimes fi lter different content, or do not fi lter content at all times. For example, ONI
testing in Thailand found that fi ltering between the two tested ISPs, TRUE and TOTNET,
was inconsistent, with neither provider blocking all the sites on the government block
list. Internet service providers tested in Indonesia showed a similar lack of uniformity,
with blocked content differing across providers. While there were some variations in
the number of sites fi ltered by ISPs in countries such as Pakistan and India, the content
was similar in nature. Providers tested in Burma showed a distinct difference in the
precision of their fi ltering — testing results showed that Myanmar Post and Telecommunication (MPT) blocked specifi c pages while Yatanarpon Teleport (or Myanmar
Teleport, formerly known as Bagan Cybertech) often blocked entire domains. Filtering
has also been intermittent in countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Thailand
where censorship occurs in response to a crisis or controversy.
The degree of transparency about blocking that users experience also varies between
countries. China ’ s system of IP blocking combined with keyword fi ltering, which is
unique in the world, can resemble network problems. When accessing a blocked site,
users receive a network-timeout error page, leaving them uncertain about whether
content is in fact blocked. Other countries, including South Korea and some Indonesian ISPs, explicitly inform users that the content they are trying to access is blocked
by government order.
Surveillance
Internet service providers in Asia are increasingly required to monitor their users ’
access and retain information about their usage. This practice can be seen most