Corporate Accountability in Networked Asia
203
grassroots efforts to spread knowledge among Indian Internet users about circumvention technologies so that most people who really wanted to access the offending
content could still manage to do so.
54
By the end of the decade the Indian government had changed its strategy for
dealing with problematic content posted on, or transmitted through, the services of
Internet companies. Ham-fi sted and overbroad ISP-level fi ltering gave way to direct
demands to the companies themselves to hand over user data and delete content.
55
The Information Technology (Amendment) Act of 2008 facilitated this transition by
empowering the state to direct any ICT service to block, intercept, monitor, or decrypt
any information through any computer resource.
56 The act also requires companies to
have a designated point of contact for content-blocking, removal, and data requests.
Company offi cials who fail to comply with government requests can face fi nes and
up to seven years in jail.
57 Analysts point out that the new act has made ISP-level
fi ltering more diffi cult, while strengthening and systematizing surveillance processes.
58
While most critics acknowledge the legitimate role of law enforcement, they have
called for more comprehensive rules and procedures to supervise the process by which
government demands are made, in order to prevent privacy violations, foul play, and
political abuse.
59
It was against this backdrop in early August 2010 that the Indian government
demanded that Research in Motion (RIM), maker of Blackberry smart phones, grant
Indian security agencies access to all corporate e-mail and instant-messenger communications transmitted within or through Indian borders. Failure to comply by the end
of the month would result in blockage of all encrypted Blackberry traffi c on Indian
networks.
60 Gaining access to Blackberry ’ s consumer services sold locally over domestic
mobile carriers was one thing, and RIM expressed willingness to help the Indian government in this regard.
61 However, given that even RIM itself cannot access user data on
Blackberry Enterprise Services — it is transmitted in highly encrypted form and retained
on the corporate customers ’ servers — full compliance with the government ’ s order in
its original form is diffi cult if not impossible.
62 The company reportedly offered Indian
authorities manual access to its messenger service with a pledge of real-time automated
access by early 2011 and gained a reprieve from punishment until that time.
63
Indian authorities claim to have begun conversations with other global companies,
including Google and Skype, neither of which would comment publicly because they
say they had not yet received any formal government requests or orders. Meanwhile,
by late 2010 concerns were mounting in the Indian business community about the
economic implications of their government ’ s threats.
64 “ We need a more balanced
approach for lawful interception, ” wrote S. Ramadorai, vice chairman of Tata Consultancy Services Limited. “ Bans and calls for bans aren ’ t a solution. They ’ ll disconnect
India from the rest of the world. We can ’ t allow that to happen, because then terrorists
will win without even fi ring a bullet. ”
65
203
grassroots efforts to spread knowledge among Indian Internet users about circumvention technologies so that most people who really wanted to access the offending
content could still manage to do so.
54
By the end of the decade the Indian government had changed its strategy for
dealing with problematic content posted on, or transmitted through, the services of
Internet companies. Ham-fi sted and overbroad ISP-level fi ltering gave way to direct
demands to the companies themselves to hand over user data and delete content.
55
The Information Technology (Amendment) Act of 2008 facilitated this transition by
empowering the state to direct any ICT service to block, intercept, monitor, or decrypt
any information through any computer resource.
56 The act also requires companies to
have a designated point of contact for content-blocking, removal, and data requests.
Company offi cials who fail to comply with government requests can face fi nes and
up to seven years in jail.
57 Analysts point out that the new act has made ISP-level
fi ltering more diffi cult, while strengthening and systematizing surveillance processes.
58
While most critics acknowledge the legitimate role of law enforcement, they have
called for more comprehensive rules and procedures to supervise the process by which
government demands are made, in order to prevent privacy violations, foul play, and
political abuse.
59
It was against this backdrop in early August 2010 that the Indian government
demanded that Research in Motion (RIM), maker of Blackberry smart phones, grant
Indian security agencies access to all corporate e-mail and instant-messenger communications transmitted within or through Indian borders. Failure to comply by the end
of the month would result in blockage of all encrypted Blackberry traffi c on Indian
networks.
60 Gaining access to Blackberry ’ s consumer services sold locally over domestic
mobile carriers was one thing, and RIM expressed willingness to help the Indian government in this regard.
61 However, given that even RIM itself cannot access user data on
Blackberry Enterprise Services — it is transmitted in highly encrypted form and retained
on the corporate customers ’ servers — full compliance with the government ’ s order in
its original form is diffi cult if not impossible.
62 The company reportedly offered Indian
authorities manual access to its messenger service with a pledge of real-time automated
access by early 2011 and gained a reprieve from punishment until that time.
63
Indian authorities claim to have begun conversations with other global companies,
including Google and Skype, neither of which would comment publicly because they
say they had not yet received any formal government requests or orders. Meanwhile,
by late 2010 concerns were mounting in the Indian business community about the
economic implications of their government ’ s threats.
64 “ We need a more balanced
approach for lawful interception, ” wrote S. Ramadorai, vice chairman of Tata Consultancy Services Limited. “ Bans and calls for bans aren ’ t a solution. They ’ ll disconnect
India from the rest of the world. We can ’ t allow that to happen, because then terrorists
will win without even fi ring a bullet. ”
65