198
Rebecca MacKinnon
even when extensive fi ltering regimes are put in place, people cannot be prevented
from accessing and creating a broad range of Internet content and holding all kinds
of conversations, including those related to politics and policy. Networked authoritarianism thus accepts and allows a lot more give and take between government and
citizens than in a pre-Internet authoritarian state. The regime uses the Internet not
only to extend its control but also to enhance its legitimacy. While one party remains
in control, a wide range of conversations about the country ’ s problems rage on Web
sites and social-networking services. The government follows online chatter and sometimes people are able to use the Internet to call attention to social problems or injustices, and even manage to have an impact on government policies. As a result, the
average person with Internet or mobile access has a much greater sense of freedom —
and may even feel like he or she has the ability to speak and be heard — in ways that
were not possible under classic authoritarianism. It also makes most people a lot less
likely to join a movement calling for radical political change. Meanwhile, the government exercises targeted censorship focused on activities and conversations that pose
the greatest threat to the regime ’ s power, and also devotes considerable resources to
proactively seeding and manipulating the nation ’ s online discourse about domestic
and international events.
21
Thus, while over 500 million Chinese people are fi nding their lives greatly enhanced
by the Internet, Communist Party control over the bureaucracy and courts has
strengthened, and the regime ’ s institutional commitments to protect the universal
rights and freedoms of all its citizens have weakened.
22 According to a recent report
by the Dui Hua Foundation, in 2008 arrests and indictments on charges of “ endangering state security ” — the most common charge used in cases of political, religious, or
ethnic dissent — more than doubled for the second time in three years.
23 Meanwhile,
the Chinese government has made clear in its 2010 Internet White Paper that the
rapid nationwide expansion of Internet and mobile penetration is a strategic priority.
The development of a vibrant indigenous Internet and telecommunications sector is
critical for China ’ s long-term global economic competitiveness.
24 At the same time,
Chinese companies are fully expected to support and reinforce domestic political
stability, and to ensure that ICTs will not be used in a manner that threatens Communist Party rule.
25
The China case demonstrates how companies can be used as an opaque extension
of state power, helping authoritarian regimes to control and manipulate citizens with
a lighter hand than was possible in the pre-Internet age while still maintaining power
and preventing viable opposition movements from emerging. But what about democracies? In democratic societies, can ICT companies be used as an opaque tool for
incumbent leaders, ruling political parties, and other powerful groups to manipulate
public discourse and marginalize critics? Trends in South Korea and India suggest that
such a situation is possible and may already be happening to different degrees. To
Rebecca MacKinnon
even when extensive fi ltering regimes are put in place, people cannot be prevented
from accessing and creating a broad range of Internet content and holding all kinds
of conversations, including those related to politics and policy. Networked authoritarianism thus accepts and allows a lot more give and take between government and
citizens than in a pre-Internet authoritarian state. The regime uses the Internet not
only to extend its control but also to enhance its legitimacy. While one party remains
in control, a wide range of conversations about the country ’ s problems rage on Web
sites and social-networking services. The government follows online chatter and sometimes people are able to use the Internet to call attention to social problems or injustices, and even manage to have an impact on government policies. As a result, the
average person with Internet or mobile access has a much greater sense of freedom —
and may even feel like he or she has the ability to speak and be heard — in ways that
were not possible under classic authoritarianism. It also makes most people a lot less
likely to join a movement calling for radical political change. Meanwhile, the government exercises targeted censorship focused on activities and conversations that pose
the greatest threat to the regime ’ s power, and also devotes considerable resources to
proactively seeding and manipulating the nation ’ s online discourse about domestic
and international events.
21
Thus, while over 500 million Chinese people are fi nding their lives greatly enhanced
by the Internet, Communist Party control over the bureaucracy and courts has
strengthened, and the regime ’ s institutional commitments to protect the universal
rights and freedoms of all its citizens have weakened.
22 According to a recent report
by the Dui Hua Foundation, in 2008 arrests and indictments on charges of “ endangering state security ” — the most common charge used in cases of political, religious, or
ethnic dissent — more than doubled for the second time in three years.
23 Meanwhile,
the Chinese government has made clear in its 2010 Internet White Paper that the
rapid nationwide expansion of Internet and mobile penetration is a strategic priority.
The development of a vibrant indigenous Internet and telecommunications sector is
critical for China ’ s long-term global economic competitiveness.
24 At the same time,
Chinese companies are fully expected to support and reinforce domestic political
stability, and to ensure that ICTs will not be used in a manner that threatens Communist Party rule.
25
The China case demonstrates how companies can be used as an opaque extension
of state power, helping authoritarian regimes to control and manipulate citizens with
a lighter hand than was possible in the pre-Internet age while still maintaining power
and preventing viable opposition movements from emerging. But what about democracies? In democratic societies, can ICT companies be used as an opaque tool for
incumbent leaders, ruling political parties, and other powerful groups to manipulate
public discourse and marginalize critics? Trends in South Korea and India suggest that
such a situation is possible and may already be happening to different degrees. To