China and Global Internet Governance
191
communism in its heyday elsewhere, the party in China has eradicated or emasculated political
rivals, eliminated the autonomy of the courts and media, restricted religion and civil society,
denigrated rival versions of nationhood, centralized political power, established extensive networks of security police, and dispatched dissidents to labor camps. There is a good reason why
the Chinese system is often described as “ market-Leninism. ”
27
Unfortunately, in the West there is a persistent refusal or inability to grasp and
accept the meaning of the SME. Westerners, and especially American politicians and
businesses, are constantly mistaking China ’ s reform with transformation . As a result,
they are repeatedly disappointed and angry with China ’ s suppression of individual
rights and its limited and fi tful openings to foreign investment and free trade. United
States policies that attempt to change China are usually based on the premise that the
country ’ s leaders are making false steps on the road to embracing liberal democratic
norms and models. They are not. Zhao Ziyang and a few other Chinese leaders from
the mid-1980s may have fl irted with or embraced transformation, but the Tiananmen
Square incident settled that issue decisively within China ’ s party.
28 Since then, the
CCP mainstream has reaffi rmed the notion of the SME and has explicitly rejected
convergence. One need not approve of this approach to accept its reality and form
one ’ s expectations based on it.
It would make sense, then, that the Chinese state ’ s approach to information and
communications technologies (ICTs) in general and the Internet in particular is neither
to completely suppress it in order to preserve a brittle and unpopular regime, nor to
provide the Internet-based economy and society free rein. It is a constant, iterative
attempt to release productive forces and then corral them into supporting the continued control and dominance of the CCP. Rebecca MacKinnon has called this “ networked
authoritarianism, ”
29 although I am not sure it is the best label. The term may attribute
too much intentionality to China ’ s approach. What is really going on is an improvised
response to the contradictions of the socialist market economy. On one hand, the
market economy part of the package thrives on open exchanges with foreigners and
robust circulation of information, both of which deliver the economic development
and growth needed for the CCP to maintain its legitimacy; the continued political
grip of the CCP, on the other hand, requires limiting entry into the market for information services, constant monitoring and surveillance of communications, propaganda activities, repressive capabilities, and accurate targeting of political and social
threats.
Note that the attempt to subject the Internet to hierarchical control relies in many
respects on the unique capabilities of networked computers, whether it is the use of
DNS blocking and deep packet inspection to fi lter Web and search-engine queries, the
mobilization of armies of freelance propagandists to search for and intervene in public
discourses critical of the government, the surreptitious use of cyber espionage, or the
“ identifi cation and record-keeping ” activities invoked by Wang Chen. In an information age, the label “ networked authoritarianism ” is practically redundant — if there is
191
communism in its heyday elsewhere, the party in China has eradicated or emasculated political
rivals, eliminated the autonomy of the courts and media, restricted religion and civil society,
denigrated rival versions of nationhood, centralized political power, established extensive networks of security police, and dispatched dissidents to labor camps. There is a good reason why
the Chinese system is often described as “ market-Leninism. ”
27
Unfortunately, in the West there is a persistent refusal or inability to grasp and
accept the meaning of the SME. Westerners, and especially American politicians and
businesses, are constantly mistaking China ’ s reform with transformation . As a result,
they are repeatedly disappointed and angry with China ’ s suppression of individual
rights and its limited and fi tful openings to foreign investment and free trade. United
States policies that attempt to change China are usually based on the premise that the
country ’ s leaders are making false steps on the road to embracing liberal democratic
norms and models. They are not. Zhao Ziyang and a few other Chinese leaders from
the mid-1980s may have fl irted with or embraced transformation, but the Tiananmen
Square incident settled that issue decisively within China ’ s party.
28 Since then, the
CCP mainstream has reaffi rmed the notion of the SME and has explicitly rejected
convergence. One need not approve of this approach to accept its reality and form
one ’ s expectations based on it.
It would make sense, then, that the Chinese state ’ s approach to information and
communications technologies (ICTs) in general and the Internet in particular is neither
to completely suppress it in order to preserve a brittle and unpopular regime, nor to
provide the Internet-based economy and society free rein. It is a constant, iterative
attempt to release productive forces and then corral them into supporting the continued control and dominance of the CCP. Rebecca MacKinnon has called this “ networked
authoritarianism, ”
29 although I am not sure it is the best label. The term may attribute
too much intentionality to China ’ s approach. What is really going on is an improvised
response to the contradictions of the socialist market economy. On one hand, the
market economy part of the package thrives on open exchanges with foreigners and
robust circulation of information, both of which deliver the economic development
and growth needed for the CCP to maintain its legitimacy; the continued political
grip of the CCP, on the other hand, requires limiting entry into the market for information services, constant monitoring and surveillance of communications, propaganda activities, repressive capabilities, and accurate targeting of political and social
threats.
Note that the attempt to subject the Internet to hierarchical control relies in many
respects on the unique capabilities of networked computers, whether it is the use of
DNS blocking and deep packet inspection to fi lter Web and search-engine queries, the
mobilization of armies of freelance propagandists to search for and intervene in public
discourses critical of the government, the surreptitious use of cyber espionage, or the
“ identifi cation and record-keeping ” activities invoked by Wang Chen. In an information age, the label “ networked authoritarianism ” is practically redundant — if there is