China and Global Internet Governance
189
government departments, national security and defense groups, Indian academics,
and journalists focused on China. The Offi ce of the Tibetan Dalai Lama was also targeted.
23 Leaked State Department cables show that U.S. and German government
agencies were becoming concerned about Chinese cyber espionage as early as 2006.
24
The Google-China incident (covered in more detail in the China country profi le in
this volume) can be seen as a straightforward clash between China ’ s domestic policy
and Internet freedom in that it involved a transnational business founded on the free
and indiscriminate dissemination of information demanded by users. It was that, but
it was something more as well. Google ’ s sudden questioning of its presence in China
was triggered not by ongoing Chinese censorship but by a break-in to its corporate
network that Google believed could be attributed to Chinese state-sponsored or statedirected actors. This break-in not only involved the theft of proprietary information
but also seemed to target the e-mail accounts of human rights activists.
State Department cables released by Wikileaks provide support for the conclusion
not only that China ’ s government was involved in the break-ins, but also that China ’ s
government views the Internet in general and Google in particular as state-directed
pieces that are being played in its geopolitical power competition with the United
States:
A well-placed contact claims that the Chinese government coordinated the recent intrusions of
Google systems. According to our contact, the closely held operations were directed at the Politburo Standing Committee level. . . . Chinese concerns over the recent Google threat to take down
the company ’ s Chinese-language search engine google.cn over censorship and hacking allegations were focused on the service ’ s growing popularity among Chinese Internet users and a
perception that the USG and Google were working in concert.
25
Ties between China ’ s leadership and Google rival Baidu are also asserted in the
cables. The current dialogue over Chinese cyber espionage may be overlooking the
extent to which China is subject to the same tactics from other countries, especially
the United States. The State Department cables, for example, warn darkly of “ potential
linkages of China ’ s top companies with the PRC [state] ” and claim that such links
“ illustrate the government ’ s use of its ‘ private sector ’ in support of information warfare
objectives. ”
26 Coming from the United States, it sounds very much like the policeman
at Rick ’ s casino in the movie Casablanca proclaiming that he is “ shocked, shocked to
discover that gambling is going on here. ” The massive U.S. military-industrial complex
and the deep, long-term ties between Internet technical experts, cyber security fi rms,
and Defense Department and the Department of Homeland Security ’ s research funding
are almost exactly the same as those described in threatening terms in the State Department cables.
An inherent feature of the nation-state system of governance is that concepts of
order and security apply fi rst and foremost in the domestic sovereign ’ s jurisdiction.
Different, negotiable standards apply to outsiders. Because China believes that it is
189
government departments, national security and defense groups, Indian academics,
and journalists focused on China. The Offi ce of the Tibetan Dalai Lama was also targeted.
23 Leaked State Department cables show that U.S. and German government
agencies were becoming concerned about Chinese cyber espionage as early as 2006.
24
The Google-China incident (covered in more detail in the China country profi le in
this volume) can be seen as a straightforward clash between China ’ s domestic policy
and Internet freedom in that it involved a transnational business founded on the free
and indiscriminate dissemination of information demanded by users. It was that, but
it was something more as well. Google ’ s sudden questioning of its presence in China
was triggered not by ongoing Chinese censorship but by a break-in to its corporate
network that Google believed could be attributed to Chinese state-sponsored or statedirected actors. This break-in not only involved the theft of proprietary information
but also seemed to target the e-mail accounts of human rights activists.
State Department cables released by Wikileaks provide support for the conclusion
not only that China ’ s government was involved in the break-ins, but also that China ’ s
government views the Internet in general and Google in particular as state-directed
pieces that are being played in its geopolitical power competition with the United
States:
A well-placed contact claims that the Chinese government coordinated the recent intrusions of
Google systems. According to our contact, the closely held operations were directed at the Politburo Standing Committee level. . . . Chinese concerns over the recent Google threat to take down
the company ’ s Chinese-language search engine google.cn over censorship and hacking allegations were focused on the service ’ s growing popularity among Chinese Internet users and a
perception that the USG and Google were working in concert.
25
Ties between China ’ s leadership and Google rival Baidu are also asserted in the
cables. The current dialogue over Chinese cyber espionage may be overlooking the
extent to which China is subject to the same tactics from other countries, especially
the United States. The State Department cables, for example, warn darkly of “ potential
linkages of China ’ s top companies with the PRC [state] ” and claim that such links
“ illustrate the government ’ s use of its ‘ private sector ’ in support of information warfare
objectives. ”
26 Coming from the United States, it sounds very much like the policeman
at Rick ’ s casino in the movie Casablanca proclaiming that he is “ shocked, shocked to
discover that gambling is going on here. ” The massive U.S. military-industrial complex
and the deep, long-term ties between Internet technical experts, cyber security fi rms,
and Defense Department and the Department of Homeland Security ’ s research funding
are almost exactly the same as those described in threatening terms in the State Department cables.
An inherent feature of the nation-state system of governance is that concepts of
order and security apply fi rst and foremost in the domestic sovereign ’ s jurisdiction.
Different, negotiable standards apply to outsiders. Because China believes that it is