China and Global Internet Governance
185
the Internet. This situation has changed. China has taken the lead in shaping the
institutional environment for the IGF at the UN. Chinese diplomat Sha Zukang, who
represented China during WSIS, became the United Nations ’ undersecretary-general
for economic and social affairs on July 1, 2007. From that platform he has made a
series of moves designed to bring the IGF more under the control of the UN system
and make it more intergovernmental in character. China has the support of many
Arab states and the BRICs in this regard. (Brazil, Russia, India, and China make up the
BRICs.) While business interests and the United States thought they were minimizing
damage by making the Committee on Science and Technology for Development
(CSTD), a near-dormant entity within the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
responsible for WSIS follow-up, they were later outmaneuvered. The UN resolution
renewing IGF was conditioned on a review and “ improvement ” process that made it
more intergovernmental. In setting the parameters of the improvement process,
Undersecretary Sha, with the support of other cyber-nationalist states, minimized the
role of civil society and business. He also reinstituted the old way of excluding nonstate actors from speaking during parts of the public consultations.
These moves actually do more to exclude the United Nations from the broader
currents of Internet governance than to assert UN control over Internet governance.
Without full and equal-status participation of Internet businesses and users, the United
Nations is unlikely to have much infl uence and the IGF will not be much of a forum.
But the changes bring a halt to the multistakeholder innovations and reforms that
came from WSIS.
China and the Regional Internet Registries
The Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) manage and set policy for Internet Protocol (IP)
address resources. Like ICANN, the RIRs are private, nonprofi t corporations that have
transnational governance responsibilities. Although they are not under the direct contractual authority of the U.S. Commerce Department, they do rely on ICANN for the
initial allocations of large address blocks, which they subdelegate to Internet service
providers (ISPs) and organizations in their regions. China has consistently attempted
to make IP addresses conform to the governmental, sovereigntist model. Led by the
Chinese director of the ITU ’ s Telecommunication Standardization Bureau, Houlin
Zhao, it has backed efforts by the ITU to compete with the RIRs.
13 It also supported a
more recent attempt by the ITU to propose a parallel system of IPv6 address allocation
based on country Internet registries.
14 Within its region, it has acquired addresses
through its own National Internet Registry (NIR) rather than allowing ISPs and companies to go directly to the IP addressing authority for its region, the Asia Pacifi c Network
Information Centre (APNIC). The cyber-nationalist pattern is consistent here, too.
185
the Internet. This situation has changed. China has taken the lead in shaping the
institutional environment for the IGF at the UN. Chinese diplomat Sha Zukang, who
represented China during WSIS, became the United Nations ’ undersecretary-general
for economic and social affairs on July 1, 2007. From that platform he has made a
series of moves designed to bring the IGF more under the control of the UN system
and make it more intergovernmental in character. China has the support of many
Arab states and the BRICs in this regard. (Brazil, Russia, India, and China make up the
BRICs.) While business interests and the United States thought they were minimizing
damage by making the Committee on Science and Technology for Development
(CSTD), a near-dormant entity within the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
responsible for WSIS follow-up, they were later outmaneuvered. The UN resolution
renewing IGF was conditioned on a review and “ improvement ” process that made it
more intergovernmental. In setting the parameters of the improvement process,
Undersecretary Sha, with the support of other cyber-nationalist states, minimized the
role of civil society and business. He also reinstituted the old way of excluding nonstate actors from speaking during parts of the public consultations.
These moves actually do more to exclude the United Nations from the broader
currents of Internet governance than to assert UN control over Internet governance.
Without full and equal-status participation of Internet businesses and users, the United
Nations is unlikely to have much infl uence and the IGF will not be much of a forum.
But the changes bring a halt to the multistakeholder innovations and reforms that
came from WSIS.
China and the Regional Internet Registries
The Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) manage and set policy for Internet Protocol (IP)
address resources. Like ICANN, the RIRs are private, nonprofi t corporations that have
transnational governance responsibilities. Although they are not under the direct contractual authority of the U.S. Commerce Department, they do rely on ICANN for the
initial allocations of large address blocks, which they subdelegate to Internet service
providers (ISPs) and organizations in their regions. China has consistently attempted
to make IP addresses conform to the governmental, sovereigntist model. Led by the
Chinese director of the ITU ’ s Telecommunication Standardization Bureau, Houlin
Zhao, it has backed efforts by the ITU to compete with the RIRs.
13 It also supported a
more recent attempt by the ITU to propose a parallel system of IPv6 address allocation
based on country Internet registries.
14 Within its region, it has acquired addresses
through its own National Internet Registry (NIR) rather than allowing ISPs and companies to go directly to the IP addressing authority for its region, the Asia Pacifi c Network
Information Centre (APNIC). The cyber-nationalist pattern is consistent here, too.