154
Nart Villeneuve and Masashi Crete-Nishihata
a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. While these attacks were under way,
Mizzima News
7 was also compromised and its Web site was defaced.
8 Periodic attacks
on Burmese opposition media sites continued through 2009 and 2010.
9 In late September 2010, around the third anniversary of the Saffron Revolution, Burmese opposition media were once again silenced by a series of DDoS attacks and Web site
defacements.
10
The timing of these attacks and the content of the messages in the Web site defacements indicate a political connection, and although the identity and capabilities of
the attackers — as well as any relationships they may have with the government — remain
unknown, it is widely believed that the government played a role in the attacks. This
belief prevails because the Burmese government has consistently demonstrated an
interest in controlling and censoring the communications environment in the country.
This chapter explores the complexities of information control and resistance in
Burma based on an investigation conducted by the Information Warfare Monitor
(IWM)
11 on the attacks launched against the Mizzima News Web site in 2008. Through
technical evidence obtained from our investigation and fi eld research conducted in
Burma, we were able to uncover and analyze the characteristics and capabilities of the
suspected attackers. We found that these attacks are consistent with government and
military interest in information control and censorship of the Internet as well as a
pattern of ongoing attacks against Burmese political opposition. However, they cannot
be conclusively attributed to the military or government of Burma. Our investigation
found that the attack on the Mizzima News Web site appeared to have been a result
of a combination of two factors: political motivation and the availability of a target
of opportunity. The attackers are certainly unfavorable toward the Burmese opposition
media, but cannot be simplistically characterized as “ progovernment ” either. Their
primary motivation appears to be nationalism and a belief that the opposition media
demean the public image of their country. The timing of the attacks provided a strategic utility that would normally have been beyond the attackers ’ means. While Burma
maintains a robust Internet censorship system that prevents its citizens from accessing
alternative news media, these attacks effectively prevented global access to opposition
media sites during a sensitive period.
We proceed by describing the spectrum of information controls in Burma that
includes pervasive Internet fi ltering, repressive legal frameworks, and recurring cyber
attacks. We then provide a detailed technical and contextual analysis of the Mizzima
News defacement attacks and highlight the diffi culty of determining the actors
involved and motivations behind such attacks as well as questions surrounding state
attribution. Finally, we situate the case study in the wider context of information
controls in Burma and argue that gaining an understanding of threats to freedom of
expression in cyberspace requires a holistic analysis that accounts for the unpredictable and contested nature of the domain.
Nart Villeneuve and Masashi Crete-Nishihata
a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack. While these attacks were under way,
Mizzima News
7 was also compromised and its Web site was defaced.
8 Periodic attacks
on Burmese opposition media sites continued through 2009 and 2010.
9 In late September 2010, around the third anniversary of the Saffron Revolution, Burmese opposition media were once again silenced by a series of DDoS attacks and Web site
defacements.
10
The timing of these attacks and the content of the messages in the Web site defacements indicate a political connection, and although the identity and capabilities of
the attackers — as well as any relationships they may have with the government — remain
unknown, it is widely believed that the government played a role in the attacks. This
belief prevails because the Burmese government has consistently demonstrated an
interest in controlling and censoring the communications environment in the country.
This chapter explores the complexities of information control and resistance in
Burma based on an investigation conducted by the Information Warfare Monitor
(IWM)
11 on the attacks launched against the Mizzima News Web site in 2008. Through
technical evidence obtained from our investigation and fi eld research conducted in
Burma, we were able to uncover and analyze the characteristics and capabilities of the
suspected attackers. We found that these attacks are consistent with government and
military interest in information control and censorship of the Internet as well as a
pattern of ongoing attacks against Burmese political opposition. However, they cannot
be conclusively attributed to the military or government of Burma. Our investigation
found that the attack on the Mizzima News Web site appeared to have been a result
of a combination of two factors: political motivation and the availability of a target
of opportunity. The attackers are certainly unfavorable toward the Burmese opposition
media, but cannot be simplistically characterized as “ progovernment ” either. Their
primary motivation appears to be nationalism and a belief that the opposition media
demean the public image of their country. The timing of the attacks provided a strategic utility that would normally have been beyond the attackers ’ means. While Burma
maintains a robust Internet censorship system that prevents its citizens from accessing
alternative news media, these attacks effectively prevented global access to opposition
media sites during a sensitive period.
We proceed by describing the spectrum of information controls in Burma that
includes pervasive Internet fi ltering, repressive legal frameworks, and recurring cyber
attacks. We then provide a detailed technical and contextual analysis of the Mizzima
News defacement attacks and highlight the diffi culty of determining the actors
involved and motivations behind such attacks as well as questions surrounding state
attribution. Finally, we situate the case study in the wider context of information
controls in Burma and argue that gaining an understanding of threats to freedom of
expression in cyberspace requires a holistic analysis that accounts for the unpredictable and contested nature of the domain.