104
Pirongrong Ramasoota
Zuckerman refers to OSPs ’ role in Internet fi ltering as “ intermediary censorship. ”
45
They have become important choke points for Web users who publish content on
Web servers they do not control. Such censorship is observed in at least three online
political discussion forums that the research team studied in the postcoup period.
These fi ndings are summarized in table 5.6 .
The summary in table 5.6 clearly shows that because a number of smaller Internet
providers rely on them to publish content, OSPs can be powerful entities in controlling online speech. But the same summary also shows that this newer generation of
Internet publishers is savvy enough to circumvent such intermediary fi ltering systems
by exploiting alternative hosting services overseas. While this strategy may not solve
their problem entirely — since the state can still block through URL-fi ltering at the IIG
level — it still suggests that cyber citizens make efforts to redress the problem with
whatever technological options are available.
Campaigning for Local and International Support
Based on interviews with civil society members, their most immediate concern about
Internet fi ltering in Thailand is the new computer crime law. To them, the new law
is more of an effort by the after-coup government to curb threats against national
security and the monarchy, rather than to stop cybercriminality. In response to arrest
cases under this very law, several rights-based groups have campaigned in support of
the arrestees. The most obvious case is that of Chiranuch Premchaiporn, who has been
arrested twice with charges under the same law. (See details about Chiranuch ’ s arrest
in table 5.4.) Because Chiranuch is a member of the prominent online freedom advocacy group — the Thai Netizen Network (TNN)
46 — her case has been continuously
reported in Prachatai (until it was blocked by the emergency decree during the redshirt crisis of March to May 2010) and in other alternative online media including
mailing lists of TNN. Ever since Chiranuch ’ s fi rst arrest in March 2009, campaigns to
support her and Internet freedom, using her case as a rallying point, have been
growing steadily.
First, only the TNN and alliance organizations like Campaign for Popular Media
Reform (CPMR)
47 and Freedom against Censorship Thailand (FACT)
48 joined forces.
Gradually, other local human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) joined
the campaign to free Chiranuch (also known by her nickname Jiew) by submitting an
open letter seeking the immediate dropping of charges against her and dissuading
public prosecutors from pursuing trial. These include the Network of Human Rights
Lawyers, the Project on Legal Environment, and the Association for Civil Rights and
Liberties. Subsequently, the circle grew to more regional participation with the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA), Southeast Asian Media Legal Defense (SEAMLD),
which is a regional spin-off from the global Media Legal Defense Initiative (MLDI),
Pirongrong Ramasoota
Zuckerman refers to OSPs ’ role in Internet fi ltering as “ intermediary censorship. ”
45
They have become important choke points for Web users who publish content on
Web servers they do not control. Such censorship is observed in at least three online
political discussion forums that the research team studied in the postcoup period.
These fi ndings are summarized in table 5.6 .
The summary in table 5.6 clearly shows that because a number of smaller Internet
providers rely on them to publish content, OSPs can be powerful entities in controlling online speech. But the same summary also shows that this newer generation of
Internet publishers is savvy enough to circumvent such intermediary fi ltering systems
by exploiting alternative hosting services overseas. While this strategy may not solve
their problem entirely — since the state can still block through URL-fi ltering at the IIG
level — it still suggests that cyber citizens make efforts to redress the problem with
whatever technological options are available.
Campaigning for Local and International Support
Based on interviews with civil society members, their most immediate concern about
Internet fi ltering in Thailand is the new computer crime law. To them, the new law
is more of an effort by the after-coup government to curb threats against national
security and the monarchy, rather than to stop cybercriminality. In response to arrest
cases under this very law, several rights-based groups have campaigned in support of
the arrestees. The most obvious case is that of Chiranuch Premchaiporn, who has been
arrested twice with charges under the same law. (See details about Chiranuch ’ s arrest
in table 5.4.) Because Chiranuch is a member of the prominent online freedom advocacy group — the Thai Netizen Network (TNN)
46 — her case has been continuously
reported in Prachatai (until it was blocked by the emergency decree during the redshirt crisis of March to May 2010) and in other alternative online media including
mailing lists of TNN. Ever since Chiranuch ’ s fi rst arrest in March 2009, campaigns to
support her and Internet freedom, using her case as a rallying point, have been
growing steadily.
First, only the TNN and alliance organizations like Campaign for Popular Media
Reform (CPMR)
47 and Freedom against Censorship Thailand (FACT)
48 joined forces.
Gradually, other local human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) joined
the campaign to free Chiranuch (also known by her nickname Jiew) by submitting an
open letter seeking the immediate dropping of charges against her and dissuading
public prosecutors from pursuing trial. These include the Network of Human Rights
Lawyers, the Project on Legal Environment, and the Association for Civil Rights and
Liberties. Subsequently, the circle grew to more regional participation with the Southeast Asian Press Alliance (SEAPA), Southeast Asian Media Legal Defense (SEAMLD),
which is a regional spin-off from the global Media Legal Defense Initiative (MLDI),