86
Pirongrong Ramasoota
Despite assuming offi ce under unusual circumstances — over doubts regarding his
government ’ s sustainability and amid grievances against government mismanagement
of the 2010 bloody crackdown — Abhisit completed his second year of administration
with powerful backing still intact. In 2011 he was continuing to pursue his proclaimed
goals of national reform and reconciliation.
To a number of observers and political experts, Thailand ’ s wrenching political
struggle over the past few years also boils down to another daunting question — the
fate of the country after the end of the ailing 83-year-old King Bhumibol Adulyadej ’ s
reign. Other than the issues of support for Thaksin and the September 19, 2006, coup ’ s
legitimacy, Thai politics has also been polarized around loyalty to the monarchy. The
right-wing conservatives and pro-status-quo forces in the military and current government, the main core of the network monarchy, are insecure and fearful of what will
happen after the king passes from the scene.
15 During these dubious times, cases of
l è se-majest é , involving prosecution of alleged insults to the immediate royal family,
have dramatically increased. Critics see charges of l è se-majest é as an effective means
to silence dissent, including on the Internet.
Insofar as online political communication is concerned, l è se-majest é has been the
keyword in clamping down alternative viewpoints and in blocking Web sites related
to Thaksin or the UDD (the red shirts). On more than one occasion, Abhisit and the
Democrat-led government publicly announced that any l è se-majest é speech would
not be tolerated offl ine or online. As part of their much-publicized policy to promote
national reconciliation, the Abhisit-chaired cabinet approved a new agency in June
2010 to look after violations of the Computer-Related Offenses Act, in particular to
protect and take care of the royal institution.
16
This complex context is necessary for a nuanced understanding of the Internetfi ltering regime in post-2006-coup Thailand. At least three regulatory elements can be
delineated in this emerging fi ltering scheme: law, architecture, and social norms.
Law, Architecture, and Social Norms: Primary Regulators of the Thai Internet
Filtering Regime
Law, architecture, and social norms are the dominant forms of regulation in Thailand ’ s
post-2006 Internet fi ltering regime. While Internet industry operators play a role, their
regulatory infl uence emanates largely from the enforcement of law.
Law: Computer Crime Law and L è se-Majest é
From September 2006 until the end of 2009, Thailand saw four different governments,
two periods of massive political unrest, persistent insurgency, and an unprecedented
Pirongrong Ramasoota
Despite assuming offi ce under unusual circumstances — over doubts regarding his
government ’ s sustainability and amid grievances against government mismanagement
of the 2010 bloody crackdown — Abhisit completed his second year of administration
with powerful backing still intact. In 2011 he was continuing to pursue his proclaimed
goals of national reform and reconciliation.
To a number of observers and political experts, Thailand ’ s wrenching political
struggle over the past few years also boils down to another daunting question — the
fate of the country after the end of the ailing 83-year-old King Bhumibol Adulyadej ’ s
reign. Other than the issues of support for Thaksin and the September 19, 2006, coup ’ s
legitimacy, Thai politics has also been polarized around loyalty to the monarchy. The
right-wing conservatives and pro-status-quo forces in the military and current government, the main core of the network monarchy, are insecure and fearful of what will
happen after the king passes from the scene.
15 During these dubious times, cases of
l è se-majest é , involving prosecution of alleged insults to the immediate royal family,
have dramatically increased. Critics see charges of l è se-majest é as an effective means
to silence dissent, including on the Internet.
Insofar as online political communication is concerned, l è se-majest é has been the
keyword in clamping down alternative viewpoints and in blocking Web sites related
to Thaksin or the UDD (the red shirts). On more than one occasion, Abhisit and the
Democrat-led government publicly announced that any l è se-majest é speech would
not be tolerated offl ine or online. As part of their much-publicized policy to promote
national reconciliation, the Abhisit-chaired cabinet approved a new agency in June
2010 to look after violations of the Computer-Related Offenses Act, in particular to
protect and take care of the royal institution.
16
This complex context is necessary for a nuanced understanding of the Internetfi ltering regime in post-2006-coup Thailand. At least three regulatory elements can be
delineated in this emerging fi ltering scheme: law, architecture, and social norms.
Law, Architecture, and Social Norms: Primary Regulators of the Thai Internet
Filtering Regime
Law, architecture, and social norms are the dominant forms of regulation in Thailand ’ s
post-2006 Internet fi ltering regime. While Internet industry operators play a role, their
regulatory infl uence emanates largely from the enforcement of law.
Law: Computer Crime Law and L è se-Majest é
From September 2006 until the end of 2009, Thailand saw four different governments,
two periods of massive political unrest, persistent insurgency, and an unprecedented