5 Internet Politics in Thailand after the 2006 Coup
Regulation by Code and a Contested Ideological Terrain
Pirongrong Ramasoota
In 2009, Thailand joined the rank of “ a new enemy of the Internet, ” according to
Reporters Without Borders.
1 This status is ironic, given the fact that the country ’ s name
means “ land of the free ” in Thai. This development marked a signifi cant regress from
a decade earlier when there was no cyber law and no regulator, only open Internet
architecture and freedom as the central norm among fi rst-generation Thai Internet
users. Despite economic doldrums that followed a fi nancial meltdown in 1997,
freedom of expression and freedom of information in Thailand were markedly stable
in the late 1990s.
2 The Thai Internet regulatory landscape gradually shifted, however,
fi rst with the establishment of the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT)
3 in 2002, which introduced the fi rst Internet fi ltering policy, and later
with the passing of the computer crime law in 2007, following the September 2006
military coup that overthrew the country ’ s longest-ruling civilian administration in
modern Thai history.
The period following the 2006 coup saw Thai politics bitterly divided between two
opposing camps: red-shirted supporters
4 of the self-exiled former prime minister,
Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted from power on charges of corruption and for
disloyalty to the crown; and those who back the country ’ s “ network monarchy ”
5 —
a loose alliance of the palace, the military, the ruling Democrat Party, and the People ’ s
Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or the “ yellow shirts. ”
6 This contest has also exhibited
itself in the online sphere as powerful members of the network monarchy exercised
control over Internet communication to maintain political stability while red-shirt
dissidents and their supporters evaded and resisted the control through circumvention
and online civic mobilization. Notably, the new computer crime law has been a potent
force in constraining the behavior of Internet users as well as service providers through
the new regulatory framework it imposes. In the postcoup years, the l è se-majest é
offense — insulting the monarchy — has also been increasingly used to charge anyone
writing or posting material deemed to be defamatory of Thailand ’ s King Bhumibol
Adulyadej or the royal family, and in blocking Internet content or shutting down Web
sites.
Regulation by Code and a Contested Ideological Terrain
Pirongrong Ramasoota
In 2009, Thailand joined the rank of “ a new enemy of the Internet, ” according to
Reporters Without Borders.
1 This status is ironic, given the fact that the country ’ s name
means “ land of the free ” in Thai. This development marked a signifi cant regress from
a decade earlier when there was no cyber law and no regulator, only open Internet
architecture and freedom as the central norm among fi rst-generation Thai Internet
users. Despite economic doldrums that followed a fi nancial meltdown in 1997,
freedom of expression and freedom of information in Thailand were markedly stable
in the late 1990s.
2 The Thai Internet regulatory landscape gradually shifted, however,
fi rst with the establishment of the Ministry of Information and Communication Technology (MICT)
3 in 2002, which introduced the fi rst Internet fi ltering policy, and later
with the passing of the computer crime law in 2007, following the September 2006
military coup that overthrew the country ’ s longest-ruling civilian administration in
modern Thai history.
The period following the 2006 coup saw Thai politics bitterly divided between two
opposing camps: red-shirted supporters
4 of the self-exiled former prime minister,
Thaksin Shinawatra, who was ousted from power on charges of corruption and for
disloyalty to the crown; and those who back the country ’ s “ network monarchy ”
5 —
a loose alliance of the palace, the military, the ruling Democrat Party, and the People ’ s
Alliance for Democracy (PAD), or the “ yellow shirts. ”
6 This contest has also exhibited
itself in the online sphere as powerful members of the network monarchy exercised
control over Internet communication to maintain political stability while red-shirt
dissidents and their supporters evaded and resisted the control through circumvention
and online civic mobilization. Notably, the new computer crime law has been a potent
force in constraining the behavior of Internet users as well as service providers through
the new regulatory framework it imposes. In the postcoup years, the l è se-majest é
offense — insulting the monarchy — has also been increasingly used to charge anyone
writing or posting material deemed to be defamatory of Thailand ’ s King Bhumibol
Adulyadej or the royal family, and in blocking Internet content or shutting down Web
sites.