Citizens 145
63.5 million in the 1970s and 1980s, while that for Sunday editions hit
a high of just over 62.5 million in 1993; by 2017, the estimate for daily
titles was less than 31 million, lower than at any period since the outbreak of the Second World War. The impact on revenue was even more
dramatic – a fall from just over $49 billion in 2004 and 2005 to less
than $16.5 billion in 2017. Significantly, the drop in advertising rates did
not coincide entirely with the decline in print circulations: for a decade
or so after titles such as the Post set up online, they managed to capitalise on advertising in print but also, to a lesser degree, across digital
formats: with the shift of advertising revenue online and the rise of the
digital duopoly, that line of profit would begin to dry up. The website,
washingtonpost.com, had been launched in 1996, but it was not until
2009 that print and online operations were integrated: like many titles,
the Post almost certainly held off such integration because print was its
only real hope of making money from journalism, but by the end of the
first decade of the twenty-first century, print circulation was falling off
a cliff. So dire were the circumstances in 2010 that the Post sold Newsweek to Harman Media for a rumoured $1 following a 38 per cent drop
in revenue between 2007 and 2009,
83
but little seemed to be able to stem
the losses that the newspaper was haemorrhaging. If Graham’s observation was true, that freedom of the press was an expensive business that
required profits to survive, it appeared as though the Post would soon
be consigned to media history books. From 2003 to 2013, 400 editorial
jobs were cut, with final staffing figures of 600 far below the 1,000 plus
team that had run the title in its Watergate heyday.
84
The Post was clearly in decline when, in August, 2013, a potential
new owner emerged: Jeff Bezos. After announcing his intention to acquire the paper, the transaction was completed on October 1 of that
year, ending four generations of ownership by the Graham family. Paul
Farhi, writing in the Post, described it as “a sudden and stunning turn
of events” for the newspaper, an opinion shared by many as news of the
negotiations had not been widely shared.
85
As a “legacy” media organisation, the newspaper had failed to escape the turmoil affecting newspapers more generally, but in the immediate years following the sale, it
was not entirely clear why Bezos was interested in purchasing the title.
In 2016, he revealed that he had paid $250 million for the Post without doing any due diligence,
86
and there was considerable speculation
that the purchase had been a billionaire’s whim. In an interview with
The New York Times, he even indicated his initial scepticism: “I don’t
know anything about the newspaper business.”
87
Yet, an early challenge
seemed to have presented itself as an entrepreneurial one. Bezos had, via
Amazon, entirely disrupted retail and bookselling: would his ownership
of The Washington Post allow him to do the same with the news industry? At the very least, returning the Post to profitability seemed to be
worthwhile as a hobby.
63.5 million in the 1970s and 1980s, while that for Sunday editions hit
a high of just over 62.5 million in 1993; by 2017, the estimate for daily
titles was less than 31 million, lower than at any period since the outbreak of the Second World War. The impact on revenue was even more
dramatic – a fall from just over $49 billion in 2004 and 2005 to less
than $16.5 billion in 2017. Significantly, the drop in advertising rates did
not coincide entirely with the decline in print circulations: for a decade
or so after titles such as the Post set up online, they managed to capitalise on advertising in print but also, to a lesser degree, across digital
formats: with the shift of advertising revenue online and the rise of the
digital duopoly, that line of profit would begin to dry up. The website,
washingtonpost.com, had been launched in 1996, but it was not until
2009 that print and online operations were integrated: like many titles,
the Post almost certainly held off such integration because print was its
only real hope of making money from journalism, but by the end of the
first decade of the twenty-first century, print circulation was falling off
a cliff. So dire were the circumstances in 2010 that the Post sold Newsweek to Harman Media for a rumoured $1 following a 38 per cent drop
in revenue between 2007 and 2009,
83
but little seemed to be able to stem
the losses that the newspaper was haemorrhaging. If Graham’s observation was true, that freedom of the press was an expensive business that
required profits to survive, it appeared as though the Post would soon
be consigned to media history books. From 2003 to 2013, 400 editorial
jobs were cut, with final staffing figures of 600 far below the 1,000 plus
team that had run the title in its Watergate heyday.
84
The Post was clearly in decline when, in August, 2013, a potential
new owner emerged: Jeff Bezos. After announcing his intention to acquire the paper, the transaction was completed on October 1 of that
year, ending four generations of ownership by the Graham family. Paul
Farhi, writing in the Post, described it as “a sudden and stunning turn
of events” for the newspaper, an opinion shared by many as news of the
negotiations had not been widely shared.
85
As a “legacy” media organisation, the newspaper had failed to escape the turmoil affecting newspapers more generally, but in the immediate years following the sale, it
was not entirely clear why Bezos was interested in purchasing the title.
In 2016, he revealed that he had paid $250 million for the Post without doing any due diligence,
86
and there was considerable speculation
that the purchase had been a billionaire’s whim. In an interview with
The New York Times, he even indicated his initial scepticism: “I don’t
know anything about the newspaper business.”
87
Yet, an early challenge
seemed to have presented itself as an entrepreneurial one. Bezos had, via
Amazon, entirely disrupted retail and bookselling: would his ownership
of The Washington Post allow him to do the same with the news industry? At the very least, returning the Post to profitability seemed to be
worthwhile as a hobby.