140 Citizens
per cent for the nearest competitors, Microsoft’s Azure and Google
58
).
As Foer observes, such clear and overt monopolisation of retail was
made possible by the fact that antitrust legislation such as the 1890
Sherman Act and activities by figures such as Thurman Arnold at the
Justice Department’s Antitrust Division were driven by the reasonable
desire to be on the side of the consumer and to prevent cartel’s inflating
prices rather than to enforce diverse competition for its own sake.
59
By keeping prices low, Amazon has been able to take advantage of lax
interventions by US authorities for the past two decades to expand without interruption.
Galloway provides a very neat term to describe another factor which
many commentators have realised contributed to Amazon’s apparently
inexorable rise: “visionary capital”. By promising continuous growth,
immediate profitability became less important to investors than the
continued prospects of future profits from a company that appears almost endless in its ability to extend its market cap. Amazon, like the
other Big Tech players, is able “to attract cheap capital by articulating
a bold vision that is easy to understand”.
60
Indeed, this has led to a
paradox noted by large numbers of commentators. Mou, for example,
remarked in late 2017 that Amazon would never be able to increase
its profits to justify its market capitalisation – and yet that capitalisation continued to grow as Amazon continued to expand. It had already
passed Walmart, previously the most valuable retailer in the world, by
2015; yet while revenue grew to $43 billion in the final quarter of 2017,
net income was still $0.26 billion.
61
Cash flow was more important
than profits, however: in 2016, the company had nearly $16.5 billion
which was constantly ploughed back into acquisitions and further
growth – and the ever- receding horizon of profits tomorrow. From a
stock price of $18 in 1997, Amazon shares were traded at more than
$1,800 dollars each in 2018, leading Forbes to predict in August that
it would be the next trillion-dollar company after Apple, which indeed
happened a month later.
62
After 20 years, Amazon refused to renege on
its disruptive origins: to all intents and purposes, the company remains
what Rocio Summers called an “eternal start-up” driven by its appetite
for growth.
63
Such factors are well known; yet while explaining Amazon’s rise to
becoming one of the most powerful monopolies in the world, they do
not help us understand the impact of the company on journalism. In
one very obvious area – book distribution – Amazon is a monopoly to
the digital duopoly of Google and Facebook considered in Chapter 2,
and unlike both those companies, it has even become involved in media
production via Amazon Prime Video. During the presidency of Trump,
however, Amazon has become important in terms of the public sphere
for one very simple reason: the decision by Jeff Bezos to purchase The
Washington Post in 2013.
per cent for the nearest competitors, Microsoft’s Azure and Google
58
).
As Foer observes, such clear and overt monopolisation of retail was
made possible by the fact that antitrust legislation such as the 1890
Sherman Act and activities by figures such as Thurman Arnold at the
Justice Department’s Antitrust Division were driven by the reasonable
desire to be on the side of the consumer and to prevent cartel’s inflating
prices rather than to enforce diverse competition for its own sake.
59
By keeping prices low, Amazon has been able to take advantage of lax
interventions by US authorities for the past two decades to expand without interruption.
Galloway provides a very neat term to describe another factor which
many commentators have realised contributed to Amazon’s apparently
inexorable rise: “visionary capital”. By promising continuous growth,
immediate profitability became less important to investors than the
continued prospects of future profits from a company that appears almost endless in its ability to extend its market cap. Amazon, like the
other Big Tech players, is able “to attract cheap capital by articulating
a bold vision that is easy to understand”.
60
Indeed, this has led to a
paradox noted by large numbers of commentators. Mou, for example,
remarked in late 2017 that Amazon would never be able to increase
its profits to justify its market capitalisation – and yet that capitalisation continued to grow as Amazon continued to expand. It had already
passed Walmart, previously the most valuable retailer in the world, by
2015; yet while revenue grew to $43 billion in the final quarter of 2017,
net income was still $0.26 billion.
61
Cash flow was more important
than profits, however: in 2016, the company had nearly $16.5 billion
which was constantly ploughed back into acquisitions and further
growth – and the ever- receding horizon of profits tomorrow. From a
stock price of $18 in 1997, Amazon shares were traded at more than
$1,800 dollars each in 2018, leading Forbes to predict in August that
it would be the next trillion-dollar company after Apple, which indeed
happened a month later.
62
After 20 years, Amazon refused to renege on
its disruptive origins: to all intents and purposes, the company remains
what Rocio Summers called an “eternal start-up” driven by its appetite
for growth.
63
Such factors are well known; yet while explaining Amazon’s rise to
becoming one of the most powerful monopolies in the world, they do
not help us understand the impact of the company on journalism. In
one very obvious area – book distribution – Amazon is a monopoly to
the digital duopoly of Google and Facebook considered in Chapter 2,
and unlike both those companies, it has even become involved in media
production via Amazon Prime Video. During the presidency of Trump,
however, Amazon has become important in terms of the public sphere
for one very simple reason: the decision by Jeff Bezos to purchase The
Washington Post in 2013.