Citizens 131
job of presenting alternative ideas, but that the scepticism of conspiracy theorists drives them to seek out alternative sources of information.
Indeed, the notion of these seekers as lazy and gullible does not at all
accord with their sceptical application of criteria to understand underlying causes: that they often make mistakes in applying those criteria
is where such theories often fail. In 2007, 9-11 represented the height
of conspiracy theorising, with strange echo chambers operating across
the Internet aslant to mainstream media and largely operating under
its radar: these micro-public spheres were relatively easily dismissed as
cranks, and while a significant percentage of the population were susceptible to different forms of such conspiracies, none seemed likely to
affect wider political activities.
The changes that took place from 2008 onwards, particularly with
regard to Infowars, were twofold. First, the election of Barack Obama
as the President would eventually shift the attention of Jones and fellow
contributors away from the Bush administration; secondly, transformations in engagement with digital media changed completely the audience
for conspiracy theories. Cohnitz is critical of the value of social media
sites such as Facebook with regard to true conspiracy theorists, arguing
that the echo-chamber conditions of such spaces do not fit well with the
sceptical nature of those seekers.
19
That may very well be true, but in
enabling such echo chambers to speak to thousands, then hundreds of
thousands, and then millions of less sceptical citizens, social media had
a crucial role to play in modifying audiences’ behaviour in the public
sphere. Prior to this, Infowars had largely operated on the fringes of
general media discourse, providing the kind of “citizen journalism” that
a smaller number of radicalised – but not necessarily uncritical – readers
desired and actively sought out.
The response by Infowars to Obama’s election in 2008 did not initially
allocate any special status to the Senator from Illinois: critical remarks
regarding the bailout after his election but prior to his inauguration, such
as those written by Infowars’ editor at large, Paul Joseph Watson, tended
to be more concerned with the wider role of the deep state and the role
of the Federal Reserve,
20
and even in the first year of the new administration, the effects of the global financial crisis drove many of the stories on the site, with occasional doses of 9-11 conspiracy theory thrown
in. Before long, however, stories surrounding Obama’s citizenship (and
thus his legitimacy to be the president) were being widely circulated,
building on previous claims about his real identity as a Muslim that had
surfaced following his election to the Senate in 2004.
21
Beginning with
a call in the National Review by Jim Geraghty to release his birth certificate, the movement disparagingly known as “birtherism” grew into
an attempt to discredit Obama. By 2010, the TexasMonthly noted that
The Alex Jones Show was becoming increasingly popular among conservatives who hated Obama, “capturing the national zeitgeist” with
job of presenting alternative ideas, but that the scepticism of conspiracy theorists drives them to seek out alternative sources of information.
Indeed, the notion of these seekers as lazy and gullible does not at all
accord with their sceptical application of criteria to understand underlying causes: that they often make mistakes in applying those criteria
is where such theories often fail. In 2007, 9-11 represented the height
of conspiracy theorising, with strange echo chambers operating across
the Internet aslant to mainstream media and largely operating under
its radar: these micro-public spheres were relatively easily dismissed as
cranks, and while a significant percentage of the population were susceptible to different forms of such conspiracies, none seemed likely to
affect wider political activities.
The changes that took place from 2008 onwards, particularly with
regard to Infowars, were twofold. First, the election of Barack Obama
as the President would eventually shift the attention of Jones and fellow
contributors away from the Bush administration; secondly, transformations in engagement with digital media changed completely the audience
for conspiracy theories. Cohnitz is critical of the value of social media
sites such as Facebook with regard to true conspiracy theorists, arguing
that the echo-chamber conditions of such spaces do not fit well with the
sceptical nature of those seekers.
19
That may very well be true, but in
enabling such echo chambers to speak to thousands, then hundreds of
thousands, and then millions of less sceptical citizens, social media had
a crucial role to play in modifying audiences’ behaviour in the public
sphere. Prior to this, Infowars had largely operated on the fringes of
general media discourse, providing the kind of “citizen journalism” that
a smaller number of radicalised – but not necessarily uncritical – readers
desired and actively sought out.
The response by Infowars to Obama’s election in 2008 did not initially
allocate any special status to the Senator from Illinois: critical remarks
regarding the bailout after his election but prior to his inauguration, such
as those written by Infowars’ editor at large, Paul Joseph Watson, tended
to be more concerned with the wider role of the deep state and the role
of the Federal Reserve,
20
and even in the first year of the new administration, the effects of the global financial crisis drove many of the stories on the site, with occasional doses of 9-11 conspiracy theory thrown
in. Before long, however, stories surrounding Obama’s citizenship (and
thus his legitimacy to be the president) were being widely circulated,
building on previous claims about his real identity as a Muslim that had
surfaced following his election to the Senate in 2004.
21
Beginning with
a call in the National Review by Jim Geraghty to release his birth certificate, the movement disparagingly known as “birtherism” grew into
an attempt to discredit Obama. By 2010, the TexasMonthly noted that
The Alex Jones Show was becoming increasingly popular among conservatives who hated Obama, “capturing the national zeitgeist” with
