Making an environment 77
which they acted and interacted. These interactions, I will continue to argue,
include various modes of modification or “construction” of conditions in the environments by the organisms themselves.
History, ecology, environment
Information specifies the environment for the observer but that specification, as
I have sought to demonstrate, always obtains with respect to the constitution and
abilities of the organism perceiving and acting within the environment that he
inhabits. Why the organism’s constitution and abilities are shaped the way they
are is the question of historical context, which specifies both the selective pressures to which an organism or a population has been exposed over time, and
hence the processes of adaptation, and the adaptive functions that result from the
selection of those variant forms which have been produced over time. The selective pressures to which an organism or a population are exposed are determined
by no fewer than two factors in conjunction: first, the traits already present in the
organism or population at t 0 , and second, all relevant conditions encountered in
the environment, that is the status and the rate and intensity of changes of those
variables which affect the organism from t 0 onward.
What is not implied here is the assumption that all traits of an organism are
to be viewed as adaptations and that all adaptive traits are a direct and exclusive
product of natural selection. The possibilities are preserved of the existence and
relevance of “spandrels” and “exaptations”. Whereas spandrels are adaptively
neutral, hence function-less, traits that arise as secondary effects of adaptive
ones or are shaped by constraints on form (Gould and Lewontin 1979), exaptations cater for the possibility of adopting existing traits for new functions (Gould
and Vrba 1982).
1
Nonetheless, presuming that complex abilities are ultimately
to be understood as adaptive traits, and that natural selection will have made an
indispensable contribution to shaping them, the Neo-Darwinian view appears
defensible. Even so, the further implication shall be avoided that organisms were
passively exposed to selective pressures that work in analogy to external forces
on inert matter. After all, the organism-environment relation is of a two-way kind,
both in terms of an organism’s abilities to detect and respond to conditions therein
and, more basically, in conditions environment- and organism-bound conditions
affecting each other.
That latter set of relations defines the ecological context for the organism, and
thus how the organism is shaped in his specific constitution and with his specific
abilities, so as to respond to conditions in the environment that he inhabits. An
environment in the sense to be discussed here is marked by two important properties: it is to be considered dynamic on different levels of description (discussed
further in the last section of this chapter), and it is, in a qualified sense, specific
to an organism. Any type of ecological reasoning, from plainly biological to normatively political (the latter of which will not be considered here), will share at
least these two broad characterisations of environments as dynamic and specific,
although different approaches are unlikely to agree on all details.
which they acted and interacted. These interactions, I will continue to argue,
include various modes of modification or “construction” of conditions in the environments by the organisms themselves.
History, ecology, environment
Information specifies the environment for the observer but that specification, as
I have sought to demonstrate, always obtains with respect to the constitution and
abilities of the organism perceiving and acting within the environment that he
inhabits. Why the organism’s constitution and abilities are shaped the way they
are is the question of historical context, which specifies both the selective pressures to which an organism or a population has been exposed over time, and
hence the processes of adaptation, and the adaptive functions that result from the
selection of those variant forms which have been produced over time. The selective pressures to which an organism or a population are exposed are determined
by no fewer than two factors in conjunction: first, the traits already present in the
organism or population at t 0 , and second, all relevant conditions encountered in
the environment, that is the status and the rate and intensity of changes of those
variables which affect the organism from t 0 onward.
What is not implied here is the assumption that all traits of an organism are
to be viewed as adaptations and that all adaptive traits are a direct and exclusive
product of natural selection. The possibilities are preserved of the existence and
relevance of “spandrels” and “exaptations”. Whereas spandrels are adaptively
neutral, hence function-less, traits that arise as secondary effects of adaptive
ones or are shaped by constraints on form (Gould and Lewontin 1979), exaptations cater for the possibility of adopting existing traits for new functions (Gould
and Vrba 1982).
1
Nonetheless, presuming that complex abilities are ultimately
to be understood as adaptive traits, and that natural selection will have made an
indispensable contribution to shaping them, the Neo-Darwinian view appears
defensible. Even so, the further implication shall be avoided that organisms were
passively exposed to selective pressures that work in analogy to external forces
on inert matter. After all, the organism-environment relation is of a two-way kind,
both in terms of an organism’s abilities to detect and respond to conditions therein
and, more basically, in conditions environment- and organism-bound conditions
affecting each other.
That latter set of relations defines the ecological context for the organism, and
thus how the organism is shaped in his specific constitution and with his specific
abilities, so as to respond to conditions in the environment that he inhabits. An
environment in the sense to be discussed here is marked by two important properties: it is to be considered dynamic on different levels of description (discussed
further in the last section of this chapter), and it is, in a qualified sense, specific
to an organism. Any type of ecological reasoning, from plainly biological to normatively political (the latter of which will not be considered here), will share at
least these two broad characterisations of environments as dynamic and specific,
although different approaches are unlikely to agree on all details.