The domains of natural information 69
be detected by R. The definition and extension of domains would then be fully
dependent on R’s perspective, with conditions at the source having at most a limited
bearing on the nature of the informational relations utilised by R. The limitations
of R’s perspective, given that R is a being of a specific constitution, with specific
abilities but limited resources and a limited existence in space and time, do have
an effect on what domains of natural information are used by him. On this level of
analysis, where purposeful creation of information is not considered, the domains
as such are constituted by regularities that may involve the nature and behaviours
of the receiver, but they are not constituted by the receiver. That one signal may
belong to different domains, where those domains may be found to carve up the
world in different ways and to different uses, owes to the applicability of different
but non-contradicting mapping rules to the otherwise observer-independent regularities involved (see NI-5c). For example one rule may circumscribe the domain
of an individual, whereas another defines the domain of the population to which
that individual belongs, so that the latter domain comprises at least some of the
signals pertaining to the individual, too, and vice versa.
Hence moving from mathematical analogy to types of concrete cases, domains
of natural information might be constituted in one of three fundamental ways:
First, informational domains may be results of natural history. A shadow of a
certain shape circling overhead in a particular way conveys information about the
presence of an Andean Condor in the Andes and of a California Condor in the
mountains of the American West, and is unlikely to convey information on the
presence of any species of Condor on the rare occasion of occurring anywhere
in the Alps. Events of speciation, population dynamics, migration and extinction
define whether, where and when a signal of a certain shape matches conditions
at a certain source. The shape itself and its causal relation to the source, taken
by themselves, are insufficient to achieve unequivocality in these respects. As in
the p- vs. q-bird case, an indistinguishable shape could be created by a phenotypically and behaviourally very similar but genealogically rather remote bird.
In order to make use of that information, the consumer would have to stand in a
certain relation to those birds. However, to the extent that California and Andean
Condors are phenotypically and behaviourally very similar to each other while
inhabiting spatially discontinuous but ecologically similar regions, their competitors in the respective regions are not in need, and normally do not have the
means, of distinguishing between the two species. A competing scavenger who
would be moved by the appearance of a such-shaped and thus-moving shadow
to defend his spoils against the Condor (or, more frequently, abandon them, as
Condors are the dominant scavenger in the food chain) or take his presence
as a signal of the presence of carrion nearby would be rather indifferent to the
distinction between California and Andean Condors. The distinction is more
relevant to a field biologist or conservationist surveying Condor populations.
The Condor’s competitor would not be indifferent, however, to the distinction
between a Condor and a behaviourally very different disposed bird, say a predator of minor scavengers like him, mimicking a Condor’s appearance in the sky
with deceptive intent.
be detected by R. The definition and extension of domains would then be fully
dependent on R’s perspective, with conditions at the source having at most a limited
bearing on the nature of the informational relations utilised by R. The limitations
of R’s perspective, given that R is a being of a specific constitution, with specific
abilities but limited resources and a limited existence in space and time, do have
an effect on what domains of natural information are used by him. On this level of
analysis, where purposeful creation of information is not considered, the domains
as such are constituted by regularities that may involve the nature and behaviours
of the receiver, but they are not constituted by the receiver. That one signal may
belong to different domains, where those domains may be found to carve up the
world in different ways and to different uses, owes to the applicability of different
but non-contradicting mapping rules to the otherwise observer-independent regularities involved (see NI-5c). For example one rule may circumscribe the domain
of an individual, whereas another defines the domain of the population to which
that individual belongs, so that the latter domain comprises at least some of the
signals pertaining to the individual, too, and vice versa.
Hence moving from mathematical analogy to types of concrete cases, domains
of natural information might be constituted in one of three fundamental ways:
First, informational domains may be results of natural history. A shadow of a
certain shape circling overhead in a particular way conveys information about the
presence of an Andean Condor in the Andes and of a California Condor in the
mountains of the American West, and is unlikely to convey information on the
presence of any species of Condor on the rare occasion of occurring anywhere
in the Alps. Events of speciation, population dynamics, migration and extinction
define whether, where and when a signal of a certain shape matches conditions
at a certain source. The shape itself and its causal relation to the source, taken
by themselves, are insufficient to achieve unequivocality in these respects. As in
the p- vs. q-bird case, an indistinguishable shape could be created by a phenotypically and behaviourally very similar but genealogically rather remote bird.
In order to make use of that information, the consumer would have to stand in a
certain relation to those birds. However, to the extent that California and Andean
Condors are phenotypically and behaviourally very similar to each other while
inhabiting spatially discontinuous but ecologically similar regions, their competitors in the respective regions are not in need, and normally do not have the
means, of distinguishing between the two species. A competing scavenger who
would be moved by the appearance of a such-shaped and thus-moving shadow
to defend his spoils against the Condor (or, more frequently, abandon them, as
Condors are the dominant scavenger in the food chain) or take his presence
as a signal of the presence of carrion nearby would be rather indifferent to the
distinction between California and Andean Condors. The distinction is more
relevant to a field biologist or conservationist surveying Condor populations.
The Condor’s competitor would not be indifferent, however, to the distinction
between a Condor and a behaviourally very different disposed bird, say a predator of minor scavengers like him, mimicking a Condor’s appearance in the sky
with deceptive intent.