Varieties of perception 55
for example, misperceptions of spatial relations or colours. After all, perception, even
if it can be assessed in terms of measurement of physical variables by an external
observer, does not amount to such measurement by and for the perceiving organism.
This observation will fit rather well with Gibson’s contention that we do not
perceive such abstract relations as space – a contention that grounds his ecological approach (Gibson 1979, 32). It is the ecological environment rather than an
abstractly and formally described physical space that is directly and objectively
given to the organism, and that he acts upon. He is perfectly entitled to get things
wrong in terms of conditions in physical space as long as he gets them right in
terms of the ecology of perception. Still, the ecological environment, despite being
objective in nature, cannot be defined in abstraction from the organism inhabiting
it. He contributes to the informational relations that he uses. His contributions,
if regular in form and adaptive in function, will neither make that information a
subjective affair, nor give rise to the misperception of affordances.
Notes
1 In a revealing passage, Marr (2010, 29) criticises his predecessor and opponent for that
“he did not understand properly what information processing was, which led him to
seriously underestimate the complexity of information-processing problems involved in
vision”. If one is convinced that information is not processed in perception in the first
place, one will hardly feel exposed to the charge of underestimating the complexity of
that processing.
2 The mediation I am alluding to was through the work of Donald Norman (2002), who
applied a rather liberal interpretation to some of Gibson’s core tenets.
3 There is no unequivocal definition of information in Gibson’s 1966 and 1979 books, nor
is there one in his smaller works on information (1960; 1971).
4 Several years prior to the Ecological Approach, Gibson was involved in a debate with
Ernst Gombrich and Rudolf Arnheim on the nature of pictorial representation, in which
the perceptual status of what is pictured in a picture and its recognition was the topic;
see Gibson (1971) and Gombrich et al. (1971). My acknowledgements go out to Alfred
Nordmann for highlighting the subtleties of this debate.
5 I have to thank Brian McLaughlin for introducing me and others to the Empirical Strategy during the workshop “Perception and Knowledge” at the University of Graz, Austria,
in October 2012, and I have to thank Martina Fürst and Guido Melchior, the organisers,
for placing that workshop and McLaughlin’s paper right when and where I needed it.
6 In fact, as Warren (1984, 695) reports, a stairway can be just as exhaustingly gentle, with
low raisers and deep treads, as it can be exhaustingly steep. The perceived gentleness of
ascent may indeed be a common misperception of an affordance.
for example, misperceptions of spatial relations or colours. After all, perception, even
if it can be assessed in terms of measurement of physical variables by an external
observer, does not amount to such measurement by and for the perceiving organism.
This observation will fit rather well with Gibson’s contention that we do not
perceive such abstract relations as space – a contention that grounds his ecological approach (Gibson 1979, 32). It is the ecological environment rather than an
abstractly and formally described physical space that is directly and objectively
given to the organism, and that he acts upon. He is perfectly entitled to get things
wrong in terms of conditions in physical space as long as he gets them right in
terms of the ecology of perception. Still, the ecological environment, despite being
objective in nature, cannot be defined in abstraction from the organism inhabiting
it. He contributes to the informational relations that he uses. His contributions,
if regular in form and adaptive in function, will neither make that information a
subjective affair, nor give rise to the misperception of affordances.
Notes
1 In a revealing passage, Marr (2010, 29) criticises his predecessor and opponent for that
“he did not understand properly what information processing was, which led him to
seriously underestimate the complexity of information-processing problems involved in
vision”. If one is convinced that information is not processed in perception in the first
place, one will hardly feel exposed to the charge of underestimating the complexity of
that processing.
2 The mediation I am alluding to was through the work of Donald Norman (2002), who
applied a rather liberal interpretation to some of Gibson’s core tenets.
3 There is no unequivocal definition of information in Gibson’s 1966 and 1979 books, nor
is there one in his smaller works on information (1960; 1971).
4 Several years prior to the Ecological Approach, Gibson was involved in a debate with
Ernst Gombrich and Rudolf Arnheim on the nature of pictorial representation, in which
the perceptual status of what is pictured in a picture and its recognition was the topic;
see Gibson (1971) and Gombrich et al. (1971). My acknowledgements go out to Alfred
Nordmann for highlighting the subtleties of this debate.
5 I have to thank Brian McLaughlin for introducing me and others to the Empirical Strategy during the workshop “Perception and Knowledge” at the University of Graz, Austria,
in October 2012, and I have to thank Martina Fürst and Guido Melchior, the organisers,
for placing that workshop and McLaughlin’s paper right when and where I needed it.
6 In fact, as Warren (1984, 695) reports, a stairway can be just as exhaustingly gentle, with
low raisers and deep treads, as it can be exhaustingly steep. The perceived gentleness of
ascent may indeed be a common misperception of an affordance.