52 Informational environments
object, in terms of measurable variables, might be essential to correctly perceiving
the object in terms of what can and should be done with it. Hence, the apparent
mismatch between experimentally determined perceptual qualities and measured
physical variables is an epiphenomenon of the operations of properly functioning
mechanisms and may be discounted as such.
Ecological psychologists after Gibson have offered partly similar accounts of
the relation between illusion and misperception. With reference to the Ames’s
distorted room illusion, Sverker Runeson (1988) argues that prima facie illusions
are easily corrected for in the course of perceptual activity, and that, in order
to persist, illusions typically have to be meticulously created and maintained –
which usually does not occur under natural circumstances. Perceptual ambiguity in terms of equivalent configurations in the optic array may be geometrically
possible, but these configurations are either physically impossible or encountered
only in manipulated environments. Either way, Runeson argues, these equivalent
configurations would be informationally irrelevant. Moreover, any residual ambiguity that might get in the way of correctly perceiving affordances is likely to be
mended in the further course of perceptual investigation, and in developing one’s
perceptual skills.
Perceptual learning might allow for correct judgement about some state of
affairs even when an illusion persists, argue John Kennedy and colleagues with
respect to geometric illusions (Kennedy et al. 1992): When presented with two
well-known size illusions (the Jastrow curves and the Sander parallelogram),
transformations of the respective shapes that correspond to perceptual investigation of an object from different angles allowed the majority of the subjects in the
experiments to make correct judgements about the true size ratios between the
shapes – without the size illusion actually being dispelled. One shape still looked
larger than the other but now was known to be of the same size. Although Kennedy et al. (1992) do not make that inference, one should expect that an affordance related to the objects in question would have come to be correctly perceived
despite the persistence of the visual illusion.
An even more direct match between an ecological view and the argument of the
Empirical Strategists is provided by Qin Zhu and Geoffrey Bingham (2011): one
of the most robust natural perceptual illusions is the size-weight illusion, in which
an object will be perceived as being heavier if and when it is smaller than another
object of equal mass. That illusion, the authors seek to demonstrate in an experiment, has a correlate in human subjects’ learning of perceiving throwing affordances in terms of selecting objects for optimal size-weight ratios. These ratios
are correctly chosen by proxy of a biased perceived quality. On the background of
an evolutionary argument, it is concluded that the illusion has a function in terms
of guiding human beings to pick objects that are optimally throw-able over long
distances, which was a highly relevant skill in Palaeolithic hunter-gatherer societies, and which has been identified as an ability as uniquely human as language.
In light of these observations on the possible adaptive functions of mismatches
between measured physical variables and perceptual qualities, should these mismatches still count as instances of misinformation? Given the relation between the
object, in terms of measurable variables, might be essential to correctly perceiving
the object in terms of what can and should be done with it. Hence, the apparent
mismatch between experimentally determined perceptual qualities and measured
physical variables is an epiphenomenon of the operations of properly functioning
mechanisms and may be discounted as such.
Ecological psychologists after Gibson have offered partly similar accounts of
the relation between illusion and misperception. With reference to the Ames’s
distorted room illusion, Sverker Runeson (1988) argues that prima facie illusions
are easily corrected for in the course of perceptual activity, and that, in order
to persist, illusions typically have to be meticulously created and maintained –
which usually does not occur under natural circumstances. Perceptual ambiguity in terms of equivalent configurations in the optic array may be geometrically
possible, but these configurations are either physically impossible or encountered
only in manipulated environments. Either way, Runeson argues, these equivalent
configurations would be informationally irrelevant. Moreover, any residual ambiguity that might get in the way of correctly perceiving affordances is likely to be
mended in the further course of perceptual investigation, and in developing one’s
perceptual skills.
Perceptual learning might allow for correct judgement about some state of
affairs even when an illusion persists, argue John Kennedy and colleagues with
respect to geometric illusions (Kennedy et al. 1992): When presented with two
well-known size illusions (the Jastrow curves and the Sander parallelogram),
transformations of the respective shapes that correspond to perceptual investigation of an object from different angles allowed the majority of the subjects in the
experiments to make correct judgements about the true size ratios between the
shapes – without the size illusion actually being dispelled. One shape still looked
larger than the other but now was known to be of the same size. Although Kennedy et al. (1992) do not make that inference, one should expect that an affordance related to the objects in question would have come to be correctly perceived
despite the persistence of the visual illusion.
An even more direct match between an ecological view and the argument of the
Empirical Strategists is provided by Qin Zhu and Geoffrey Bingham (2011): one
of the most robust natural perceptual illusions is the size-weight illusion, in which
an object will be perceived as being heavier if and when it is smaller than another
object of equal mass. That illusion, the authors seek to demonstrate in an experiment, has a correlate in human subjects’ learning of perceiving throwing affordances in terms of selecting objects for optimal size-weight ratios. These ratios
are correctly chosen by proxy of a biased perceived quality. On the background of
an evolutionary argument, it is concluded that the illusion has a function in terms
of guiding human beings to pick objects that are optimally throw-able over long
distances, which was a highly relevant skill in Palaeolithic hunter-gatherer societies, and which has been identified as an ability as uniquely human as language.
In light of these observations on the possible adaptive functions of mismatches
between measured physical variables and perceptual qualities, should these mismatches still count as instances of misinformation? Given the relation between the