46 Informational environments
malfunction in an organism’s perceptual system, information will still be present
in the environment, as there will be nomologically governed relations between
incoming light, refraction and reflection on surfaces and so forth, but these relations could not, or not properly, be detected by the perceiving organism for reasons internal to him. Hence, the third of the previous requirements, namely that
of being in a condition suitable to picking up information, will be violated. This
condition will be violated in a different manner if modifications or untypical conditions in the environment obtain, to the effect that the relations involved are not
within the range of what is detectable even for a properly functioning perceptual
system despite being nomological in kind.
Perceiving organisms, being finite creatures with finite resources acting within
concrete ecological situations, are in practice not in a position to track all those
specifying relations. Gibson himself admits that information may be inadequate,
impoverished or masked in a given perceptual situation, so that conditions for
perception fall out of the range of variance that an organism is accustomed to
(Gibson 1966, Chapter XIV). Such will be the case when unusual lighting conditions obtain or when distorting mirrors or similar devices are placed in the environment. These qualifications, however, apply to what the perceiving organism
is in a position to pick up from his environment rather than to the specificity of
information as such.
In developing this account of “misrepresentation”, Dretske (1986) seeks to
accommodate for the possibility that an organism might get things wrong despite
informational relations being in proper shape. Under normal conditions, he
receives information on some world affair through several independent channels,
and will be able to evaluate some signal or channel condition and remedy against
what a faulty, information-less signal might seem to convey. Although he carefully avoids information-theoretical talk of “channels”, Gibson apparently holds a
similar view when he refers to information as being redundantly available in the
environment, allowing for “multiple specification” (as paraphrased by Runeson
1988, 296f ). Still, Gibson can be seen struggling with the concept of misperception (see Gibson 1979, 243f ). He accepts that misinformation could still be
information, while he insists that one will need separate theories of successful
and unsuccessful perception respectively (Gibson 1966, 287f ), so the parallel
to Dretske’s (1986) view that a theory of information cannot be symmetrically
applied to cases of misinformation is only partial. Hence, the question arises of
how to account for illusion and misperception if information is an objective commodity and perception is the activity of tracking the relations that make up that
commodity.
Perceptual illusions vs. misperception: the empirical strategy
On some accounts, the possibility of misperception and illusion appears to be a
hard, and possibly insurmountable, problem for an ecological theory of perception (see, first and foremost, Fodor and Pylyshyn 1981, 153–155). A short answer
to this apparent problem is offered in a reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn from the
malfunction in an organism’s perceptual system, information will still be present
in the environment, as there will be nomologically governed relations between
incoming light, refraction and reflection on surfaces and so forth, but these relations could not, or not properly, be detected by the perceiving organism for reasons internal to him. Hence, the third of the previous requirements, namely that
of being in a condition suitable to picking up information, will be violated. This
condition will be violated in a different manner if modifications or untypical conditions in the environment obtain, to the effect that the relations involved are not
within the range of what is detectable even for a properly functioning perceptual
system despite being nomological in kind.
Perceiving organisms, being finite creatures with finite resources acting within
concrete ecological situations, are in practice not in a position to track all those
specifying relations. Gibson himself admits that information may be inadequate,
impoverished or masked in a given perceptual situation, so that conditions for
perception fall out of the range of variance that an organism is accustomed to
(Gibson 1966, Chapter XIV). Such will be the case when unusual lighting conditions obtain or when distorting mirrors or similar devices are placed in the environment. These qualifications, however, apply to what the perceiving organism
is in a position to pick up from his environment rather than to the specificity of
information as such.
In developing this account of “misrepresentation”, Dretske (1986) seeks to
accommodate for the possibility that an organism might get things wrong despite
informational relations being in proper shape. Under normal conditions, he
receives information on some world affair through several independent channels,
and will be able to evaluate some signal or channel condition and remedy against
what a faulty, information-less signal might seem to convey. Although he carefully avoids information-theoretical talk of “channels”, Gibson apparently holds a
similar view when he refers to information as being redundantly available in the
environment, allowing for “multiple specification” (as paraphrased by Runeson
1988, 296f ). Still, Gibson can be seen struggling with the concept of misperception (see Gibson 1979, 243f ). He accepts that misinformation could still be
information, while he insists that one will need separate theories of successful
and unsuccessful perception respectively (Gibson 1966, 287f ), so the parallel
to Dretske’s (1986) view that a theory of information cannot be symmetrically
applied to cases of misinformation is only partial. Hence, the question arises of
how to account for illusion and misperception if information is an objective commodity and perception is the activity of tracking the relations that make up that
commodity.
Perceptual illusions vs. misperception: the empirical strategy
On some accounts, the possibility of misperception and illusion appears to be a
hard, and possibly insurmountable, problem for an ecological theory of perception (see, first and foremost, Fodor and Pylyshyn 1981, 153–155). A short answer
to this apparent problem is offered in a reply to Fodor and Pylyshyn from the