44 Informational environments
and information. Affordances are viewed as properties by some (Heft 2001; Reed
1988; Turvey 1992), as relationally defined by others (Chemero 2003a; 2003b);
information is considered properly external to the organism by few (Reed 1988),
and as organism involving by most others (Chemero 2003b; Costall 2004; Heft
2001; Turvey 1992; 2013; van Dijk et al. 2015).
In particular, Michael Turvey refers to affordances as dispositional properties
of objects that are actualised under a concrete set of conditions, whereas Chemero
(2003a) develops a relational theory of affordances that is complemented by
an equally relational account of information for perception (Chemero 2003b).
Whereas relations exist between entities with certain properties, this does not
entail that these relations are properties themselves. For example John is taller
than Sally. Quite obviously, “being taller than” is not an absolute measure, nor
is there a complex property of taller-than-ness, let alone taller-than-Sally-ness
possessed by John (Chemero 2003a, 187). If we conceive of information as informational relations from the start, we do not incur the ontological challenge of
justifying such complex properties. If perception of an affordance is based on
relations between the ambient energies and structures in the environment, including the perceiving organism himself (Chemero 2003b, 580f ), an affordance is, in
Chemero’s wording, a relational “feature” of entire “situations” of an organism
moving in and through a certain environment. The information picked up in perception does include relations between organism and environment. It specifies
the environment and the self, and hence can be both an objective commodity and
relationally defined.
Under this interpretation at least, Gibsonian information for perception assumes
an appearance quite similar to Dretske’s notion of information. Although he does
not clearly define it as such (and although Fodor and Pylyshyn 1981, 166–167
claim otherwise), Gibson appears to employ a view of information that is similarly realist and relational when he discusses the perceiving organism’s tracking
of the invariants of some object in the environment and the activity of extracting
information from the ambient optic array. If that information is supposed to remain
identical throughout the various instances and situations of perception, it has to
be regular in a fashion that is independent of subjective conditions – even though
the perceiving organism’s position, constitution and abilities will enter into the
set of perceivable relations. As these relations remain stable and unequivocal in
an otherwise changeable environment, he can relate to them in various ways over
time, under variant conditions. Although organism-related variables enter into a
given set of informational relation that he uses, the functional status of his sensory
organs or his degree of attentiveness in a given perceptual situation will not. Only
if the informational relations and their stability can be taken for granted will there
be affordances that are organism specific.
An object affords what it affords because some of its properties remain stable
and reliably detectable in the ambient optic array for the perceiving organism.
They are reliably detectable precisely if there are, first, conditions for perception
which are such that any transformation of the object or its position has strict and
unequivocal correlates in its placement in the ambient optic array. Second, the
and information. Affordances are viewed as properties by some (Heft 2001; Reed
1988; Turvey 1992), as relationally defined by others (Chemero 2003a; 2003b);
information is considered properly external to the organism by few (Reed 1988),
and as organism involving by most others (Chemero 2003b; Costall 2004; Heft
2001; Turvey 1992; 2013; van Dijk et al. 2015).
In particular, Michael Turvey refers to affordances as dispositional properties
of objects that are actualised under a concrete set of conditions, whereas Chemero
(2003a) develops a relational theory of affordances that is complemented by
an equally relational account of information for perception (Chemero 2003b).
Whereas relations exist between entities with certain properties, this does not
entail that these relations are properties themselves. For example John is taller
than Sally. Quite obviously, “being taller than” is not an absolute measure, nor
is there a complex property of taller-than-ness, let alone taller-than-Sally-ness
possessed by John (Chemero 2003a, 187). If we conceive of information as informational relations from the start, we do not incur the ontological challenge of
justifying such complex properties. If perception of an affordance is based on
relations between the ambient energies and structures in the environment, including the perceiving organism himself (Chemero 2003b, 580f ), an affordance is, in
Chemero’s wording, a relational “feature” of entire “situations” of an organism
moving in and through a certain environment. The information picked up in perception does include relations between organism and environment. It specifies
the environment and the self, and hence can be both an objective commodity and
relationally defined.
Under this interpretation at least, Gibsonian information for perception assumes
an appearance quite similar to Dretske’s notion of information. Although he does
not clearly define it as such (and although Fodor and Pylyshyn 1981, 166–167
claim otherwise), Gibson appears to employ a view of information that is similarly realist and relational when he discusses the perceiving organism’s tracking
of the invariants of some object in the environment and the activity of extracting
information from the ambient optic array. If that information is supposed to remain
identical throughout the various instances and situations of perception, it has to
be regular in a fashion that is independent of subjective conditions – even though
the perceiving organism’s position, constitution and abilities will enter into the
set of perceivable relations. As these relations remain stable and unequivocal in
an otherwise changeable environment, he can relate to them in various ways over
time, under variant conditions. Although organism-related variables enter into a
given set of informational relation that he uses, the functional status of his sensory
organs or his degree of attentiveness in a given perceptual situation will not. Only
if the informational relations and their stability can be taken for granted will there
be affordances that are organism specific.
An object affords what it affords because some of its properties remain stable
and reliably detectable in the ambient optic array for the perceiving organism.
They are reliably detectable precisely if there are, first, conditions for perception
which are such that any transformation of the object or its position has strict and
unequivocal correlates in its placement in the ambient optic array. Second, the