Resurrecting Dretskean information 33
of exercising his natural, evolutionary acquired proper functions; see further discussion
on pp. 112–113.
6 With a somewhat different aim in mind, Millikan (2001, 106) suggests that we could
drop the k-condition without any loss if we integrate r into a more complete signal that
includes information about s previously transmitted to the receiver.
7 One socio-political connotation of this interpretation of Dretske’s view will not escape
the attentive reader: it reads like the semantic counterpart to a roughshod conservatism which I would paraphrase as follows: “If you make it in life, it’s because you’re
quite smart, so you deserve it. If you don’t make it, it’s your own fault, so please don’t
blame unfavourable circumstances or, even worse, sinister forces of falsehood conspiring against the honest workingman’s fortunes.” (I am, however, convinced that Dretske
never intended such a parallel.) Compare this to Millikan’s emphasis on the importance
of the environment and her emphasis on the possibility of its uncooperativeness –
and the generally very favourable reception of her theories, albeit mostly on different
grounds, among animal rights activists.
8 The theory of Punctuated Equilibria was introduced by Eldredge and Gould (1972)
and received thorough criticisms from Dawkins (1983, 412–418) and Dennett (1995,
Chapter 10.3). Both authors target the issue of choosing the appropriate time-frame.
The clause “viewed in relation to the time-frame of evolution” is relevant in this context
because, in a trivial sense, everything, even the ignition of a nuclear bomb or the Big
Bang, is a gradual process – if we adjust the time-frame accordingly. The most elementary unit of evolutionary processes are generations of organisms. Definitionally, every
modification that takes n > 1 generations to obtain and does not suddenly appear from
one generation to the next may count as a gradual process in evolutionary terms. Factually, however, even for rather rapid or fairly minor developments, n will normally be
much larger than 1. The Punctuated Equilibria debate concerned the distinction among,
first, a notion of continuous evolution, second, alternating paces with periods of relative
stasis punctuated by processes of relatively rapid change and, third, genuine evolutionary saltation, that is macro-mutation. These are different processes, occurring on different time scales, that should be, but not always are, viewed apart from each other.
9 The term “adaptationist programme” was coined, with critical intent, by Gould and
Lewontin (1979). Fodor’s critique builds on this seminal essay and adds some more
radical tenets to it (which he continues to do in Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini 2010).
For the classical sources of Neo-Darwinian adaptationism adhered to by Dennett, see
Dawkins (1983), Pittendrigh (1958), and Williams (1966); for a qualified and nuanced
defence of adaptationism as a research programme against Gould and Lewontin (1979),
see Sober (1998).
of exercising his natural, evolutionary acquired proper functions; see further discussion
on pp. 112–113.
6 With a somewhat different aim in mind, Millikan (2001, 106) suggests that we could
drop the k-condition without any loss if we integrate r into a more complete signal that
includes information about s previously transmitted to the receiver.
7 One socio-political connotation of this interpretation of Dretske’s view will not escape
the attentive reader: it reads like the semantic counterpart to a roughshod conservatism which I would paraphrase as follows: “If you make it in life, it’s because you’re
quite smart, so you deserve it. If you don’t make it, it’s your own fault, so please don’t
blame unfavourable circumstances or, even worse, sinister forces of falsehood conspiring against the honest workingman’s fortunes.” (I am, however, convinced that Dretske
never intended such a parallel.) Compare this to Millikan’s emphasis on the importance
of the environment and her emphasis on the possibility of its uncooperativeness –
and the generally very favourable reception of her theories, albeit mostly on different
grounds, among animal rights activists.
8 The theory of Punctuated Equilibria was introduced by Eldredge and Gould (1972)
and received thorough criticisms from Dawkins (1983, 412–418) and Dennett (1995,
Chapter 10.3). Both authors target the issue of choosing the appropriate time-frame.
The clause “viewed in relation to the time-frame of evolution” is relevant in this context
because, in a trivial sense, everything, even the ignition of a nuclear bomb or the Big
Bang, is a gradual process – if we adjust the time-frame accordingly. The most elementary unit of evolutionary processes are generations of organisms. Definitionally, every
modification that takes n > 1 generations to obtain and does not suddenly appear from
one generation to the next may count as a gradual process in evolutionary terms. Factually, however, even for rather rapid or fairly minor developments, n will normally be
much larger than 1. The Punctuated Equilibria debate concerned the distinction among,
first, a notion of continuous evolution, second, alternating paces with periods of relative
stasis punctuated by processes of relatively rapid change and, third, genuine evolutionary saltation, that is macro-mutation. These are different processes, occurring on different time scales, that should be, but not always are, viewed apart from each other.
9 The term “adaptationist programme” was coined, with critical intent, by Gould and
Lewontin (1979). Fodor’s critique builds on this seminal essay and adds some more
radical tenets to it (which he continues to do in Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini 2010).
For the classical sources of Neo-Darwinian adaptationism adhered to by Dennett, see
Dawkins (1983), Pittendrigh (1958), and Williams (1966); for a qualified and nuanced
defence of adaptationism as a research programme against Gould and Lewontin (1979),
see Sober (1998).