Resurrecting Dretskean information 31
refusal to accept arguments for naturalising intentionality in Darwinian terms,
and that, unsurprisingly perhaps, explicitly recurs to heterodox, non- adaptationist
strands in contemporary evolutionary reasoning, is provided by Fodor (1996) in a
polemical review of Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995). In contrast to the
“adaptationist programme” (as understood by Fodor but not Dennett, who vigorously defends a different interpretation),
9
natural selection is not a teleological
process in terms of biological traits being selected for, that is selected with respect
to pre-existing criteria of fitness that may not (yet) have a counterpart in real-world
conditions. Even if there were such a teleological element to natural selection,
Fodor continues, that element would not suffice to ground the intentional character
of thought – whereas the teleosemanticist is supposedly committed to believing
that the intentionality of thought is derived, in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions, from some presumed intentionality of natural selection.
Whatever teleology there might be to natural selection, Fodor claims, it cannot,
as a matter of biological fact, consist in being directed towards anything that is
not actual, whereas the intentionality of the mind is characterised by the thoughts
being directed towards real, ideal, prospective, imaginary or other states of affairs
that, on Franz Brentano’s famous definition, specifically and sometimes only
exist in those thoughts (and hence in-exist, 1874, 115f ). Fodor concludes that
there must be something particular about the intentionality of thoughts that is not
covered by a teleological nature of natural selection. This does nothing to speak
against semantic naturalism, since Fodor, like Dretske, not only acknowledges but
endorses the existence of natural representational content. The important qualification is that such content does not exist qua being selected for, but qua determinate natural correlations of the informational kind. Nor is Fodor’s objection
supposed to include the claim that intentional phenomena are not a product of
evolutionary processes, including natural selection. However, he insists that it is
not some intentional character of natural selection that makes them intentional.
Dennett’s reply to this criticism in Dennett (1996) is every bit as instructive as
Fodor’s argument itself: the assumption that there is an element of intentionality
to natural selection is a false allegation, so Fodor’s critique appears to be based on
an utter misreading of his and any serious evolutionist’s work. Dennett insists that
his point was precisely to demonstrate that intentionality and representation can
be derived from processes that do not, and could not, be endowed with these same
characteristics. Not only can teleological structures emerge without a conscious
agent at the wheel, they can also emerge from processes that have no trace of goaldirectedness to them. Goal-directedness begins with biological functions, not with
natural selection, but natural selection is the causal antecedent of all biological
functions, understood as “selected effects”. It also is the historical antecedent of
each individual biological function. The natural information an organism encounters in his environment becomes relevant to the organism only in the light of, and
in relation to, these functions.
On these grounds, Dennett, like Millikan, goes on to claim that there are ever
so slight degrees between the non-intentional and the intentional, in terms of the
evolution of cognitive abilities, that it would be arbitrary to draw a line and decide
refusal to accept arguments for naturalising intentionality in Darwinian terms,
and that, unsurprisingly perhaps, explicitly recurs to heterodox, non- adaptationist
strands in contemporary evolutionary reasoning, is provided by Fodor (1996) in a
polemical review of Dennett’s Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (1995). In contrast to the
“adaptationist programme” (as understood by Fodor but not Dennett, who vigorously defends a different interpretation),
9
natural selection is not a teleological
process in terms of biological traits being selected for, that is selected with respect
to pre-existing criteria of fitness that may not (yet) have a counterpart in real-world
conditions. Even if there were such a teleological element to natural selection,
Fodor continues, that element would not suffice to ground the intentional character
of thought – whereas the teleosemanticist is supposedly committed to believing
that the intentionality of thought is derived, in terms of necessary and sufficient
conditions, from some presumed intentionality of natural selection.
Whatever teleology there might be to natural selection, Fodor claims, it cannot,
as a matter of biological fact, consist in being directed towards anything that is
not actual, whereas the intentionality of the mind is characterised by the thoughts
being directed towards real, ideal, prospective, imaginary or other states of affairs
that, on Franz Brentano’s famous definition, specifically and sometimes only
exist in those thoughts (and hence in-exist, 1874, 115f ). Fodor concludes that
there must be something particular about the intentionality of thoughts that is not
covered by a teleological nature of natural selection. This does nothing to speak
against semantic naturalism, since Fodor, like Dretske, not only acknowledges but
endorses the existence of natural representational content. The important qualification is that such content does not exist qua being selected for, but qua determinate natural correlations of the informational kind. Nor is Fodor’s objection
supposed to include the claim that intentional phenomena are not a product of
evolutionary processes, including natural selection. However, he insists that it is
not some intentional character of natural selection that makes them intentional.
Dennett’s reply to this criticism in Dennett (1996) is every bit as instructive as
Fodor’s argument itself: the assumption that there is an element of intentionality
to natural selection is a false allegation, so Fodor’s critique appears to be based on
an utter misreading of his and any serious evolutionist’s work. Dennett insists that
his point was precisely to demonstrate that intentionality and representation can
be derived from processes that do not, and could not, be endowed with these same
characteristics. Not only can teleological structures emerge without a conscious
agent at the wheel, they can also emerge from processes that have no trace of goaldirectedness to them. Goal-directedness begins with biological functions, not with
natural selection, but natural selection is the causal antecedent of all biological
functions, understood as “selected effects”. It also is the historical antecedent of
each individual biological function. The natural information an organism encounters in his environment becomes relevant to the organism only in the light of, and
in relation to, these functions.
On these grounds, Dennett, like Millikan, goes on to claim that there are ever
so slight degrees between the non-intentional and the intentional, in terms of the
evolution of cognitive abilities, that it would be arbitrary to draw a line and decide