Resurrecting Dretskean information 29
fully fledged propositional knowledge, or even any knowledge, is the product
of the informational relation.
6
The addition to the definition of the parenthetical
and – at least seemingly – optional condition of the presence of knowledge on the
receiver’s side, and the reference to a “suitably placed observer” who “could learn
something about X” by consulting the information conferred by some state of
affairs (Dretske 1981, 45), might distract the reader from the systematic point that
he places at the centre of his inquiry (Dretske 1981, vii): that for natural information to exist, there is no need for interpretive processes that confer meaning upon
a signalled world affair, so that there is no presupposition of a system capable of
delivering such interpretations to be involved in informational processes either.
Receivers of information might be of much more primitive nature than that of
being interpreters or “consumers”. A receiver of information may simply react to
a signal in the most mechanical fashion or simply record it without doing anything
else with it, yet without signals reliably transmitting information about world
affairs, there would be no knowledge and no reference point for meaning. Hence,
in order to keep the distinction clear, Dretske locates the paradigm of information
below not only the level of linguistic forms but also the level of any interpretation
in even the most elementary or rudimentary of semantic terms.
Interpretation of information, on this view, is a higher-level affair, where a signal not only triggers a reaction, but is recognised, consciously or otherwise, as a
bearer of some information. Only on this level, intentionality and error will make
their appearance. The world abounds with information, and the organisms’ task
lies in tapping into this resource, depending on their respective constitution and
abilities. If an organism is unsuccessful in providing himself with reliable information on what is relevant to him, the blame will never lie with the presumed
informational relations as such. If those relations are not reliable, they are not
informational relations in the first place. Instead, the organism’s own misfortunes,
deficiencies or dysfunctions will be the first thing to be held responsible for any
unhappy outcome that ensues.
7
In order to balance for this consumer-unfriendly
bias, Dretske supplements his account of natural information with an elaborate
theory of misrepresentations, as they will occur once we move from the realm of
abstractly defined correlations towards the realm of biological functions of representing these correlations. Fulfilment of these functions may not only be thwarted
by internally caused failures to perform them but also by abnormal conditions in
the environment, Dretske (1986) later admitted – but this does little to undermine
the foundational role of genuinely misrepresentation-free natural information.
What is at issue here is, on a proximate level, the difference between “informational semantics” as proposed by Dretske himself, Jerry Fodor, Dennis Stampe
and other authors, and the “consumer semantics” brought forward by Millikan,
David Papineau, Peter Carruthers, probably also Skyrms and others (see Dretske’s
own account of the distinction in Dretske 2009): although both approaches are
of an externalist kind, the latter authors prefer to locate the meaning of linguistic
signs or other signals ‘downstream’ from the source of information, namely in
its effects on the receiver and his or her behaviours, whereas the former insist on
grounding meaning in the original informational relations at the source.
fully fledged propositional knowledge, or even any knowledge, is the product
of the informational relation.
6
The addition to the definition of the parenthetical
and – at least seemingly – optional condition of the presence of knowledge on the
receiver’s side, and the reference to a “suitably placed observer” who “could learn
something about X” by consulting the information conferred by some state of
affairs (Dretske 1981, 45), might distract the reader from the systematic point that
he places at the centre of his inquiry (Dretske 1981, vii): that for natural information to exist, there is no need for interpretive processes that confer meaning upon
a signalled world affair, so that there is no presupposition of a system capable of
delivering such interpretations to be involved in informational processes either.
Receivers of information might be of much more primitive nature than that of
being interpreters or “consumers”. A receiver of information may simply react to
a signal in the most mechanical fashion or simply record it without doing anything
else with it, yet without signals reliably transmitting information about world
affairs, there would be no knowledge and no reference point for meaning. Hence,
in order to keep the distinction clear, Dretske locates the paradigm of information
below not only the level of linguistic forms but also the level of any interpretation
in even the most elementary or rudimentary of semantic terms.
Interpretation of information, on this view, is a higher-level affair, where a signal not only triggers a reaction, but is recognised, consciously or otherwise, as a
bearer of some information. Only on this level, intentionality and error will make
their appearance. The world abounds with information, and the organisms’ task
lies in tapping into this resource, depending on their respective constitution and
abilities. If an organism is unsuccessful in providing himself with reliable information on what is relevant to him, the blame will never lie with the presumed
informational relations as such. If those relations are not reliable, they are not
informational relations in the first place. Instead, the organism’s own misfortunes,
deficiencies or dysfunctions will be the first thing to be held responsible for any
unhappy outcome that ensues.
7
In order to balance for this consumer-unfriendly
bias, Dretske supplements his account of natural information with an elaborate
theory of misrepresentations, as they will occur once we move from the realm of
abstractly defined correlations towards the realm of biological functions of representing these correlations. Fulfilment of these functions may not only be thwarted
by internally caused failures to perform them but also by abnormal conditions in
the environment, Dretske (1986) later admitted – but this does little to undermine
the foundational role of genuinely misrepresentation-free natural information.
What is at issue here is, on a proximate level, the difference between “informational semantics” as proposed by Dretske himself, Jerry Fodor, Dennis Stampe
and other authors, and the “consumer semantics” brought forward by Millikan,
David Papineau, Peter Carruthers, probably also Skyrms and others (see Dretske’s
own account of the distinction in Dretske 2009): although both approaches are
of an externalist kind, the latter authors prefer to locate the meaning of linguistic
signs or other signals ‘downstream’ from the source of information, namely in
its effects on the receiver and his or her behaviours, whereas the former insist on
grounding meaning in the original informational relations at the source.