8 Preliminaries
Weiser’s work, in turn, is considered visionary in setting the stage for, and coining the term of “ubiquitous computing” (to which he also referred as “embodied
virtuality”). He describes his ideas in hardly less vivid terms than those used by
Turing to illustrate his concept of computing machines:
In our experimental embodied virtuality, doors open only to the right badge
wearer, rooms greet people by name, telephone calls can be automatically
forwarded to wherever the recipient may be, receptionists actually know
where people are, computer terminals retrieve the preferences of whoever is
sitting at them, and appointment diaries write themselves. No revolution in
artificial intelligence is needed, merely computers embedded in the everyday
world. [. . .]
Machines that fit the human environment instead of forcing humans to
enter theirs will make using a computer as refreshing as taking a walk in the
woods.
(Weiser 1991, 99 and 104)
Under this paradigm, human thinking is primarily considered with respect to practical tasks in everyday contexts, and as being mostly implicit in nature. Computer
systems embedded in the environment may unobtrusively assist in such practical, implicit problem solving. Reference to AI is even explicitly avoided. Despite
these apparently humble aims, we encounter machines that accomplish things that
were not anywhere near conceivable as machine accomplishments in Turing’s
day. (Arguably, even Turing himself had other accomplishments in mind.)
Although AI remains a factor in computer science and engineering, and
although computers have not ‘disappeared’ into the background of the environment altogether since Weiser wrote the aforementioned lines, this shift in emphasis is significant. As evidenced by the attention that Brooks’s and Weiser’s works
have received, and continue to receive, this shift in emphasis affects the development both of the cognitive sciences, with AI as one of their founding disciplines,
and of user-oriented computing applications. On either level, human cognitive
abilities will appear in a different light when viewed from the perspective of the
environments in which they develop and unfold.
Outline
On the background of these preliminary observations, the aim of this book can be
parsed into two related questions, which roughly correspond to the two parts of
the text: first, what is the role of the environment, and of the information it provides, in cognition? Second, and more specifically, what role do artefacts play in
this context? Part of my mission will be to demonstrate that the focus on artefacts
in the second question is not an arbitrary narrowing down of the topic but inherent
to the first question – at least as far as human cognition is concerned – and that
this condition continues to hold if I further narrow down my focus on specific
kinds of artefacts.
Weiser’s work, in turn, is considered visionary in setting the stage for, and coining the term of “ubiquitous computing” (to which he also referred as “embodied
virtuality”). He describes his ideas in hardly less vivid terms than those used by
Turing to illustrate his concept of computing machines:
In our experimental embodied virtuality, doors open only to the right badge
wearer, rooms greet people by name, telephone calls can be automatically
forwarded to wherever the recipient may be, receptionists actually know
where people are, computer terminals retrieve the preferences of whoever is
sitting at them, and appointment diaries write themselves. No revolution in
artificial intelligence is needed, merely computers embedded in the everyday
world. [. . .]
Machines that fit the human environment instead of forcing humans to
enter theirs will make using a computer as refreshing as taking a walk in the
woods.
(Weiser 1991, 99 and 104)
Under this paradigm, human thinking is primarily considered with respect to practical tasks in everyday contexts, and as being mostly implicit in nature. Computer
systems embedded in the environment may unobtrusively assist in such practical, implicit problem solving. Reference to AI is even explicitly avoided. Despite
these apparently humble aims, we encounter machines that accomplish things that
were not anywhere near conceivable as machine accomplishments in Turing’s
day. (Arguably, even Turing himself had other accomplishments in mind.)
Although AI remains a factor in computer science and engineering, and
although computers have not ‘disappeared’ into the background of the environment altogether since Weiser wrote the aforementioned lines, this shift in emphasis is significant. As evidenced by the attention that Brooks’s and Weiser’s works
have received, and continue to receive, this shift in emphasis affects the development both of the cognitive sciences, with AI as one of their founding disciplines,
and of user-oriented computing applications. On either level, human cognitive
abilities will appear in a different light when viewed from the perspective of the
environments in which they develop and unfold.
Outline
On the background of these preliminary observations, the aim of this book can be
parsed into two related questions, which roughly correspond to the two parts of
the text: first, what is the role of the environment, and of the information it provides, in cognition? Second, and more specifically, what role do artefacts play in
this context? Part of my mission will be to demonstrate that the focus on artefacts
in the second question is not an arbitrary narrowing down of the topic but inherent
to the first question – at least as far as human cognition is concerned – and that
this condition continues to hold if I further narrow down my focus on specific
kinds of artefacts.