Conceptual analysis and human nature 181
A domain for conceptual analysis
Commencing from a revision of Immanuel Kant’s account of the analytic/ synthetic
distinction (1781, “Einleitung”), the conceptual analyst’s hope was that it would
be possible to ground epistemology by sorting out those statements which are analytically true, that is true by virtue of the meanings of its constituent concepts and
thus by logical necessity, and justified a priori, that is justified independently of
experience, from a variety of other types of statements: those which are synthetic,
that is true only by virtue of how the world stands and thus logically contingently,
and those which are justified only by experience, and hence a posteriori – and
those which Kant considered the genuine domain of metaphysics, namely the
class of synthetic a priori statements. Using Kant’s own examples, the statement
“All bodies are extended” is analytic because the predicate of extendedness is part
the definition of, and thus logically tied to, the term “body”. It is impossible to
think in a logically consistent fashion of something that is a body and not extended
or, to use a contemporary way of expressing this condition, it is true that bodies
are extended in all possible worlds. Typically, a statement that could be tested for
analyticity will have the form of, or be translatable without loss of meaning into,
a universally quantified subject-predicate sentence of the form “All s are F”, so as
to see how the predicate term F relates to the subject term s.
Besides being analytic, the statement “All bodies are extended” is also a priori because one – hypothetically – does not have to consult experience to obtain
knowledge about that conceptual affair. “All bodies” is not equal to “All known
bodies” but “All possible bodies”. In contrast to this first example, the statement
“All bodies are heavy” is synthetic because the predicate of heaviness is not part
the definition of, and thus is not logically tied to, the term “body” (although,
again, “All bodies have mass” would be). “Bodies exist”, in turn, is a synthetic a
posteriori statement, as the concept of a body does not logically contain or entail
its existence, and as we have to consult experience to obtain knowledge about
whether that existential quantification is true – which it is. “All bodies are heavy”
is equally a posteriori but not true, as the property of having weight rather than
mass only obtains in another object’s gravitational field. Or consider the contrast between “All bachelors are unmarried”, which is analytic a priori because
being a bachelor means being unmarried, and “All bachelors are unhappy”, which
is synthetic a posteriori because it is a contingent claim that requires empirical
validation – which will show that it is false. Analyticity and a-prioriness are typically fellow travellers, as are syntheticity and a-posterioriness, whereas synthetic
a priori statements are logically conceivable and the notion of analytic a posteriori
statements is a logical contradiction in terms.
The Kantian and the analytic path of reasoning about concepts parted on the
topic of synthetic a priori statements (see Rey 2015): mathematical propositions
such as “2 + 2 = 4” counted as synthetic a priori statements for Kant, as there is
no conceptual containment relation of “2 + 2” in “4” but a principled knowability
of its truth independent of experience. Kant equalled the possibility of knowledge of
the truth of such statements with the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, in
A domain for conceptual analysis
Commencing from a revision of Immanuel Kant’s account of the analytic/ synthetic
distinction (1781, “Einleitung”), the conceptual analyst’s hope was that it would
be possible to ground epistemology by sorting out those statements which are analytically true, that is true by virtue of the meanings of its constituent concepts and
thus by logical necessity, and justified a priori, that is justified independently of
experience, from a variety of other types of statements: those which are synthetic,
that is true only by virtue of how the world stands and thus logically contingently,
and those which are justified only by experience, and hence a posteriori – and
those which Kant considered the genuine domain of metaphysics, namely the
class of synthetic a priori statements. Using Kant’s own examples, the statement
“All bodies are extended” is analytic because the predicate of extendedness is part
the definition of, and thus logically tied to, the term “body”. It is impossible to
think in a logically consistent fashion of something that is a body and not extended
or, to use a contemporary way of expressing this condition, it is true that bodies
are extended in all possible worlds. Typically, a statement that could be tested for
analyticity will have the form of, or be translatable without loss of meaning into,
a universally quantified subject-predicate sentence of the form “All s are F”, so as
to see how the predicate term F relates to the subject term s.
Besides being analytic, the statement “All bodies are extended” is also a priori because one – hypothetically – does not have to consult experience to obtain
knowledge about that conceptual affair. “All bodies” is not equal to “All known
bodies” but “All possible bodies”. In contrast to this first example, the statement
“All bodies are heavy” is synthetic because the predicate of heaviness is not part
the definition of, and thus is not logically tied to, the term “body” (although,
again, “All bodies have mass” would be). “Bodies exist”, in turn, is a synthetic a
posteriori statement, as the concept of a body does not logically contain or entail
its existence, and as we have to consult experience to obtain knowledge about
whether that existential quantification is true – which it is. “All bodies are heavy”
is equally a posteriori but not true, as the property of having weight rather than
mass only obtains in another object’s gravitational field. Or consider the contrast between “All bachelors are unmarried”, which is analytic a priori because
being a bachelor means being unmarried, and “All bachelors are unhappy”, which
is synthetic a posteriori because it is a contingent claim that requires empirical
validation – which will show that it is false. Analyticity and a-prioriness are typically fellow travellers, as are syntheticity and a-posterioriness, whereas synthetic
a priori statements are logically conceivable and the notion of analytic a posteriori
statements is a logical contradiction in terms.
The Kantian and the analytic path of reasoning about concepts parted on the
topic of synthetic a priori statements (see Rey 2015): mathematical propositions
such as “2 + 2 = 4” counted as synthetic a priori statements for Kant, as there is
no conceptual containment relation of “2 + 2” in “4” but a principled knowability
of its truth independent of experience. Kant equalled the possibility of knowledge of
the truth of such statements with the possibility of metaphysical knowledge, in