The intelligence of environments 177
human-likeness is conveyed in such interactions remains partial in a way that
allows for uncomfortably surprising experiences of un-likeness. These conditions
leave some room for uncertainty in the human counterpart about what kind of
being he or she is interacting with. As long as there is no strategy of disambiguation that involves the robots and agents themselves, these beings will exist in a
state of suspended or partial sociality. A certain mode of perceiving and treating
them might emerge over time, but there is no clear path or predictable goal. The
further development of these technologies and the degree of pervasiveness they
assume will be factors in the emergence of a less suspended and more clearly
defined state of affairs.
For all examples involving human interaction, it can be said that, where human
agents encounter stubborn informational ambiguities in their environments, and
where these ambiguities concern relevant environmental variables, they will, by
acting under and towards these conditions so as to achieve some degree of disambiguation, effectively modify the framework of reference for that interaction.
They will hence accommodate those changes where possible and adapt to them
where necessary. Partly in allusion to the biological and juridical meanings of the
term respectively, namely of being adopted in a new environment as an organism
and of assuming citizenship of one’s host country, and partly in reference to the
use of that term in philosophy, I chose to call this latter kind of process one of
“naturalisation”. If naturalism is true, and if we are natural beings involved in the
business of dealing with conditions in environments as we encounter them, naturalisation is not merely something that we are subject to. It is also something that
we do, and it is, at root, the other face of one and the same process.
Naturalisation, in this context, means trying to integrate the unfamiliar beings
and environments one encounters into a common framework of knowledge about,
and expectations towards, how environments and other agents behave. This does
not necessarily mean that those beings are treated like any conventional social
actor, that is like other human beings under all circumstances, nor that the environment is treated as a natural environment. More often, it means treating them
in a manner that tests the boundaries of commonly shared expectations, so as to
assign to them a place within the cognitive and practical order that one has come
to know as his or her familiar environment. The domains of information on which
one relies are tentatively adjusted, as are the channels through which information
is transmitted and the conditions under which something is taken to be information. Thus, any human-like signal emanating from a human or a machine would
henceforth only convey information about the presence of a human-or-machine,
either asking for additional cues by which to make that information unequivocal,
or asking for the domain of that information to be modified so as to accommodate
the presence of the machines.
As the examples discussed in this chapter suggest that the complexity of
technological modifications of human informational environments is increasing proportionally to the capabilities of the artefacts involved, the number and
complexity of ways of accommodating these modifications should be expected to
increase, too. Returning to the opening quote of this book, when Herbert Simon
human-likeness is conveyed in such interactions remains partial in a way that
allows for uncomfortably surprising experiences of un-likeness. These conditions
leave some room for uncertainty in the human counterpart about what kind of
being he or she is interacting with. As long as there is no strategy of disambiguation that involves the robots and agents themselves, these beings will exist in a
state of suspended or partial sociality. A certain mode of perceiving and treating
them might emerge over time, but there is no clear path or predictable goal. The
further development of these technologies and the degree of pervasiveness they
assume will be factors in the emergence of a less suspended and more clearly
defined state of affairs.
For all examples involving human interaction, it can be said that, where human
agents encounter stubborn informational ambiguities in their environments, and
where these ambiguities concern relevant environmental variables, they will, by
acting under and towards these conditions so as to achieve some degree of disambiguation, effectively modify the framework of reference for that interaction.
They will hence accommodate those changes where possible and adapt to them
where necessary. Partly in allusion to the biological and juridical meanings of the
term respectively, namely of being adopted in a new environment as an organism
and of assuming citizenship of one’s host country, and partly in reference to the
use of that term in philosophy, I chose to call this latter kind of process one of
“naturalisation”. If naturalism is true, and if we are natural beings involved in the
business of dealing with conditions in environments as we encounter them, naturalisation is not merely something that we are subject to. It is also something that
we do, and it is, at root, the other face of one and the same process.
Naturalisation, in this context, means trying to integrate the unfamiliar beings
and environments one encounters into a common framework of knowledge about,
and expectations towards, how environments and other agents behave. This does
not necessarily mean that those beings are treated like any conventional social
actor, that is like other human beings under all circumstances, nor that the environment is treated as a natural environment. More often, it means treating them
in a manner that tests the boundaries of commonly shared expectations, so as to
assign to them a place within the cognitive and practical order that one has come
to know as his or her familiar environment. The domains of information on which
one relies are tentatively adjusted, as are the channels through which information
is transmitted and the conditions under which something is taken to be information. Thus, any human-like signal emanating from a human or a machine would
henceforth only convey information about the presence of a human-or-machine,
either asking for additional cues by which to make that information unequivocal,
or asking for the domain of that information to be modified so as to accommodate
the presence of the machines.
As the examples discussed in this chapter suggest that the complexity of
technological modifications of human informational environments is increasing proportionally to the capabilities of the artefacts involved, the number and
complexity of ways of accommodating these modifications should be expected to
increase, too. Returning to the opening quote of this book, when Herbert Simon