150 Environments of intelligence
interaction between the capacities of the artefact and human purposes and abilities
on constitutive W and, sometimes, constitutive S levels.
With that caveat in mind, I will now turn to selected examples of contemporary
cognitive artefacts, and try to analyse their properties in the light of the concept
of informational environments introduced earlier, so as to identify the informational relations they bear to these environments, using the convergence/isomorphism distinction established towards the end of Chapter 8 where applicable.
These examples will, for the most part, be introduced in illustrative manner rather
than having the character of proper empirical studies. One participant observation
and interviews with nine computer scientists, engineers and ergonomists are the
modest empirical grounding for the discussion of some examples.
1
Interviewees
were based at the Institute for Cognitive Systems (ICS), the Intelligent Autonomous Systems Group (IAS), the Augmented Reality Research Group (FAR), the
Chair of Ergonomics (LFE) and the Institute of Micro Technology and Medical Device Technology (MIMED), all at Technical University of Munich (TUM).
Interviews are referenced by department acronym, counter and year, for example
“LFE-a-2015”.
The sample presented here will not be representative of all advances that are
being made in cognition-related information technologies. Nor will the examples
chosen capture more than a few moments in time of the many, and often rapid,
developments within a variety of fields of science and technology. The descriptions and analyses will certainly look dated within a few years’ time, with a slim
chance of having an afterlife as interesting contributions to the history of science
and technology.
Still, the examples chosen should give an idea of recent approaches to systems that create or modify informational environments and that are capable of
tracking variables in these environments, in some cases including the activities of
their human users. Not every example will meet these specifications to the same
extent, and in the same way. Some of the systems are not made to interact with
human beings, while developing functional analogies to organic adaptations to
their environment (evolutionary and cognitive robotics). Some of the systems
under investigation create closed informational environments, whereas others create open informational environments (Second Life and Mobile Massive Multiplayer Online Games respectively, henceforth referenced as SL and MMMOG).
One will expressly strive for human-likeness of the machine counterpart of an
interaction (social robotics and embodied conversational agents), one will do so in
less unequivocal fashion (SL), whereas all others will not. Some are simulational
in character (SL), whereas others are only partly so, in intriguing ways (especially
Augmented Reality, henceforth referenced as AR, but also MMMOG) – but the
distinction between “simulated” or “virtual” and “embodied” will turn out to be
less sharp than expected to begin with. Some are readily classifiable as cognitive artefacts (AR in particular, but also conversational agents), whereas others
are not. Some belong to the realm of fundamental research (especially evolutionary and cognitive robotics, but partly also social robotics), some to the realm of
emerging technologies (embodied conversational agents and AR) and some to the
interaction between the capacities of the artefact and human purposes and abilities
on constitutive W and, sometimes, constitutive S levels.
With that caveat in mind, I will now turn to selected examples of contemporary
cognitive artefacts, and try to analyse their properties in the light of the concept
of informational environments introduced earlier, so as to identify the informational relations they bear to these environments, using the convergence/isomorphism distinction established towards the end of Chapter 8 where applicable.
These examples will, for the most part, be introduced in illustrative manner rather
than having the character of proper empirical studies. One participant observation
and interviews with nine computer scientists, engineers and ergonomists are the
modest empirical grounding for the discussion of some examples.
1
Interviewees
were based at the Institute for Cognitive Systems (ICS), the Intelligent Autonomous Systems Group (IAS), the Augmented Reality Research Group (FAR), the
Chair of Ergonomics (LFE) and the Institute of Micro Technology and Medical Device Technology (MIMED), all at Technical University of Munich (TUM).
Interviews are referenced by department acronym, counter and year, for example
“LFE-a-2015”.
The sample presented here will not be representative of all advances that are
being made in cognition-related information technologies. Nor will the examples
chosen capture more than a few moments in time of the many, and often rapid,
developments within a variety of fields of science and technology. The descriptions and analyses will certainly look dated within a few years’ time, with a slim
chance of having an afterlife as interesting contributions to the history of science
and technology.
Still, the examples chosen should give an idea of recent approaches to systems that create or modify informational environments and that are capable of
tracking variables in these environments, in some cases including the activities of
their human users. Not every example will meet these specifications to the same
extent, and in the same way. Some of the systems are not made to interact with
human beings, while developing functional analogies to organic adaptations to
their environment (evolutionary and cognitive robotics). Some of the systems
under investigation create closed informational environments, whereas others create open informational environments (Second Life and Mobile Massive Multiplayer Online Games respectively, henceforth referenced as SL and MMMOG).
One will expressly strive for human-likeness of the machine counterpart of an
interaction (social robotics and embodied conversational agents), one will do so in
less unequivocal fashion (SL), whereas all others will not. Some are simulational
in character (SL), whereas others are only partly so, in intriguing ways (especially
Augmented Reality, henceforth referenced as AR, but also MMMOG) – but the
distinction between “simulated” or “virtual” and “embodied” will turn out to be
less sharp than expected to begin with. Some are readily classifiable as cognitive artefacts (AR in particular, but also conversational agents), whereas others
are not. Some belong to the realm of fundamental research (especially evolutionary and cognitive robotics, but partly also social robotics), some to the realm of
emerging technologies (embodied conversational agents and AR) and some to the