144 Environments of intelligence
environment in mind, anyone using the simulation via an interface that allows
for a high degree of naturalness of interaction will use the same visual cues as he
or she would use in a real environment in order to orient himself or herself and
pick up information on objects and events. However, there will be no such natural
environment from which to pick up any information, but a mostly iconic representation of such an environment that serves as the information source. Under
these conditions, the user will use a subset of an analogue of the cues that he
or she would use in a natural environment, and he or she will pick up information on analogues of objects and events that he or she would encounter a natural
environment.
A paradigm of such a simulated environment is a flight simulator, whose purpose is to give pilots a realistic impression of the experience of flying an aeroplane. Events within the flight simulation call for operations on the simulation’s
controls that are, in their effects on that simulation, analogous to the effects of
the same operations in the flight that is being simulated. Hence, the simulator
environment is equipped with a cockpit with displays and controls that are all
tied to the simulated conditions in such a fashion as to produce a partial, but
in the selected aspects credible or even near-perfect, replica of the experience
of flying an aeroplane. Pushing the lever connected to the simulated elevator
too far will result in a simulated nose-dive, which might be displayed to the
pilot in some richness of detail, and to which he can react by further simulated
manoeuvres that map onto their real-world counterparts analogously. Neither the
physical or functional structure of an aeroplane will have to be reproduced for
this purpose nor, of course, the physical effects of handling or mishandling an
in-flight routine.
In simulated environments of this kind, the primary change involved does not
concern the mechanisms of information uptake (e 1) but the creation of a selfcontained and well-ordered domain of informational relations. In a simulated
environment, there might be no information on concrete conditions at some individual source in a concrete target environment, that is the environment that is being
simulated. Concerning the possible alteration of the informational environment
(e 3), the situation is intriguing: on the one hand, the simulation does not present
natural information to me, as the reference of the displays and controls is purely
internal, directed towards and contained within the simulated environment. In
this respect, there is no common reference point in concrete natural informational
relations with respect to which there could be a change. Hence, the condition of
convergence (DS-1) cannot be met. On the other hand, the pilot using the simulation will become part of an environment that, although being thus self-contained,
is supposed to faithfully represent a selection of features of a natural environment,
that is it will represent key aspects of a real aeroplane being really flown by a real
pilot. The relations between the appearance of the simulated elements and the
pilot’s operations on them, purely internal as they may be, have to match types of
relations that would hold in a real environment. A picturing relation of the iconic
kind, as discussed earlier, enriched with some indexical elements and interactive
opportunities, will be the aim.
environment in mind, anyone using the simulation via an interface that allows
for a high degree of naturalness of interaction will use the same visual cues as he
or she would use in a real environment in order to orient himself or herself and
pick up information on objects and events. However, there will be no such natural
environment from which to pick up any information, but a mostly iconic representation of such an environment that serves as the information source. Under
these conditions, the user will use a subset of an analogue of the cues that he
or she would use in a natural environment, and he or she will pick up information on analogues of objects and events that he or she would encounter a natural
environment.
A paradigm of such a simulated environment is a flight simulator, whose purpose is to give pilots a realistic impression of the experience of flying an aeroplane. Events within the flight simulation call for operations on the simulation’s
controls that are, in their effects on that simulation, analogous to the effects of
the same operations in the flight that is being simulated. Hence, the simulator
environment is equipped with a cockpit with displays and controls that are all
tied to the simulated conditions in such a fashion as to produce a partial, but
in the selected aspects credible or even near-perfect, replica of the experience
of flying an aeroplane. Pushing the lever connected to the simulated elevator
too far will result in a simulated nose-dive, which might be displayed to the
pilot in some richness of detail, and to which he can react by further simulated
manoeuvres that map onto their real-world counterparts analogously. Neither the
physical or functional structure of an aeroplane will have to be reproduced for
this purpose nor, of course, the physical effects of handling or mishandling an
in-flight routine.
In simulated environments of this kind, the primary change involved does not
concern the mechanisms of information uptake (e 1) but the creation of a selfcontained and well-ordered domain of informational relations. In a simulated
environment, there might be no information on concrete conditions at some individual source in a concrete target environment, that is the environment that is being
simulated. Concerning the possible alteration of the informational environment
(e 3), the situation is intriguing: on the one hand, the simulation does not present
natural information to me, as the reference of the displays and controls is purely
internal, directed towards and contained within the simulated environment. In
this respect, there is no common reference point in concrete natural informational
relations with respect to which there could be a change. Hence, the condition of
convergence (DS-1) cannot be met. On the other hand, the pilot using the simulation will become part of an environment that, although being thus self-contained,
is supposed to faithfully represent a selection of features of a natural environment,
that is it will represent key aspects of a real aeroplane being really flown by a real
pilot. The relations between the appearance of the simulated elements and the
pilot’s operations on them, purely internal as they may be, have to match types of
relations that would hold in a real environment. A picturing relation of the iconic
kind, as discussed earlier, enriched with some indexical elements and interactive
opportunities, will be the aim.