2 Preliminaries
The second of the aforementioned readings may seem somewhat untypical for
what one expects from a pioneer of classical AI. Viewed in the light of that reading, Simon’s hypothesis even appears to anticipate some of the core tenets of what
has come to be labelled “active externalism” in the philosophy of mind, and the
“4E” set of doctrines that flow from it, namely extended, embedded, enactive and
embodied cognition.
1
Nonetheless, Simon remained committed to the notion of
computational models of cognitive processes, as heralded by AI.
If we follow the second reading of Simon’s hypothesis, human cognitive accomplishments do not appear unfairly depreciated but rich and complex in kind. That
richness, however, depends first on the richness of the information available in human
environments. Second, it depends on the richness of informational relations that
human beings are actually in a position to exploit, in perception and action, within
those environments. Only if these conditions are in place, human cognitive traits may
also comprise representational capacities that finally, but still only partially, transcend
the bounds of what the environment provides. This ranking is one of causal and, in
terms of the evolution of cognition, historical priority. It does nothing to deny the
importance of the ‘internal’ component of cognition, but makes the richness that there
is to the mental life of human beings dependent on factors that are not in our heads.
In this book, I will try to develop a perspective on how Simon’s insight into the
cognitive importance of the environment and the information provided by that environment could be accounted for in general, and what implications this analysis will
have for an account of information-providing artefacts like the ones referred to in
the earlier quote. In doing so, I will have made a statement on the accomplishments
of AI and the cognitive sciences with respect to what are important components of
cognitive processes. However, that statement, unlike the Weizenbaum – Searle –
Dreyfus continuum of fundamental critiques of AI, neither dares to dictate solutions
to the problems that AI and the cognitive sciences have to deal with nor lectures
them about the ultimate futility of their endeavours. In order to provide the reader
with an idea of what follows in the two parts of this book, I will first sketch the
backdrop against which I develop my approach, and then outline my argument.
Background
The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call
the ‘imitation game.’ It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and
an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart
front the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine
which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. [. . .]
We now ask the question, ‘What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in
this game?’ Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played
like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These
questions replace our original, ‘Can machines think?’ [. . .]
The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between the
physical and the intellectual capacities of a man.
(Turing 1950, 433f )
The second of the aforementioned readings may seem somewhat untypical for
what one expects from a pioneer of classical AI. Viewed in the light of that reading, Simon’s hypothesis even appears to anticipate some of the core tenets of what
has come to be labelled “active externalism” in the philosophy of mind, and the
“4E” set of doctrines that flow from it, namely extended, embedded, enactive and
embodied cognition.
1
Nonetheless, Simon remained committed to the notion of
computational models of cognitive processes, as heralded by AI.
If we follow the second reading of Simon’s hypothesis, human cognitive accomplishments do not appear unfairly depreciated but rich and complex in kind. That
richness, however, depends first on the richness of the information available in human
environments. Second, it depends on the richness of informational relations that
human beings are actually in a position to exploit, in perception and action, within
those environments. Only if these conditions are in place, human cognitive traits may
also comprise representational capacities that finally, but still only partially, transcend
the bounds of what the environment provides. This ranking is one of causal and, in
terms of the evolution of cognition, historical priority. It does nothing to deny the
importance of the ‘internal’ component of cognition, but makes the richness that there
is to the mental life of human beings dependent on factors that are not in our heads.
In this book, I will try to develop a perspective on how Simon’s insight into the
cognitive importance of the environment and the information provided by that environment could be accounted for in general, and what implications this analysis will
have for an account of information-providing artefacts like the ones referred to in
the earlier quote. In doing so, I will have made a statement on the accomplishments
of AI and the cognitive sciences with respect to what are important components of
cognitive processes. However, that statement, unlike the Weizenbaum – Searle –
Dreyfus continuum of fundamental critiques of AI, neither dares to dictate solutions
to the problems that AI and the cognitive sciences have to deal with nor lectures
them about the ultimate futility of their endeavours. In order to provide the reader
with an idea of what follows in the two parts of this book, I will first sketch the
backdrop against which I develop my approach, and then outline my argument.
Background
The new form of the problem can be described in terms of a game which we call
the ‘imitation game.’ It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and
an interrogator (C) who may be of either sex. The interrogator stays in a room apart
front the other two. The object of the game for the interrogator is to determine
which of the other two is the man and which is the woman. [. . .]
We now ask the question, ‘What will happen when a machine takes the part of A in
this game?’ Will the interrogator decide wrongly as often when the game is played
like this as he does when the game is played between a man and a woman? These
questions replace our original, ‘Can machines think?’ [. . .]
The new problem has the advantage of drawing a fairly sharp line between the
physical and the intellectual capacities of a man.
(Turing 1950, 433f )