134 Environments of intelligence
nonetheless directly, what is depicted. (Even language, on her account, allows for
direct perception of the subject matter of some utterance.) It will be a relatively
straightforward matter to keep track of the transformations of the mapping relations for cases such as the photographer’s view of the scene from the mountain on
which the picture was taken vs. my view of the scene as it is now pictured in the
book on my table. Keeping track of the transformations will, however, be more
difficult for more abstract ways of depicting world affairs, where there is no obvious way of anchoring the transformations of the mapping relation in such a thing
as an original view of a scene. Besides some concept of the target, a concept of the
required transformations will have to be in place.
Among these three conditions – suitable selection of information, availability
of contextual information for filling in the missing information and knowledge
about the required transformations of the mapping relations – the latter two might
suggest that perception of pictorial forms is mediated through theoretical concepts
and hence indirect. Although there undeniably is a level of conceptual mediation
to this kind of perception, that fact neither provides a criterion of demarcation
from direct visual perception of natural objects and scenes, nor does it imply an
indirectness of perception of pictorial forms. If all three conditions are fulfilled,
the information about the target that is contained in the picture will be preserved,
and hence be perceivable to the observer. It is the informational limitations and
de-contextualisation of pictorial forms that will affect all kinds of pictures, but
these limitations as such do not make the reference of the pictures indirect. What
will be required is the filling-in of contextual information and the application of
transformations of the mapping relations, which amounts to conceptual mediations. Once, however, these mediations are firmly in place – which may require
learning how to look at a certain picture or kind of picture – information uptake
may become quite direct, so that one will be entitled to say: “Das Bild sagt mir
also sich selbst” (Wittgenstein 1969, IX, 115).
However, what mediation implies is, first, that a picture, like a linguistic item
but unlike an instance of misperceiving a natural object or scene, might guide us
with respect to things that do not exist without necessarily losing its referential
character, and without necessarily amounting to an artfully created illusion. A picture of a band of unicorns at double sunset on a distant world, although neither that
world nor those animals may exist, will still preserve some of the information that
would have been present in that scene if it existed. At the same instance, it will be
clear to the observer that the animals, the hills on which they roam and the two
suns are not constituents of his environment.
Second, there might be considerable variation between different observers in
terms of available contextual information and knowledge of the required transformations of mapping relations, and there might be no obvious and unequivocal way
of mending it: is the picture in question a photograph taken during my vacation for
private use, is it a painting of a person or place that can be assumed to be known
to a collective of people, or is it a map or pictogram designed for public use? Is
the other observer of a visualisation of the hydrogen bomb core simulation versed
enough in nuclear physics to see the importance of the change in the target at t n ?
nonetheless directly, what is depicted. (Even language, on her account, allows for
direct perception of the subject matter of some utterance.) It will be a relatively
straightforward matter to keep track of the transformations of the mapping relations for cases such as the photographer’s view of the scene from the mountain on
which the picture was taken vs. my view of the scene as it is now pictured in the
book on my table. Keeping track of the transformations will, however, be more
difficult for more abstract ways of depicting world affairs, where there is no obvious way of anchoring the transformations of the mapping relation in such a thing
as an original view of a scene. Besides some concept of the target, a concept of the
required transformations will have to be in place.
Among these three conditions – suitable selection of information, availability
of contextual information for filling in the missing information and knowledge
about the required transformations of the mapping relations – the latter two might
suggest that perception of pictorial forms is mediated through theoretical concepts
and hence indirect. Although there undeniably is a level of conceptual mediation
to this kind of perception, that fact neither provides a criterion of demarcation
from direct visual perception of natural objects and scenes, nor does it imply an
indirectness of perception of pictorial forms. If all three conditions are fulfilled,
the information about the target that is contained in the picture will be preserved,
and hence be perceivable to the observer. It is the informational limitations and
de-contextualisation of pictorial forms that will affect all kinds of pictures, but
these limitations as such do not make the reference of the pictures indirect. What
will be required is the filling-in of contextual information and the application of
transformations of the mapping relations, which amounts to conceptual mediations. Once, however, these mediations are firmly in place – which may require
learning how to look at a certain picture or kind of picture – information uptake
may become quite direct, so that one will be entitled to say: “Das Bild sagt mir
also sich selbst” (Wittgenstein 1969, IX, 115).
However, what mediation implies is, first, that a picture, like a linguistic item
but unlike an instance of misperceiving a natural object or scene, might guide us
with respect to things that do not exist without necessarily losing its referential
character, and without necessarily amounting to an artfully created illusion. A picture of a band of unicorns at double sunset on a distant world, although neither that
world nor those animals may exist, will still preserve some of the information that
would have been present in that scene if it existed. At the same instance, it will be
clear to the observer that the animals, the hills on which they roam and the two
suns are not constituents of his environment.
Second, there might be considerable variation between different observers in
terms of available contextual information and knowledge of the required transformations of mapping relations, and there might be no obvious and unequivocal way
of mending it: is the picture in question a photograph taken during my vacation for
private use, is it a painting of a person or place that can be assumed to be known
to a collective of people, or is it a map or pictogram designed for public use? Is
the other observer of a visualisation of the hydrogen bomb core simulation versed
enough in nuclear physics to see the importance of the change in the target at t n ?