126 Environments of intelligence
shape of explicit representations. Thus, the next remarkable development, again
in phylogenetic terms, does not as much lie in an extension of cognition into the
environment as it lies in the internalisation of some of the guidance that would
otherwise be directly provided by the environment. Externalisation reappears on
the level of artefacts that are used for cognitive functions in such a way as to reinstantiate environmental guidance on a higher level.
On the other hand, the purposeful creation and appropriation of cognitive
resources fosters their (partial) detachment from a present, imminent or otherwise
predetermined practical use. In turn, however, the use of these artificial resources,
once it has been properly learned, and if it functions smoothly, normally is quite as
direct, implicit and automatic as in the more basic cases. One may pause to reflect
on the information taken up from the environment, and one may then either resort
to other sources of information or store away that information for later use. However, doing so remains a special case mostly reserved for instances of interference
or error, and for (re-) assessing the goals of one’s actions. In a familiar and wellbehaved environment, the natural and artificial features of that environment will
equally provide direct guidance.
Language has the intriguing property of essentially involving both artefacts
and internal mechanisms in order to perform its functions. It is at once rooted in
evolution and in the history of artefact use. More specifically, it has been argued,
most prominently by Terrence Deacon (1997), that language co-evolved with the
human brain and its capability of symbolic reference. Deacon takes language to
be a structure whose properties and reproduction within language communities
are in a straightforwardly evolutionary way interdependent with the properties
particular to the human brain. The complexity and the adaptive functions of the
human mind have as one of the necessary conditions of their emergence and present functioning the development and use of linguistic structures. The intra- and
extra-somatic mechanisms for the production of linguistic items are tightly integrated with each other. Neither mechanism would be present nor could it function
in absence of the other. Individually, they contribute to shaping their counterpart
and its functions, historically and at present. Jointly, they enable speakers to create
concrete artefactual structures on which their further interaction relies. This claim
is to be distinguished from the considerably broader view that human linguistic
capacities are a product of natural selection on the one hand, where the possible
role of linguistic artefacts in shaping these capacities is not further considered,
and Chomskyan linguistics on the other, where linguistic structures proper are
supposed to be at once innate and not a product of natural selection.
11
Complementary to the hypothesis of language-brain co-evolution, there are
arguments for a co-evolution of tool use in general and human cognitive capacities. It is suggested that there is some covariance between an animal’s brain size
and structure on the one hand and his skills in using or manufacturing objects
to manipulate other objects in their environments on the other.
12
Although the
claim that there is a direct and necessary correlation between tool use and general intelligence remains contested (for critical views see, e.g. McGrew 2013;
Shumaker et al. 2011, Chapter 7; Teschke et al. 2013), theories of this kind may
shape of explicit representations. Thus, the next remarkable development, again
in phylogenetic terms, does not as much lie in an extension of cognition into the
environment as it lies in the internalisation of some of the guidance that would
otherwise be directly provided by the environment. Externalisation reappears on
the level of artefacts that are used for cognitive functions in such a way as to reinstantiate environmental guidance on a higher level.
On the other hand, the purposeful creation and appropriation of cognitive
resources fosters their (partial) detachment from a present, imminent or otherwise
predetermined practical use. In turn, however, the use of these artificial resources,
once it has been properly learned, and if it functions smoothly, normally is quite as
direct, implicit and automatic as in the more basic cases. One may pause to reflect
on the information taken up from the environment, and one may then either resort
to other sources of information or store away that information for later use. However, doing so remains a special case mostly reserved for instances of interference
or error, and for (re-) assessing the goals of one’s actions. In a familiar and wellbehaved environment, the natural and artificial features of that environment will
equally provide direct guidance.
Language has the intriguing property of essentially involving both artefacts
and internal mechanisms in order to perform its functions. It is at once rooted in
evolution and in the history of artefact use. More specifically, it has been argued,
most prominently by Terrence Deacon (1997), that language co-evolved with the
human brain and its capability of symbolic reference. Deacon takes language to
be a structure whose properties and reproduction within language communities
are in a straightforwardly evolutionary way interdependent with the properties
particular to the human brain. The complexity and the adaptive functions of the
human mind have as one of the necessary conditions of their emergence and present functioning the development and use of linguistic structures. The intra- and
extra-somatic mechanisms for the production of linguistic items are tightly integrated with each other. Neither mechanism would be present nor could it function
in absence of the other. Individually, they contribute to shaping their counterpart
and its functions, historically and at present. Jointly, they enable speakers to create
concrete artefactual structures on which their further interaction relies. This claim
is to be distinguished from the considerably broader view that human linguistic
capacities are a product of natural selection on the one hand, where the possible
role of linguistic artefacts in shaping these capacities is not further considered,
and Chomskyan linguistics on the other, where linguistic structures proper are
supposed to be at once innate and not a product of natural selection.
11
Complementary to the hypothesis of language-brain co-evolution, there are
arguments for a co-evolution of tool use in general and human cognitive capacities. It is suggested that there is some covariance between an animal’s brain size
and structure on the one hand and his skills in using or manufacturing objects
to manipulate other objects in their environments on the other.
12
Although the
claim that there is a direct and necessary correlation between tool use and general intelligence remains contested (for critical views see, e.g. McGrew 2013;
Shumaker et al. 2011, Chapter 7; Teschke et al. 2013), theories of this kind may