The extension of the extended mind 121
debates – concern devices that we are suggested to consider as substitutes for, or
supplements to, internally based cognitive processes. Their notebooks, keyboards
and pocket calculators are artefacts that can be used for operations that could be,
at least prima facie, equally accomplished “in the head”, for example making a
calculation or remembering an appointment or the directions to a certain place.
This choice of examples not only seems to suggest Int W but also, however inadvertently, creates the impression that the extensions in question might be mere
instruments of cognition – which is a logical non sequitur: although Int S stands in
a relation of mutual implication with the constitutiveness claim (Ext C ), the instrumentalist claim (Ext I ) and Int W are logically independent. The claim that entities
in the environment might be viewed as parts of cognitive processes does allow
for the possibility but does not necessarily imply that these entities will work
as instruments of a cognitive process, nor does the reverse hold. At the same
instance, one will be entitled to accept that Ext C and Ext I might hold at the same
time, albeit in different, non-intersecting domains: some extensions might play a
constitutive role, and thus imply Int S for the respective class of cases, whereas others might count as mere instruments of cognition in another class of cases. Still,
Int S will be vindicated, because there is a class of cases by which it is implied. On
this analysis, the Ext C type of cases provides much better support for the Extended
Mind Hypothesis, and it does so for its stronger version.
In conjunction with the aetiological argument, these distinctions will contribute
to a reasonably detailed classification of relations of extendedness. Any claim for
a functional parity between the internal and external mechanisms involved will
have to be cashed out in some not necessarily directly biological reproductive
advantage determinable for each part of the equation.
If, first, I were able to substitute an environmentally coupled for an internal
process at will, where that substitution made no difference to the achievement of
my goals, in terms of scope, effectiveness, efficiency or reliability, the functional
equivalence involved would be of the weak Ext I kind. We still would have to
explain how the elements involved have come to be thus substitutable.
If, second, the members of some population become equally able to mobilise
some novel environment-based mechanism in order to supplement an established
cognitive function, so as to achieve an increase in scope, effectiveness, efficiency
or reliability, functional equivalence of a non-trivial constitutive W kind will be
reached, while adaptive fitness will actually be increased across the entire population. This is where some of the standard examples of cognitive extensions will fit
in, namely computing devices that increase the amount and complexity of available information or the speed of retrieval.
If, third, members of some population become able to individually mobilise a
novel environment-based mechanism for an established function, so as to outperform other members of that population to whom the mechanism remains unavailable, the condition of functional equivalence will hold with respect to the sameness
of function but not with respect to adaptive fitness within the population. Such
would be the case for technologies of cognitive enhancement that are available
only to some members of a population.
debates – concern devices that we are suggested to consider as substitutes for, or
supplements to, internally based cognitive processes. Their notebooks, keyboards
and pocket calculators are artefacts that can be used for operations that could be,
at least prima facie, equally accomplished “in the head”, for example making a
calculation or remembering an appointment or the directions to a certain place.
This choice of examples not only seems to suggest Int W but also, however inadvertently, creates the impression that the extensions in question might be mere
instruments of cognition – which is a logical non sequitur: although Int S stands in
a relation of mutual implication with the constitutiveness claim (Ext C ), the instrumentalist claim (Ext I ) and Int W are logically independent. The claim that entities
in the environment might be viewed as parts of cognitive processes does allow
for the possibility but does not necessarily imply that these entities will work
as instruments of a cognitive process, nor does the reverse hold. At the same
instance, one will be entitled to accept that Ext C and Ext I might hold at the same
time, albeit in different, non-intersecting domains: some extensions might play a
constitutive role, and thus imply Int S for the respective class of cases, whereas others might count as mere instruments of cognition in another class of cases. Still,
Int S will be vindicated, because there is a class of cases by which it is implied. On
this analysis, the Ext C type of cases provides much better support for the Extended
Mind Hypothesis, and it does so for its stronger version.
In conjunction with the aetiological argument, these distinctions will contribute
to a reasonably detailed classification of relations of extendedness. Any claim for
a functional parity between the internal and external mechanisms involved will
have to be cashed out in some not necessarily directly biological reproductive
advantage determinable for each part of the equation.
If, first, I were able to substitute an environmentally coupled for an internal
process at will, where that substitution made no difference to the achievement of
my goals, in terms of scope, effectiveness, efficiency or reliability, the functional
equivalence involved would be of the weak Ext I kind. We still would have to
explain how the elements involved have come to be thus substitutable.
If, second, the members of some population become equally able to mobilise
some novel environment-based mechanism in order to supplement an established
cognitive function, so as to achieve an increase in scope, effectiveness, efficiency
or reliability, functional equivalence of a non-trivial constitutive W kind will be
reached, while adaptive fitness will actually be increased across the entire population. This is where some of the standard examples of cognitive extensions will fit
in, namely computing devices that increase the amount and complexity of available information or the speed of retrieval.
If, third, members of some population become able to individually mobilise a
novel environment-based mechanism for an established function, so as to outperform other members of that population to whom the mechanism remains unavailable, the condition of functional equivalence will hold with respect to the sameness
of function but not with respect to adaptive fitness within the population. Such
would be the case for technologies of cognitive enhancement that are available
only to some members of a population.