The extension of the extended mind 111
Hence, if one takes active externalism by its ahistorical first word, the chemical
difference between water and twin water in Hilary Putnam’s well-known thought
experiment (1975b), contrary to what its author aimed to demonstrate, will not
matter as long as my interaction with either substance produces identical effects,
cognitively and practically. Conversely, on the “passive” account, the different
histories of earthly and twin-earthly water are all that matters in making the difference between the semantic success conditions for “water” tokens being applied to
either substance, even if I cannot see, feel or taste any difference between the two.
Although the active/passive terminology is now well-established (see, e.g.
Carter et al. 2014), there remains a certain artificiality to referring to the varieties of externalism in this way. Past interactions have been relevant to shaping
the content of some present linguistic or mental token, and there is no reason to
assume the past to be in any normative sense remote from the present. What Clark
and Chalmers are after is quite different from Putnam-style semantic externalism though: their focus is on the locus of cognitive processes, whereas Putnam,
Burge, McGinn and many others are concerned with the external conditions that
ground the content of mental or linguistic tokens. The difference at issue here is
also known as “vehicle” vs. “content” externalism (Hurley 1998; 2010). On an
ahistorical reading of active externalism, the concrete content of what is being
processed appears secondary to the issue of the locus of cognitive activity, just as
history is deemed secondary to present states of cognitive affairs.
Such a choice of priorities might be unfortunate, for several interrelated reasons –
of which, to be sure, theories of extended cognition have become at least partly
aware since that initial statement.
3
Nonetheless, it will be worthwhile to spell out
why, in terms of a unified rationale, any serious theory of extended cognition
will benefit from accounting for the history of the functions of environmental
coupling.
First, when referring to the functions of some object or process, one will have
to tell the difference between genuine functions and coincidental effects. That difference can be established only on the grounds of a history of how the object or
process in question came to display the effects that it displays – and why it fails
to do so under some circumstances. For artefacts, their design will provide part
of the relevant criteria, whereas all relevant criteria will be historical in the case
of natural systems.
Second, the content of cognitive activities – what in the environment they refer
to and whether, why and how they succeed in doing so – is relevant to an explanation of the shape, function and extension of these activities, historically and at
present, on more than one level. On the one hand, the concrete content of some
cognitive process depends on the history of cognisers living in a concrete natural
and social environment to which they relate. More fundamentally, on the other
hand, the mechanisms for producing and acting upon these contents are rooted in
histories of evolution and ontogenetic development, broadly construed.
Third, present interactions dynamically reshape the mode of extension in many
cases. There is no ending to history. If the conditions under which some relation of
cognitive coupling is realised are altered – from within or outside the organism – that
Hence, if one takes active externalism by its ahistorical first word, the chemical
difference between water and twin water in Hilary Putnam’s well-known thought
experiment (1975b), contrary to what its author aimed to demonstrate, will not
matter as long as my interaction with either substance produces identical effects,
cognitively and practically. Conversely, on the “passive” account, the different
histories of earthly and twin-earthly water are all that matters in making the difference between the semantic success conditions for “water” tokens being applied to
either substance, even if I cannot see, feel or taste any difference between the two.
Although the active/passive terminology is now well-established (see, e.g.
Carter et al. 2014), there remains a certain artificiality to referring to the varieties of externalism in this way. Past interactions have been relevant to shaping
the content of some present linguistic or mental token, and there is no reason to
assume the past to be in any normative sense remote from the present. What Clark
and Chalmers are after is quite different from Putnam-style semantic externalism though: their focus is on the locus of cognitive processes, whereas Putnam,
Burge, McGinn and many others are concerned with the external conditions that
ground the content of mental or linguistic tokens. The difference at issue here is
also known as “vehicle” vs. “content” externalism (Hurley 1998; 2010). On an
ahistorical reading of active externalism, the concrete content of what is being
processed appears secondary to the issue of the locus of cognitive activity, just as
history is deemed secondary to present states of cognitive affairs.
Such a choice of priorities might be unfortunate, for several interrelated reasons –
of which, to be sure, theories of extended cognition have become at least partly
aware since that initial statement.
3
Nonetheless, it will be worthwhile to spell out
why, in terms of a unified rationale, any serious theory of extended cognition
will benefit from accounting for the history of the functions of environmental
coupling.
First, when referring to the functions of some object or process, one will have
to tell the difference between genuine functions and coincidental effects. That difference can be established only on the grounds of a history of how the object or
process in question came to display the effects that it displays – and why it fails
to do so under some circumstances. For artefacts, their design will provide part
of the relevant criteria, whereas all relevant criteria will be historical in the case
of natural systems.
Second, the content of cognitive activities – what in the environment they refer
to and whether, why and how they succeed in doing so – is relevant to an explanation of the shape, function and extension of these activities, historically and at
present, on more than one level. On the one hand, the concrete content of some
cognitive process depends on the history of cognisers living in a concrete natural
and social environment to which they relate. More fundamentally, on the other
hand, the mechanisms for producing and acting upon these contents are rooted in
histories of evolution and ontogenetic development, broadly construed.
Third, present interactions dynamically reshape the mode of extension in many
cases. There is no ending to history. If the conditions under which some relation of
cognitive coupling is realised are altered – from within or outside the organism – that