In Part I, I have argued in some detail for an intrinsic connection between an
organism’s constitution and abilities and the make-up of his informational environment. I have also argued for the essentially natural character of the information
involved, as being information for perception, as conceived of in ecological psychology. Informational environments, I continued, are determined with respect
to conditions of ecological relevance. At the same instance, I acknowledged the
possibilities for an organism to modify his ecological and informational environments. Hence, if there are activities in which parts of the environment are
modified in constructive or constitutive fashion – in keeping with the technical
meaning of these terms introduced by Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996a) and discussed
in Chapter 5 – and if these modifications have an effect on the shape and availability of information, cognitive processes will not be confined to somatic boundaries.
They might actually depend on features of the environment that are used or made
to serve cognitive purposes. The accomplishment – and in a relevant subset of
cases also the establishment – of some of the functions of human cognition may
ultimately rely on the presence and operation of things that are neither in our
heads nor in our bodies. This proposal has a prima facie parallel in the “Extended
Mind Hypothesis”, as introduced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998),
which shall be explored in the present chapter.
In their brief, bold and controversial manifesto of a thorough, “active” externalism, Clark and Chalmers highlight “the active role of the environment in driving
cognitive processes” (1998, 7). Their version of externalism goes beyond established externalist views in the philosophy of mind and language respectively (see
Putnam 1975b; Burge 1979 in philosophical semantics and McGinn 1977 in the
philosophy of mind), according to which the content of mental processes or linguistic expressions depends on what is in the environment. In contrast, Clark and Chalmers argue that there are situations in which “the human organism is linked with an
external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen
as a cognitive system in its own right” (1998, 8, emphasis in original). This externalist position, in its general outlook, shall be endorsed here. However, the notion
of cognitive extension has become many things to many people in a continuously
sprawling debate, where the most forceful critiques appear to frequently miss the
most serious points that arguments for extended cognition are capable of making.
1
7 The extension of the extended
mind
organism’s constitution and abilities and the make-up of his informational environment. I have also argued for the essentially natural character of the information
involved, as being information for perception, as conceived of in ecological psychology. Informational environments, I continued, are determined with respect
to conditions of ecological relevance. At the same instance, I acknowledged the
possibilities for an organism to modify his ecological and informational environments. Hence, if there are activities in which parts of the environment are
modified in constructive or constitutive fashion – in keeping with the technical
meaning of these terms introduced by Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996a) and discussed
in Chapter 5 – and if these modifications have an effect on the shape and availability of information, cognitive processes will not be confined to somatic boundaries.
They might actually depend on features of the environment that are used or made
to serve cognitive purposes. The accomplishment – and in a relevant subset of
cases also the establishment – of some of the functions of human cognition may
ultimately rely on the presence and operation of things that are neither in our
heads nor in our bodies. This proposal has a prima facie parallel in the “Extended
Mind Hypothesis”, as introduced by Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998),
which shall be explored in the present chapter.
In their brief, bold and controversial manifesto of a thorough, “active” externalism, Clark and Chalmers highlight “the active role of the environment in driving
cognitive processes” (1998, 7). Their version of externalism goes beyond established externalist views in the philosophy of mind and language respectively (see
Putnam 1975b; Burge 1979 in philosophical semantics and McGinn 1977 in the
philosophy of mind), according to which the content of mental processes or linguistic expressions depends on what is in the environment. In contrast, Clark and Chalmers argue that there are situations in which “the human organism is linked with an
external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen
as a cognitive system in its own right” (1998, 8, emphasis in original). This externalist position, in its general outlook, shall be endorsed here. However, the notion
of cognitive extension has become many things to many people in a continuously
sprawling debate, where the most forceful critiques appear to frequently miss the
most serious points that arguments for extended cognition are capable of making.
1
7 The extension of the extended
mind