List of Tables
1.1
Examples of research carried out in complex adaptive systems.
Adapted from Schuster [171]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
2.1
Comparison of agent-based modeling frameworks. . . . . . .
33
3.1
Simulation times across multiple processors in HPC grids [76]. 56
4.1
Model parameters for fox and rabbit example. . . . . . . . .
72
5.1
Global variables used in FLAME Sugarscape. . . . . . . . .
96
5.2
FLAME Sugarscape model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97
5.3
Results of skewness and kurtosis measures in three experiments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4
Social network model specifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.1
Five big ideas that distinguish complexity economics [21]. . 124
6.2
Evolving Cournot characteristics for each firm. . . . . . . . . 135
6.3
Numerical values in Cournot experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.4
Difference between Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stable
state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.5
Prisoner sentences in PD game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.6
Payoff matrix in PD game, where R=3, S=0, T=5, P=1. . . 165
6.7
All defect strategy (Player 1) playing against a tit-for-tat
strategy (Player 2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.8
Example of a three state machine represented by automaton. 169
6.9
Numerical values in FLAME-IPD experiment. . . . . . . . . 172
7.1
Comparing building simulations in MATLAB and FLAME.
197
7.2
Different initial value setting for the Bicoid ABM. . . . . . . 198
xxv
1.1
Examples of research carried out in complex adaptive systems.
Adapted from Schuster [171]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3
2.1
Comparison of agent-based modeling frameworks. . . . . . .
33
3.1
Simulation times across multiple processors in HPC grids [76]. 56
4.1
Model parameters for fox and rabbit example. . . . . . . . .
72
5.1
Global variables used in FLAME Sugarscape. . . . . . . . .
96
5.2
FLAME Sugarscape model. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97
5.3
Results of skewness and kurtosis measures in three experiments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.4
Social network model specifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
6.1
Five big ideas that distinguish complexity economics [21]. . 124
6.2
Evolving Cournot characteristics for each firm. . . . . . . . . 135
6.3
Numerical values in Cournot experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . 138
6.4
Difference between Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stable
state. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
6.5
Prisoner sentences in PD game. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
6.6
Payoff matrix in PD game, where R=3, S=0, T=5, P=1. . . 165
6.7
All defect strategy (Player 1) playing against a tit-for-tat
strategy (Player 2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
6.8
Example of a three state machine represented by automaton. 169
6.9
Numerical values in FLAME-IPD experiment. . . . . . . . . 172
7.1
Comparing building simulations in MATLAB and FLAME.
197
7.2
Different initial value setting for the Bicoid ABM. . . . . . . 198
xxv
