List of Figures
xxi
5.15 Agents walking in the scene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.1
A black box represents an economic model where only inputs
and outputs are known and little is known about what goes
on inside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.2
Groups in economic systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.3
Replacing the black box with agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.4
Different shoppers in the same simulation. . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.5
Five firms producing a particular output of the same product
in the scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.6
A supply-demand curve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.7
Time line of the various activities in a simple Cournot model. 132
6.8
Firm reaction curves in a duopoly model. A duopoly market
is a market with only two acting firms. Adapted from [5]. . 133
6.9
An evolutionary model. Each firm has its own strategy base
which after every simulation is updated using genetic algorithms. Adapted from [5]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.10 All firms have a strategy base in their memory. . . . . . . . 136
6.11 How a strategy base looks in firm’s memory. . . . . . . . . . 136
6.12 How crossover works in Cournot model. Strategy A, B, C and
D represent numerical values of bit strings. . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.13 How mutation works in Cournot model. . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.14 The system contains four agents (three firms and one system
demand, responsible for assessing the product price). . . . . 137
6.15 Quantity and profits of three firms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.16 Price and strategy space in evolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.17 Average price with crossover rate 0.1, 0.5 and multiple mutation rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.18 Average price with crossover rate 0.7 and multiple mutation
rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.19 Mall capitals and worker savings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.20 People wages and unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.21 Mall strategies and costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.22 Stategraph for virtual mall experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.23 Example automaton for prisoner’s dilemma strategies. . . . 167
6.24 Finite state machine of eight states representing a prisoner’s
dilemma strategy. cf. [81]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.25 Example of automaton represented by Table 6.8. . . . . . . 169
6.26 Strategy database of ten strategies in player memory. . . . . 170
6.27 One state in a strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.28 Two strategies acting as parents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.29 Two children resulting from crossover of parents, at crossover
point state number 1 and state length 4. . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.30 Mutant child of Parent-1 at mutation point state number 1
and state length 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
xxi
5.15 Agents walking in the scene. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.1
A black box represents an economic model where only inputs
and outputs are known and little is known about what goes
on inside. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.2
Groups in economic systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.3
Replacing the black box with agents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
6.4
Different shoppers in the same simulation. . . . . . . . . . . 128
6.5
Five firms producing a particular output of the same product
in the scenario. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
6.6
A supply-demand curve. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
6.7
Time line of the various activities in a simple Cournot model. 132
6.8
Firm reaction curves in a duopoly model. A duopoly market
is a market with only two acting firms. Adapted from [5]. . 133
6.9
An evolutionary model. Each firm has its own strategy base
which after every simulation is updated using genetic algorithms. Adapted from [5]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
6.10 All firms have a strategy base in their memory. . . . . . . . 136
6.11 How a strategy base looks in firm’s memory. . . . . . . . . . 136
6.12 How crossover works in Cournot model. Strategy A, B, C and
D represent numerical values of bit strings. . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.13 How mutation works in Cournot model. . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.14 The system contains four agents (three firms and one system
demand, responsible for assessing the product price). . . . . 137
6.15 Quantity and profits of three firms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.16 Price and strategy space in evolution. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
6.17 Average price with crossover rate 0.1, 0.5 and multiple mutation rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
6.18 Average price with crossover rate 0.7 and multiple mutation
rates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
6.19 Mall capitals and worker savings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
6.20 People wages and unemployment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.21 Mall strategies and costs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
6.22 Stategraph for virtual mall experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
6.23 Example automaton for prisoner’s dilemma strategies. . . . 167
6.24 Finite state machine of eight states representing a prisoner’s
dilemma strategy. cf. [81]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
6.25 Example of automaton represented by Table 6.8. . . . . . . 169
6.26 Strategy database of ten strategies in player memory. . . . . 170
6.27 One state in a strategy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
6.28 Two strategies acting as parents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.29 Two children resulting from crossover of parents, at crossover
point state number 1 and state length 4. . . . . . . . . . . . 171
6.30 Mutant child of Parent-1 at mutation point state number 1
and state length 4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172