interpleader statute is “remedial and to be liberally construed,” particularly to
prevent races to judgment and the unfairness of multiple and potentially conflicting
obligations.
48 Wesley J. emphasized that where the other requirements of statutory
interpleader are met, the statute makes it irrelevant that the title or claims of the
conflicting claimants do not have a common origin.
49 Then, the Second Circuit
relied on Royal School Laboratories, Inc. v. Town of Waterman, to explain that
nothing could be more palpably unjust than to permit two recoveries against the
interpleader plaintiff for the same enrichment.
50 The Second Circuit concluded,
therefore, that the claims alleged in this action are inextricably interrelated and
interpleader jurisdiction is proper under the broad and remedial nature of
28 U.S.C. § 1335.
51
Next, the actual suppliers challenged the sufficiency of the District Court’s in rem
jurisdiction by arguing that to obtain that jurisdiction, it is necessary to have the
consent of both the owner of the res and the lienholder seeking to arrest.
52 But the
Second Circuit held that the cases relied on by USOT were inconsistent with other
cases, which indicated that only the owner’s consent is necessary.
53 Also, the court
emphasized that in rem jurisdiction may be waived without seizure when the owner
appears without contesting jurisdiction.
54 The court concluded, therefore, that “by
initiating interpleader concerning certain in rem claims of a provider of fuel delivery
services involving maritime liens on ships and posting adequate security for those
claims, [ship owner] consented to the District Court’s jurisdiction over its interests,
which [wa]s sufficient to confer in rem jurisdiction.”
55
Lastly, USOT contended that the interpleader injunction issued here was in
violation of the requirement of 28 USC § 2361. USOT argued that § 2361 did not
expressly authorize an interpleader injunction to extend to foreign suits.
56 The
Second Circuit acknowledged that while the statue itself has no extraterritorial
reach, federal courts have long possessed the inherent power to restrain the parties
before them from engaging in suit in foreign jurisdictions.
57 As a result, the court
48 Id.
49 Id. at 152.
50 Id.; see also Royal School Laboratories, Inc. v. Town of Waterman, 358 F.2d 813, 815
(2d Cir. 1966).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 153.
53 Id.; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
54 Id. at 154; see also United States v. Republic Marine, Inc., 829 F.2d 1399, 1402 (7th Cir. 1987);
Cactus Pipe & Supply Co. v. M/V Montmartre, 756 F.2d 1103, 1107–08 (5th Cir. 1985); cf.
Continental Grain Co. v. The FBL 585, 364 U.S. 19, 22–27 (1960) (construing the owner’s consent
as sufficient for venue transfer of both in personam and in rem claims).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
684
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prevent races to judgment and the unfairness of multiple and potentially conflicting
obligations.
48 Wesley J. emphasized that where the other requirements of statutory
interpleader are met, the statute makes it irrelevant that the title or claims of the
conflicting claimants do not have a common origin.
49 Then, the Second Circuit
relied on Royal School Laboratories, Inc. v. Town of Waterman, to explain that
nothing could be more palpably unjust than to permit two recoveries against the
interpleader plaintiff for the same enrichment.
50 The Second Circuit concluded,
therefore, that the claims alleged in this action are inextricably interrelated and
interpleader jurisdiction is proper under the broad and remedial nature of
28 U.S.C. § 1335.
51
Next, the actual suppliers challenged the sufficiency of the District Court’s in rem
jurisdiction by arguing that to obtain that jurisdiction, it is necessary to have the
consent of both the owner of the res and the lienholder seeking to arrest.
52 But the
Second Circuit held that the cases relied on by USOT were inconsistent with other
cases, which indicated that only the owner’s consent is necessary.
53 Also, the court
emphasized that in rem jurisdiction may be waived without seizure when the owner
appears without contesting jurisdiction.
54 The court concluded, therefore, that “by
initiating interpleader concerning certain in rem claims of a provider of fuel delivery
services involving maritime liens on ships and posting adequate security for those
claims, [ship owner] consented to the District Court’s jurisdiction over its interests,
which [wa]s sufficient to confer in rem jurisdiction.”
55
Lastly, USOT contended that the interpleader injunction issued here was in
violation of the requirement of 28 USC § 2361. USOT argued that § 2361 did not
expressly authorize an interpleader injunction to extend to foreign suits.
56 The
Second Circuit acknowledged that while the statue itself has no extraterritorial
reach, federal courts have long possessed the inherent power to restrain the parties
before them from engaging in suit in foreign jurisdictions.
57 As a result, the court
48 Id.
49 Id. at 152.
50 Id.; see also Royal School Laboratories, Inc. v. Town of Waterman, 358 F.2d 813, 815
(2d Cir. 1966).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 153.
53 Id.; see also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977).
54 Id. at 154; see also United States v. Republic Marine, Inc., 829 F.2d 1399, 1402 (7th Cir. 1987);
Cactus Pipe & Supply Co. v. M/V Montmartre, 756 F.2d 1103, 1107–08 (5th Cir. 1985); cf.
Continental Grain Co. v. The FBL 585, 364 U.S. 19, 22–27 (1960) (construing the owner’s consent
as sufficient for venue transfer of both in personam and in rem claims).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
684
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