San Diego County.
30 The ship was deemed to have a legal personality, such that it
was treated as the offender itself and subject to suit directly for the torts it committed
and for the contracts it breached.
31 The U.S courts, however, have viewed personification with varying degrees of rigidity.
32
Courts usually have deemed in personam action and in rem action as two distinct
types of suit. Applying the personification doctrine in The China, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the ship was liable independently for her acts even though her owner,
who had chartered the ship to another party, could not be held liable in personam.
33
Similarly, in S.E.L. Maduro (Florida), Inc. v. M/V Antonio de Gastaneta, the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals illustrated the distinction between the obligations
of a ship in rem and a shipowner in personam.
34 The Eleventh Circuit held that res
judicata did not bar a later action in rem against the ship to enforce a maritime lien
because the “the primary right at stake” in the breach of contract claim was “not the
same as the primary right stake” in the in rem action.
35 The District Court of
Maryland in The Eastern Shore held that res judicata did not apply to the subsequent
in rem claim, reasoning that, “[t]he maritime lien here claimed is a proprietary
interest or right in the ship itself, and entirely distinct from the cause of action or
demand for personal judgment against its owner.”
36 Thus, the court based its holding
on the personification theory’s precept that in rem proceedings to execute a maritime
lien against a ship are different from in personam proceedings against that ship’s
owner.
37 In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Empresa Naviera Santa S.A., the
Southern District Court of New York held that “the distinction between in rem and in
personam jurisdiction in admiralty cases . . . remains a bedrock principle of admiralty law,” and found the plaintiff’s in personam claim to be “distinct from its claim
against the ship in rem.”
38
There are, however, some courts that have not strictly pursued the personification
doctrine and criticize its overly technical application. In Continental Grain Co. v.
Barge FBL-585, the U.S. Supreme Court criticized mechanistic distinctions between
civil actions in rem and in personam in light of “admiralty’s approach to do justice
with slight regard to formal matters”—particularly where applying the legal fiction
30 Madruga v. Superior Court of State of Cal. in & for San Diego County, 346 U.S. 556, 1954 AMC
405 (1954).
31 Id., at 560, 1954 AMC at 409; see Force (2013), p. 31.
32 Schwab (2012), p. 255.
33 The China, 74 U.S. 53, 70–71, 2002 AMC 1504, 1511–12 (1868).
34 S.E.L. Maduro (Florida), Inc. v. M/V Antonio de Gastaneta, 833 F.2d 1477, 1481–82, 1988 AMC
1217, 1223–24 (11th Cir. 1987).
35 Id. at 1482. (AMC reporter summarizing case).
36 The Eastern Shore, 24 F.2d 443, 444, 1928 AMC 327, 328 (D. Md. 1928).
37 Id.
38 Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp. v. Empresa Naviera Santa, S.A., 845 F.Supp.
150, 152–53, 1994 AMC 2003, 2005–06 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
682
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