• Principe,
• Senegal,
• Sierra Leone,
• Togo.
56
“In contrast to the initial Djibouti Code of Conduct which focused primarily on
piracy, the West and Central Africa strategy contains a comprehensive regional
maritime security framework to counter not only piracy and armed robbery against
ships, but other illicit maritime activities as well, such as Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, drug smuggling, etc. [m]aking it much broader in scope
. . . .”
57 It is expected “to stimulate economic development in the countries that are
Party to it, develop sustainable fisheries sectors and promote the overall enhancement of West Africa’s maritime sector.”
58 This most recent anti-piracy agreement
has expanded the ambit of services available to member states and has in turn had an
effect on prior treaties. It suggests an evolving regional approach to fighting the
crime, blended with less of a focus on the traditional international crime.
3 Conclusion: An Overview and the Future
The century from 1918 until 2018 saw: (1) the rise and fall of attempts to universalize the crime of piracy, followed by (2) a geographically-reduced field of operation and, more recently, (3) a more regionalized approach. This last tack would
appear to be the currently-preferred format for dealing with the problem, but the
long-term vitality of agreements such as ReCAAP, the Djibouti Code of Conduct,
and the 2013 Code of Conduct, will depend upon the continued satisfaction of all
major stakeholders in the process. Future regional agreements may be anticipated if
major recurring problems in semi-enclosed areas (such as the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, or even the Bay of Bengal) exist, if external stakeholders exert enough
pressure to find solutions, and if the creation of such anti-piracy regimes benefit at
least some local stakeholders (such as maritime professionals and government
elites). Just as the SUA Convention’s concentration on prohibited actions rather
than piracy or maritime terrorism resulted in advances in maritime security, so the
practice of “bundling” anti-piracy initiatives with potential solutions to other maritime problems may succeed in making remedial action more palatable to locals.
While it is beyond the purview of this paper, the updating and—to a certain degree—
standardization of domestic piracy law and successful prosecution of perpetrators are
other factors which could add to the success of the current regionalized approach.
56 Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit
Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa.
57 Id.
58 Id.
A Century of Piracy Treaties: An Overview for the Future
559
• Senegal,
• Sierra Leone,
• Togo.
56
“In contrast to the initial Djibouti Code of Conduct which focused primarily on
piracy, the West and Central Africa strategy contains a comprehensive regional
maritime security framework to counter not only piracy and armed robbery against
ships, but other illicit maritime activities as well, such as Illegal, Unreported, and
Unregulated (IUU) Fishing, drug smuggling, etc. [m]aking it much broader in scope
. . . .”
57 It is expected “to stimulate economic development in the countries that are
Party to it, develop sustainable fisheries sectors and promote the overall enhancement of West Africa’s maritime sector.”
58 This most recent anti-piracy agreement
has expanded the ambit of services available to member states and has in turn had an
effect on prior treaties. It suggests an evolving regional approach to fighting the
crime, blended with less of a focus on the traditional international crime.
3 Conclusion: An Overview and the Future
The century from 1918 until 2018 saw: (1) the rise and fall of attempts to universalize the crime of piracy, followed by (2) a geographically-reduced field of operation and, more recently, (3) a more regionalized approach. This last tack would
appear to be the currently-preferred format for dealing with the problem, but the
long-term vitality of agreements such as ReCAAP, the Djibouti Code of Conduct,
and the 2013 Code of Conduct, will depend upon the continued satisfaction of all
major stakeholders in the process. Future regional agreements may be anticipated if
major recurring problems in semi-enclosed areas (such as the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, or even the Bay of Bengal) exist, if external stakeholders exert enough
pressure to find solutions, and if the creation of such anti-piracy regimes benefit at
least some local stakeholders (such as maritime professionals and government
elites). Just as the SUA Convention’s concentration on prohibited actions rather
than piracy or maritime terrorism resulted in advances in maritime security, so the
practice of “bundling” anti-piracy initiatives with potential solutions to other maritime problems may succeed in making remedial action more palatable to locals.
While it is beyond the purview of this paper, the updating and—to a certain degree—
standardization of domestic piracy law and successful prosecution of perpetrators are
other factors which could add to the success of the current regionalized approach.
56 Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery Against Ships, and Illicit
Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa.
57 Id.
58 Id.
A Century of Piracy Treaties: An Overview for the Future
559