of its coverage. For instance, some contend that the goal-based approach, while
allowing for creativity and flexibility, may turn into a weakness when applied to the
EEDI and SEEMP. It may be argued that it would be unreasonable “to expect port
state control inspectors to verify a ship’s actual EEDI methodology and characteristics, simply because of the sheer diversity in designs that may be adopted by
individual ships” or “to check the exact underpinnings of the methodologies and
processes adopted in the SEEMP for each particular ship.”
76 Even the positive side
of PSC inspections influencing shipowner’s choice of flag registry or classification
society could be counterbalanced by the suggestion “that PSC actions give rise to
opportunistic behaviour among shipowners operating relatively bad vessels.”
77
Aside from the lack of PSC officers, uniformity and harmonization in carrying out
inspections is another constant bane of PSC MoUs. At the end of the day, the
outcome of any inspection is heavily dependent on the professional judgement of
the PSC officer who, afflicted with the human condition, will understandably be
unable to attain perfect objectivity. It would not come as a surprise that “both
detention for non-compliance. . . and detection of non-compliance will vary from
officer to officer, port to port and nation to nation”
78 and potentially “distort the level
playing field within the region.”
79 Some other persistent challenges facing PSC
inspection regimes are short turnaround times of vessels, remote port locations,
corruption, lukewarm enforcement by some states, the fact that port state control
MoUs are not binding agreements, and resource availability.
80 Public sector budgets,
including those for maritime administration functions, are undergoing constant
review and reduction.
81 This has an impact not only on the acquisition of high
cost technological solutions such as remote SOx emission monitoring systems or
“sniffers” as well as the construction of expensive laboratories, but also on the
associated training and technical competence of PSC inspectors.
82
4 Conclusion
Shipping occasionally faces imputations that it is responsible for emissions of
inordinately significant amounts of air pollutants and greenhouse gases. These
accusations unfortunately focus on absolute emissions figures rather than the proportional share of shipping taken in the context of the amount of cargo it carries.
Comparisons have been made between CO 2 emissions from ships and those from
76 Fakhry and Bulut (2018), pp. 26–27.
77 Cariou and Wolff (2011).
78 Bloor et al. (2015), pp. 343–344.
79 Graziano et al. (2018b), pp. 230–231.
80 For instance, the case of the Mediterranean MoU, in Lagdami (2012), pp. 25–26.
81 Bloor et al. (2015), pp. 343–344; Metzger (2016).
82 DNV GL (2014).
540
M. Q. Mejia, Jr.
allowing for creativity and flexibility, may turn into a weakness when applied to the
EEDI and SEEMP. It may be argued that it would be unreasonable “to expect port
state control inspectors to verify a ship’s actual EEDI methodology and characteristics, simply because of the sheer diversity in designs that may be adopted by
individual ships” or “to check the exact underpinnings of the methodologies and
processes adopted in the SEEMP for each particular ship.”
76 Even the positive side
of PSC inspections influencing shipowner’s choice of flag registry or classification
society could be counterbalanced by the suggestion “that PSC actions give rise to
opportunistic behaviour among shipowners operating relatively bad vessels.”
77
Aside from the lack of PSC officers, uniformity and harmonization in carrying out
inspections is another constant bane of PSC MoUs. At the end of the day, the
outcome of any inspection is heavily dependent on the professional judgement of
the PSC officer who, afflicted with the human condition, will understandably be
unable to attain perfect objectivity. It would not come as a surprise that “both
detention for non-compliance. . . and detection of non-compliance will vary from
officer to officer, port to port and nation to nation”
78 and potentially “distort the level
playing field within the region.”
79 Some other persistent challenges facing PSC
inspection regimes are short turnaround times of vessels, remote port locations,
corruption, lukewarm enforcement by some states, the fact that port state control
MoUs are not binding agreements, and resource availability.
80 Public sector budgets,
including those for maritime administration functions, are undergoing constant
review and reduction.
81 This has an impact not only on the acquisition of high
cost technological solutions such as remote SOx emission monitoring systems or
“sniffers” as well as the construction of expensive laboratories, but also on the
associated training and technical competence of PSC inspectors.
82
4 Conclusion
Shipping occasionally faces imputations that it is responsible for emissions of
inordinately significant amounts of air pollutants and greenhouse gases. These
accusations unfortunately focus on absolute emissions figures rather than the proportional share of shipping taken in the context of the amount of cargo it carries.
Comparisons have been made between CO 2 emissions from ships and those from
76 Fakhry and Bulut (2018), pp. 26–27.
77 Cariou and Wolff (2011).
78 Bloor et al. (2015), pp. 343–344.
79 Graziano et al. (2018b), pp. 230–231.
80 For instance, the case of the Mediterranean MoU, in Lagdami (2012), pp. 25–26.
81 Bloor et al. (2015), pp. 343–344; Metzger (2016).
82 DNV GL (2014).
540
M. Q. Mejia, Jr.