satisfaction of the Administration” which term demonstrated the rather hard limits
established in respect of national sovereignty. There were little to no means of
external control and verification. The 1995 major revisions, however, introduced
significantly more controls by other Parties and a requirement to report information
the IMO (through its Secretariat)—a kind of quasi-vetting by soft control, that
ensured that prima facie, a Contracting Government was giving effect to the
Convention. Subsequently, given concerns that member States of the IMO were
not implementing the requirements of the Conventions they had ratified,
42 a voluntary audit scheme was set up. It is a sign of the creeping erosion of sovereignty that
this voluntary scheme has since become mandatory through amendments to a
number of Conventions that mandate the IMO Instruments Implementation (III)
Code. These amendments include a requirement for “verification of compliance”
43
per the requirements of the III Code and the IMO Member State Audit Scheme.
44
It is expected that the transparency required by this audit scheme and the potential
reputational and economic consequences as well as possibilities of technical cooperation support, will be a deterrent (or incentive as the case may be) for States to fulfil
their international obligations in the implementation of the requirements of ratified
conventions. To some, the existence of the many safety nets in maritime regulations
reflected the lack of trust that sovereign States, acting in their primary capacities as
flag States, would or could always meet their obligations. Such safety nets as port
State control, inspections, audits etc. while possibly restricting sovereign expression,
do help to increase confidence in what may otherwise be a rather unruly legal
environment.
In the pragmatic reality of today’s international regulation of the education and
training of seafarers, this international “command and control” approach may be
deemed to be essential. The prescriptive approach, which has characterized the
setting of international standards in the maritime industry so far, may be argued to
have benefits and to have led to better safety at sea,
45 although some data may
suggest the contrary.
46
For one thing, prescriptive regimes represent an easier way to legislate, to have
common standards globally, legal certainty and easier checking of compliance.
However, in their nature they tend not to be comprehensive enough to cover the
unique contexts of complex ship operation. The earlier approaches to seafarer
42 Ratification, per se, has not, relatively speaking, been a problem for the IMO. SOLAS has been
ratified by 164 countries (99.18% of world tonnage), MARPOL has 157 ratification (99.15% of
world tonnage) and STCW has 164 Contracting Governments (99.18% of world tonnage). The
issue of concern is the implementation efforts (or the lack of them) that should follow ratification.
43 The 2014 amendments to the STCW Convention incorporated a new Regulation I/16 which
requires that “Every Party shall be subject to periodic audits by the Organization in accordance with
the audit standard to verify compliance with and implementation of the present Convention”.
44 Resolutions A.1070(28) and A.1067(28) respectively.
45 Kokotos (2013), Butt et al. (2013), Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (2017) and
Dyrcz (2016).
46 Eliopoulou et al. (2016).
The Evolution of Seafarer Education and Training in International Law
485
established in respect of national sovereignty. There were little to no means of
external control and verification. The 1995 major revisions, however, introduced
significantly more controls by other Parties and a requirement to report information
the IMO (through its Secretariat)—a kind of quasi-vetting by soft control, that
ensured that prima facie, a Contracting Government was giving effect to the
Convention. Subsequently, given concerns that member States of the IMO were
not implementing the requirements of the Conventions they had ratified,
42 a voluntary audit scheme was set up. It is a sign of the creeping erosion of sovereignty that
this voluntary scheme has since become mandatory through amendments to a
number of Conventions that mandate the IMO Instruments Implementation (III)
Code. These amendments include a requirement for “verification of compliance”
43
per the requirements of the III Code and the IMO Member State Audit Scheme.
44
It is expected that the transparency required by this audit scheme and the potential
reputational and economic consequences as well as possibilities of technical cooperation support, will be a deterrent (or incentive as the case may be) for States to fulfil
their international obligations in the implementation of the requirements of ratified
conventions. To some, the existence of the many safety nets in maritime regulations
reflected the lack of trust that sovereign States, acting in their primary capacities as
flag States, would or could always meet their obligations. Such safety nets as port
State control, inspections, audits etc. while possibly restricting sovereign expression,
do help to increase confidence in what may otherwise be a rather unruly legal
environment.
In the pragmatic reality of today’s international regulation of the education and
training of seafarers, this international “command and control” approach may be
deemed to be essential. The prescriptive approach, which has characterized the
setting of international standards in the maritime industry so far, may be argued to
have benefits and to have led to better safety at sea,
45 although some data may
suggest the contrary.
46
For one thing, prescriptive regimes represent an easier way to legislate, to have
common standards globally, legal certainty and easier checking of compliance.
However, in their nature they tend not to be comprehensive enough to cover the
unique contexts of complex ship operation. The earlier approaches to seafarer
42 Ratification, per se, has not, relatively speaking, been a problem for the IMO. SOLAS has been
ratified by 164 countries (99.18% of world tonnage), MARPOL has 157 ratification (99.15% of
world tonnage) and STCW has 164 Contracting Governments (99.18% of world tonnage). The
issue of concern is the implementation efforts (or the lack of them) that should follow ratification.
43 The 2014 amendments to the STCW Convention incorporated a new Regulation I/16 which
requires that “Every Party shall be subject to periodic audits by the Organization in accordance with
the audit standard to verify compliance with and implementation of the present Convention”.
44 Resolutions A.1070(28) and A.1067(28) respectively.
45 Kokotos (2013), Butt et al. (2013), Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty (2017) and
Dyrcz (2016).
46 Eliopoulou et al. (2016).
The Evolution of Seafarer Education and Training in International Law
485