owners and managers from the traditional maritime nations, leading to more and
more tonnage moving from traditional flags to open registries for “convenience”.
27
Such movements allowed ship owners/managers to bypass stricter shipowner
“home” national regulations relating to seafarer education and training, among
others, and to employ labour from diverse countries (sometimes ununionized) at
much lower wage rates and conditions than would have been required for labour
from their own traditional maritime nations.
28 While some viewed these trends as
undermining the maritime industry (and still do) others saw in it the opportunity to
increase the profitability of ship operation.
29 Wiswall notes, for example, that the
pejorative nature of the term “flags of convenience” is “fostered as such by the
interests which have lost advantage from the moves toward free market competition
and unrestricted transfer of shipping capital – the maritime unions, shipbuilders and
government-tied shipowners of both the developed and some of the remaining
centrally-controlled economies”.
30 The International Federation of Transport
Workers (ITF) has an unambiguous position against FoCs.
31
The debate about the (de)merits of the FoCs is not relevant here. Suffice it to say
that there remained a perception that there exists a positive correlation between
cheap labour and low standards i.e. the cheaper the labour, the lower the standards of
competence evidenced. While this has not been necessarily empirically proven, there
may be some logical rationalization of and anecdotal evidence for this perception.
Irrespective of the view one takes, an undeniable consequence of the FoC phenomenon was that crew from many different countries—some of which countries were
significantly resource-constrained in respect of seafarer education and training—
with very different levels of competence and the education/training that underpinned
that competence, found themselves operating ships in international waters. Indeed,
the supply of the world’s maritime labour shifted significantly to less-endowed and
resource-deprived jurisdictions. This supply was fed by a demand for labour
irrespective of nationality arising from increased use of FoCs where substantial
economic advantage could be gained by the beneficial shipowners. This led to a
rising sentiment that there was the need for an international framework that mandated the meeting of minimum standards to which all national maritime education
and training systems could be held accountable irrespective of nationality.
27 Sampson (2004).
28 Ibid.
29 Luo et al. (2013).
30 Wiswall (1996).
31 See http://www.itfglobal.org/en/transport-sectors/seafarers/in-focus/flags-of-convenience-cam
paign/.
478
M. E. Manuel and R. Baumler
more tonnage moving from traditional flags to open registries for “convenience”.
27
Such movements allowed ship owners/managers to bypass stricter shipowner
“home” national regulations relating to seafarer education and training, among
others, and to employ labour from diverse countries (sometimes ununionized) at
much lower wage rates and conditions than would have been required for labour
from their own traditional maritime nations.
28 While some viewed these trends as
undermining the maritime industry (and still do) others saw in it the opportunity to
increase the profitability of ship operation.
29 Wiswall notes, for example, that the
pejorative nature of the term “flags of convenience” is “fostered as such by the
interests which have lost advantage from the moves toward free market competition
and unrestricted transfer of shipping capital – the maritime unions, shipbuilders and
government-tied shipowners of both the developed and some of the remaining
centrally-controlled economies”.
30 The International Federation of Transport
Workers (ITF) has an unambiguous position against FoCs.
31
The debate about the (de)merits of the FoCs is not relevant here. Suffice it to say
that there remained a perception that there exists a positive correlation between
cheap labour and low standards i.e. the cheaper the labour, the lower the standards of
competence evidenced. While this has not been necessarily empirically proven, there
may be some logical rationalization of and anecdotal evidence for this perception.
Irrespective of the view one takes, an undeniable consequence of the FoC phenomenon was that crew from many different countries—some of which countries were
significantly resource-constrained in respect of seafarer education and training—
with very different levels of competence and the education/training that underpinned
that competence, found themselves operating ships in international waters. Indeed,
the supply of the world’s maritime labour shifted significantly to less-endowed and
resource-deprived jurisdictions. This supply was fed by a demand for labour
irrespective of nationality arising from increased use of FoCs where substantial
economic advantage could be gained by the beneficial shipowners. This led to a
rising sentiment that there was the need for an international framework that mandated the meeting of minimum standards to which all national maritime education
and training systems could be held accountable irrespective of nationality.
27 Sampson (2004).
28 Ibid.
29 Luo et al. (2013).
30 Wiswall (1996).
31 See http://www.itfglobal.org/en/transport-sectors/seafarers/in-focus/flags-of-convenience-cam
paign/.
478
M. E. Manuel and R. Baumler