maritime property that was “abandoned”. The Court was dissatisfied with the
plaintiffs’ contention regarding locating the shipwreck and submerged cargo and
the ongoing engagement in possession and dominion. The uncertainty of actual
possession was conclusive and the salvor’s right to title was denied. The law of finds
precluded the Court from awarding the plaintiff title to the cargo and personal effects
of the passengers and crew that remained submerged.
5 Concluding Remarks
From a general viewpoint, “property” can be seen as an instrument of “relational
governance” since property law is “relational” in principle.
129 The term “relational
governance” in the context of this sentence is used to indicate the relation that a
property can have with regard to the owner and any other person who is not the
actual owner, but merely has actual possession for a temporary period. But if the
129 The term “relational governance” is comprised of those mechanisms, which are regarded as a
means to enhance transaction-specific investments associated with less monitoring and bargaining
as indicated in Barney and Hansen (1994). It is based on trust between the two parties and has been
explained in Yu et al. (2006). The authors state, “Trust is frequently considered to be the positive
expectations one party has about another party’s intentions. That is, trust is one party’s confidence
in another’s goodwill . . . In keeping with the literature, “trust”, in this study, is made up of two
components: calculative trust, the rational component of trust, and benevolent trust, the emotional
side of trust . . . Calculative trust is preceded by the calculative process: an organization calculates
the costs and/or rewards of cheating (or not) in a particular transaction. When one partner can
deliver in the manner that it has promised, demonstrates the ability to continue the exchange
relationship, or seems capable of generating some benefit for another partner in the future, another
partner may be more willing to continue to make exchanges and to stay in the relationship [in-text
references omitted]”. See also Johnson (2007). The author states, “It is not necessary to hold all
eleven of Honoré’s incidents to be considered a per se owner of property, but some incidents are
clearly more important than others. Although it is often said that the right to possession is one of the
most important rights, it is not necessarily more important than the right to capital, which is the right
to alienate or dispose of the property. Honoré’s incidents are also naturally subsets of other
incidents. If one has a right to capital, or to exercise dominion over property, he also has a right
to use, unless he has exercised his power to give it away temporarily to a tenant. One might own the
right to receive the income from a piece of property, but not own the property itself because one
lacks the right to dispose of it. The combination of some incidents can add up to ownership rights,
depending on the context, and without all the incidents being present. Ownership can be shared in
an almost infinite variety of ways.
Thus, the concept of the bundle of separate sticks, with different “owners” holding different
sticks, meant that property ownership was a very flexible concept, largely unconcerned with the
object itself . . . Honoré’s incidents of ownership demonstrate Hohfeld’s concept of property rights
as “different sorts of rights and rights-correlatives” that may aggregate in many different ways to
explain ownership. For example, the right to capital is a legal right that is enforceable against others.
If I own the right to capital, I can convey or sell the property to somebody else; I can waste it by
refusing to maintain it and letting it fall into disrepair; I can destroy it by razing a building on my
land. These rights are not unlimited, however, because laws affect how I may convey the property,
how I waste it, or how I destroy it”.
An Exposé of Canadian “Abandoned Vessels &. . .
369
plaintiffs’ contention regarding locating the shipwreck and submerged cargo and
the ongoing engagement in possession and dominion. The uncertainty of actual
possession was conclusive and the salvor’s right to title was denied. The law of finds
precluded the Court from awarding the plaintiff title to the cargo and personal effects
of the passengers and crew that remained submerged.
5 Concluding Remarks
From a general viewpoint, “property” can be seen as an instrument of “relational
governance” since property law is “relational” in principle.
129 The term “relational
governance” in the context of this sentence is used to indicate the relation that a
property can have with regard to the owner and any other person who is not the
actual owner, but merely has actual possession for a temporary period. But if the
129 The term “relational governance” is comprised of those mechanisms, which are regarded as a
means to enhance transaction-specific investments associated with less monitoring and bargaining
as indicated in Barney and Hansen (1994). It is based on trust between the two parties and has been
explained in Yu et al. (2006). The authors state, “Trust is frequently considered to be the positive
expectations one party has about another party’s intentions. That is, trust is one party’s confidence
in another’s goodwill . . . In keeping with the literature, “trust”, in this study, is made up of two
components: calculative trust, the rational component of trust, and benevolent trust, the emotional
side of trust . . . Calculative trust is preceded by the calculative process: an organization calculates
the costs and/or rewards of cheating (or not) in a particular transaction. When one partner can
deliver in the manner that it has promised, demonstrates the ability to continue the exchange
relationship, or seems capable of generating some benefit for another partner in the future, another
partner may be more willing to continue to make exchanges and to stay in the relationship [in-text
references omitted]”. See also Johnson (2007). The author states, “It is not necessary to hold all
eleven of Honoré’s incidents to be considered a per se owner of property, but some incidents are
clearly more important than others. Although it is often said that the right to possession is one of the
most important rights, it is not necessarily more important than the right to capital, which is the right
to alienate or dispose of the property. Honoré’s incidents are also naturally subsets of other
incidents. If one has a right to capital, or to exercise dominion over property, he also has a right
to use, unless he has exercised his power to give it away temporarily to a tenant. One might own the
right to receive the income from a piece of property, but not own the property itself because one
lacks the right to dispose of it. The combination of some incidents can add up to ownership rights,
depending on the context, and without all the incidents being present. Ownership can be shared in
an almost infinite variety of ways.
Thus, the concept of the bundle of separate sticks, with different “owners” holding different
sticks, meant that property ownership was a very flexible concept, largely unconcerned with the
object itself . . . Honoré’s incidents of ownership demonstrate Hohfeld’s concept of property rights
as “different sorts of rights and rights-correlatives” that may aggregate in many different ways to
explain ownership. For example, the right to capital is a legal right that is enforceable against others.
If I own the right to capital, I can convey or sell the property to somebody else; I can waste it by
refusing to maintain it and letting it fall into disrepair; I can destroy it by razing a building on my
land. These rights are not unlimited, however, because laws affect how I may convey the property,
how I waste it, or how I destroy it”.
An Exposé of Canadian “Abandoned Vessels &. . .
369