respect of Crimean ports seems to be rather limited, unless the parties to a charter
party include specific Ukrainian ports or Ukraine as a whole. This assessment could
change on a day-by-day basis, however, if the tensions between Ukraine and Russia
should escalate. Above all, it does not diminish the importance of compliance with
existing sanctions regimes.
4 Conclusions
Despite the fact that many statements were given by European officials expressing
their intention to ease the economic sanctions imposed against Russia and at a later
stage lift them, the restrictions which have been introduced in 2014 remain in force.
The same applies for the United States. In fact, further Russian individuals and
entities are being regularly added to the applicable List of Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN List).
68 Thus, as part of a rapidly changing business environment,
commercial operators must check the available lists on a regular basis in order to
ascertain whether an entity (such as a port operating company) or other authority is
subject to sanctions—which could severely impede the operations of vessel and
which could eventually even result in a port becoming (politically) unsafe.
The situation in Crimea is now—to some extent—unfortunately comparable to
“frozen conflicts” in other parts of the world. Particularly relevant for shipping, the
status of Crimean ports seems to resemble more and more the Northern Cypriot
situation of “closed ports”. Ultimately, commercial operators (should) know that
they have to make a choice: Basically, they have to choose one of the conflicting
parties (and their allies). As a consequence, they have to avoid the other party
completely if they seek to trade in the region—otherwise they would run a significant sanctions compliance risk. Under such circumstances, Crimean ports may be
considered politically unsafe for any particular ship having called or intending to call
at a Ukrainian port—but this assessment applies exclusively for those kinds of
vessels. Moreover, taking into account the established legal definition of a “safe
port” under charter parties, the existing sanctions compliance risk cannot at all be
deemed an “abnormal occurrence” or an unforeseeable event.
Inevitably, there is also the other side of the coin: Russia has also introduced
measures affecting the Ukrainian shipping industry (as well as other industrial
sectors) with consequent repercussions for shipowners, charterers, crew members,
and insurers. Members of the Parliament of Ukraine declared that the activities of
Russia in the Sea of Azov (including inspecting merchant vessels heading for the
ports of that area and seizing Ukrainian fishing vessels from Ukrainian ports) already
constitute a “de-facto blockade” of Ukrainian ports of the Sea of Azov, even if the
Russian authorities did not officially declare the existence of such a measure.
Unavoidably, the implementation of a de facto blockade on the Ukrainian ports by
68 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/sdn-list/pages/default.aspx.
306
H. Jessen
party include specific Ukrainian ports or Ukraine as a whole. This assessment could
change on a day-by-day basis, however, if the tensions between Ukraine and Russia
should escalate. Above all, it does not diminish the importance of compliance with
existing sanctions regimes.
4 Conclusions
Despite the fact that many statements were given by European officials expressing
their intention to ease the economic sanctions imposed against Russia and at a later
stage lift them, the restrictions which have been introduced in 2014 remain in force.
The same applies for the United States. In fact, further Russian individuals and
entities are being regularly added to the applicable List of Specially Designated
Nationals (SDN List).
68 Thus, as part of a rapidly changing business environment,
commercial operators must check the available lists on a regular basis in order to
ascertain whether an entity (such as a port operating company) or other authority is
subject to sanctions—which could severely impede the operations of vessel and
which could eventually even result in a port becoming (politically) unsafe.
The situation in Crimea is now—to some extent—unfortunately comparable to
“frozen conflicts” in other parts of the world. Particularly relevant for shipping, the
status of Crimean ports seems to resemble more and more the Northern Cypriot
situation of “closed ports”. Ultimately, commercial operators (should) know that
they have to make a choice: Basically, they have to choose one of the conflicting
parties (and their allies). As a consequence, they have to avoid the other party
completely if they seek to trade in the region—otherwise they would run a significant sanctions compliance risk. Under such circumstances, Crimean ports may be
considered politically unsafe for any particular ship having called or intending to call
at a Ukrainian port—but this assessment applies exclusively for those kinds of
vessels. Moreover, taking into account the established legal definition of a “safe
port” under charter parties, the existing sanctions compliance risk cannot at all be
deemed an “abnormal occurrence” or an unforeseeable event.
Inevitably, there is also the other side of the coin: Russia has also introduced
measures affecting the Ukrainian shipping industry (as well as other industrial
sectors) with consequent repercussions for shipowners, charterers, crew members,
and insurers. Members of the Parliament of Ukraine declared that the activities of
Russia in the Sea of Azov (including inspecting merchant vessels heading for the
ports of that area and seizing Ukrainian fishing vessels from Ukrainian ports) already
constitute a “de-facto blockade” of Ukrainian ports of the Sea of Azov, even if the
Russian authorities did not officially declare the existence of such a measure.
Unavoidably, the implementation of a de facto blockade on the Ukrainian ports by
68 See https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/sdn-list/pages/default.aspx.
306
H. Jessen