Another option would be to develop a new special convention addressing the
legal issues that relate to various types of unmanned ships. It is submitted that this
would not be a practical solution.
It has been suggested that a partial solution could be to adopt a new overriding
treaty addressing special problems relating to unmanned vessels.
92 Such an overriding treaty could, for example, clarify the meaning of certain generic words and terms
for all these Conventions, for instance the terms of ‘ship’ and ‘master’, i.e. whether
these terms would apply to unmanned vessels of various types and cover shorebased personnel, and how the regulations would apply when command and control is
exercised from the shore. If this approach were to be taken, it would not be necessary
to make amendments as regards these words and terms in each of the treaty
instruments. It is recognised, however, that it would not be easy—or rather that it
would most likely be immensely difficult—to reach agreement within the IMO
bodies and at a Diplomatic Conference on the content of such an overriding treaty.
In addition, the treaty would have to be ratified in order to be binding for a particular
State, and it would certainly take many years before most of the States parties to the
old Conventions had become parties to this new treaty.
Many of the required amendments relating to provisions of a technical character
in existing treaty instruments could probably be agreed by using the tacit acceptance
procedure, that is be adopted by qualified majority decision by the competent IMO
Committee, in which case the amendment once in force would be binding for all
States parties to the treaty. Other amendments, in particular those relating to conventions in the field of civil or criminal law, would have to be submitted to a
Diplomatic Conference for adoption, followed by ratification by States parties, and
as a result it would take many years before these amendments would have universal
application.
As regards the treaties under the competence of IMO, it might be feasible to
achieve acceptable results, at least for an interim period, through Resolutions
adopted by the IMO Assembly on the interpretation or clarification of selected
provisions in the various treaties. Contrary to formal amendments of treaties, such
Resolutions would not, however, be legally binding on the States parties or on
national courts. It should nevertheless be possible by this method to arrive at a fairly
high degree of uniformity as regards the application of a large number of provisions
to unmanned ships, in particular since the decision-making in the IMO bodies is
traditionally based on the consensus principle.
93
The method to use Interpretative Resolutions by the IMO Assembly could not be
applied, however, if formal amendments to the relevant treaty provisions are
required (e.g. concerning STCW watchkeeping provisions). In addition, that method
could not be used as regards provisions in UNCLOS or in other treaties that have not
92 Eder (2018).
93 Reference should be made to art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
provides that in the interpretation of a treaty account shall be taken of agreement between the States
parties to the relevant treaty and subsequent practise regarding its interpretation and application.
282
M. Jacobsson
legal issues that relate to various types of unmanned ships. It is submitted that this
would not be a practical solution.
It has been suggested that a partial solution could be to adopt a new overriding
treaty addressing special problems relating to unmanned vessels.
92 Such an overriding treaty could, for example, clarify the meaning of certain generic words and terms
for all these Conventions, for instance the terms of ‘ship’ and ‘master’, i.e. whether
these terms would apply to unmanned vessels of various types and cover shorebased personnel, and how the regulations would apply when command and control is
exercised from the shore. If this approach were to be taken, it would not be necessary
to make amendments as regards these words and terms in each of the treaty
instruments. It is recognised, however, that it would not be easy—or rather that it
would most likely be immensely difficult—to reach agreement within the IMO
bodies and at a Diplomatic Conference on the content of such an overriding treaty.
In addition, the treaty would have to be ratified in order to be binding for a particular
State, and it would certainly take many years before most of the States parties to the
old Conventions had become parties to this new treaty.
Many of the required amendments relating to provisions of a technical character
in existing treaty instruments could probably be agreed by using the tacit acceptance
procedure, that is be adopted by qualified majority decision by the competent IMO
Committee, in which case the amendment once in force would be binding for all
States parties to the treaty. Other amendments, in particular those relating to conventions in the field of civil or criminal law, would have to be submitted to a
Diplomatic Conference for adoption, followed by ratification by States parties, and
as a result it would take many years before these amendments would have universal
application.
As regards the treaties under the competence of IMO, it might be feasible to
achieve acceptable results, at least for an interim period, through Resolutions
adopted by the IMO Assembly on the interpretation or clarification of selected
provisions in the various treaties. Contrary to formal amendments of treaties, such
Resolutions would not, however, be legally binding on the States parties or on
national courts. It should nevertheless be possible by this method to arrive at a fairly
high degree of uniformity as regards the application of a large number of provisions
to unmanned ships, in particular since the decision-making in the IMO bodies is
traditionally based on the consensus principle.
93
The method to use Interpretative Resolutions by the IMO Assembly could not be
applied, however, if formal amendments to the relevant treaty provisions are
required (e.g. concerning STCW watchkeeping provisions). In addition, that method
could not be used as regards provisions in UNCLOS or in other treaties that have not
92 Eder (2018).
93 Reference should be made to art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which
provides that in the interpretation of a treaty account shall be taken of agreement between the States
parties to the relevant treaty and subsequent practise regarding its interpretation and application.
282
M. Jacobsson