and control the use of force in the fight against piracy within their waters.
141 A
similar process of re-nationalising and control of the use of force by states such as
Nigeria and Togo occurred at the initial phase of global attention on the spate of
attacks in the region and the corresponding PMSC interest in the Gulf of Guinea
waters.
Aside from providing services, PMSCs issue statements, publish and circulate
risk assessments and reports on the threat of piracy in the Strait of Malacca, the Gulf
of Aden, and the Gulf of Guinea. These statements and documents impact the
decision-making processes of governments and businesses, as well as public perception of security issues.
142
The impact of PMSC involvement in the norm making process is most visible
from the events in the Gulf of Aden. The unprecedented scale of attacks off the coast
of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden resulted in a mushrooming of PMSCs scattered
around the globe wishing to take advantage of the booming security market.
143 Even
though commercial vessels were already engaging their services, there was initially
stiff resistance from prominent stakeholders.
144 The resistance was in line with longstanding international practice that discouraged the arming of vessels.
145 Furthermore, there was a prevailing view that the provision of security for on-going vessels
was an obligation for states.
146 Through cooperation with other private non-state
actors and even states, the PMSC industry was able to push the agenda for
reassessing the position concerning the use of PMSCs in the Gulf of Aden and
providing appropriate instruments for regulating their engagement.
147 For instance,
the now defunct Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) collaborated
with the Marshall Islands to champion the cause of the use of PMSCs in the Indian
Ocean at the 89th meeting of the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC).
148
There is generally tacit acceptance of the practice of deploying armed security
personnel on board vessels in certain circumstances.
149 There are now several
laws—hard and soft both at international and state level—formulated as a result of
141 Liss (2007), https://www.murdoch.edu.au/Research-capabilities/Asia-Research-Centre/_docu
ment/working-papers/wp141.pdf. Accessed 22 January 2019.
142 Liss (2007), https://www.murdoch.edu.au/Research-capabilities/Asia-Research-Centre/_docu
ment/working-papers/wp141.pdf. Accessed 22 May 2018; Liwång et al. (2015), p. 201.
143 Most of them are in European countries. See Liss (2015), p. 88.
144 Affi et al. (2016), p. 939.
145 Aatstad (2017), pp. 313–331; Marin et al. (2017), pp. 192–193.
146 Affi et al. (2016), p. 939.
147 Liss (2015), p. 88; Liss (2013), p. 205.
148 Skype Interview with Maritime Security Expert (12 April 2017).
149 The Maritime Organization’s IMO’s stance over a two-year period evolved from actively
discouraging to ‘tacitly accepting the industry and flag state practice of deploying armed security
personnel on board vessels under certain circumstances.’ See http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/
Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Private-Armed-Security.aspx. Accessed 18 October 2018.
Similarly, prominent maritime nations such as United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands have
also changed their stance about the use of armed personnel onboard vessels. See Van Hespen
198
O. A. Eruaga
141 A
similar process of re-nationalising and control of the use of force by states such as
Nigeria and Togo occurred at the initial phase of global attention on the spate of
attacks in the region and the corresponding PMSC interest in the Gulf of Guinea
waters.
Aside from providing services, PMSCs issue statements, publish and circulate
risk assessments and reports on the threat of piracy in the Strait of Malacca, the Gulf
of Aden, and the Gulf of Guinea. These statements and documents impact the
decision-making processes of governments and businesses, as well as public perception of security issues.
142
The impact of PMSC involvement in the norm making process is most visible
from the events in the Gulf of Aden. The unprecedented scale of attacks off the coast
of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden resulted in a mushrooming of PMSCs scattered
around the globe wishing to take advantage of the booming security market.
143 Even
though commercial vessels were already engaging their services, there was initially
stiff resistance from prominent stakeholders.
144 The resistance was in line with longstanding international practice that discouraged the arming of vessels.
145 Furthermore, there was a prevailing view that the provision of security for on-going vessels
was an obligation for states.
146 Through cooperation with other private non-state
actors and even states, the PMSC industry was able to push the agenda for
reassessing the position concerning the use of PMSCs in the Gulf of Aden and
providing appropriate instruments for regulating their engagement.
147 For instance,
the now defunct Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) collaborated
with the Marshall Islands to champion the cause of the use of PMSCs in the Indian
Ocean at the 89th meeting of the IMO’s Maritime Safety Committee (MSC).
148
There is generally tacit acceptance of the practice of deploying armed security
personnel on board vessels in certain circumstances.
149 There are now several
laws—hard and soft both at international and state level—formulated as a result of
141 Liss (2007), https://www.murdoch.edu.au/Research-capabilities/Asia-Research-Centre/_docu
ment/working-papers/wp141.pdf. Accessed 22 January 2019.
142 Liss (2007), https://www.murdoch.edu.au/Research-capabilities/Asia-Research-Centre/_docu
ment/working-papers/wp141.pdf. Accessed 22 May 2018; Liwång et al. (2015), p. 201.
143 Most of them are in European countries. See Liss (2015), p. 88.
144 Affi et al. (2016), p. 939.
145 Aatstad (2017), pp. 313–331; Marin et al. (2017), pp. 192–193.
146 Affi et al. (2016), p. 939.
147 Liss (2015), p. 88; Liss (2013), p. 205.
148 Skype Interview with Maritime Security Expert (12 April 2017).
149 The Maritime Organization’s IMO’s stance over a two-year period evolved from actively
discouraging to ‘tacitly accepting the industry and flag state practice of deploying armed security
personnel on board vessels under certain circumstances.’ See http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/
Security/PiracyArmedRobbery/Pages/Private-Armed-Security.aspx. Accessed 18 October 2018.
Similarly, prominent maritime nations such as United Kingdom, Italy and the Netherlands have
also changed their stance about the use of armed personnel onboard vessels. See Van Hespen
198
O. A. Eruaga