socio-economic challenges around the coasts of these states remain the true cause of
the problem.
19 As a result of the foregoing, the threat of piracy and armed robbery
against ships continues to ‘wax and wane,’ while serious concerns about security
remain.
20 With this perceived lack of security, especially during the peak periods of
persistent attacks, the vacuum was filled by PMSCs offering services to protect
commercial operations at sea.
Anti-piracy services were initially offered in the Strait of Malacca, before
expanding in earnest in reaction to the spate of attacks off the coast of Somalia.
21
In recent times, PMSC services have surfaced in the Gulf of Guinea.
22 These
commercial entities fill a vacuum created by improperly policed strategic waterways
and offer potential victims of piratical attacks an extra layer of security in addition to
that provided by states.
23 Their contributions within this sphere can be theoretically
explained with the rationalist idea of resource exchange.
24 PMSCs provide services
that supplement governmental capacities because they profit from such an arrangement. As first and foremost commercial entities, PMSCs operate to ensure that the
provision of security services as a business remains profitable. From the various
services which they can provide, the sea-based or active services offered by PMSCs
involve the possibility of the use of lethal force against suspected pirates, through the
provision of armed guards (commonly known as privately contracted armed security
personnel or PCASP) directly on board merchant vessels or on escort vessels.
25
Their presence points to the reality of the global system where non-state actors play
significant roles in international affairs.
26
19 Mejia et al. (2012), pp. 360–367.
20 Hasan and Hassan (2016), p. 215.
21 Osnin (2006a), p. 195; paper presented by Osnin NA in 5th Maritime Institute of Malaysia
Conference on the Strait of Malacca: Present and Future Perspectives Kuala Lumpur 1–2 August
2006b; Ronzitti (2011), p. 43; Liss (2014), p. 196; Liss (2015), p. 87; Liss (2017), pp. 88–89.
22 Parsons (2010), p. 156; Petrig (2013), p. 670; Cullen (2012), p. 26.
23 Liss (2013), p. 199.
24 Jakobi (2016), pp. 76–77. The theory postulates that resources perceived to be the same or in
proximal categories are more likely to be exchanged. See further Brinberg and Wood (1983),
pp. 330–338.
25 On the various services which PMSCs can provide for protection against pirate attacks see Cullen
(2012), p. 26; Liss (2015), pp. 87–88, ISO 28007-1:2015, 3.7. On the categorization of the services,
see Liss (2015), pp. 87–88. Contrast with the categorization in Struwe (2012), pp. 590–595. Struwe
categorises the services into four main groups—security intelligence, security services, crisis
response and intervention on land. This chapter adopts Liss’ options of classification-active and
passive services or land and sea-based services. Apart from the simplicity, Liss’ categorisation
options offer a more encompassing classification that that caters for other forms of services that may
arise in future as well as reflects the operational distinctions of the services identified as conflicting
with the state monopoly in the legal provision of security. Furthermore, the Struwe classification
can easily be subsumed under either of Liss’ classification.
26 Ryngaert (2016), p. 186.
Private Maritime Security Companies Within the International Legal. . .
179
the problem.
19 As a result of the foregoing, the threat of piracy and armed robbery
against ships continues to ‘wax and wane,’ while serious concerns about security
remain.
20 With this perceived lack of security, especially during the peak periods of
persistent attacks, the vacuum was filled by PMSCs offering services to protect
commercial operations at sea.
Anti-piracy services were initially offered in the Strait of Malacca, before
expanding in earnest in reaction to the spate of attacks off the coast of Somalia.
21
In recent times, PMSC services have surfaced in the Gulf of Guinea.
22 These
commercial entities fill a vacuum created by improperly policed strategic waterways
and offer potential victims of piratical attacks an extra layer of security in addition to
that provided by states.
23 Their contributions within this sphere can be theoretically
explained with the rationalist idea of resource exchange.
24 PMSCs provide services
that supplement governmental capacities because they profit from such an arrangement. As first and foremost commercial entities, PMSCs operate to ensure that the
provision of security services as a business remains profitable. From the various
services which they can provide, the sea-based or active services offered by PMSCs
involve the possibility of the use of lethal force against suspected pirates, through the
provision of armed guards (commonly known as privately contracted armed security
personnel or PCASP) directly on board merchant vessels or on escort vessels.
25
Their presence points to the reality of the global system where non-state actors play
significant roles in international affairs.
26
19 Mejia et al. (2012), pp. 360–367.
20 Hasan and Hassan (2016), p. 215.
21 Osnin (2006a), p. 195; paper presented by Osnin NA in 5th Maritime Institute of Malaysia
Conference on the Strait of Malacca: Present and Future Perspectives Kuala Lumpur 1–2 August
2006b; Ronzitti (2011), p. 43; Liss (2014), p. 196; Liss (2015), p. 87; Liss (2017), pp. 88–89.
22 Parsons (2010), p. 156; Petrig (2013), p. 670; Cullen (2012), p. 26.
23 Liss (2013), p. 199.
24 Jakobi (2016), pp. 76–77. The theory postulates that resources perceived to be the same or in
proximal categories are more likely to be exchanged. See further Brinberg and Wood (1983),
pp. 330–338.
25 On the various services which PMSCs can provide for protection against pirate attacks see Cullen
(2012), p. 26; Liss (2015), pp. 87–88, ISO 28007-1:2015, 3.7. On the categorization of the services,
see Liss (2015), pp. 87–88. Contrast with the categorization in Struwe (2012), pp. 590–595. Struwe
categorises the services into four main groups—security intelligence, security services, crisis
response and intervention on land. This chapter adopts Liss’ options of classification-active and
passive services or land and sea-based services. Apart from the simplicity, Liss’ categorisation
options offer a more encompassing classification that that caters for other forms of services that may
arise in future as well as reflects the operational distinctions of the services identified as conflicting
with the state monopoly in the legal provision of security. Furthermore, the Struwe classification
can easily be subsumed under either of Liss’ classification.
26 Ryngaert (2016), p. 186.
Private Maritime Security Companies Within the International Legal. . .
179