technical cooperation emerged from a technical consultative body. Before the IMO’s
constitutive instrument was amended, the original IMO purposes in Article 1 were
narrow, reflecting old concerns and was hardly forward-looking: ‘to provide machinery for cooperation’ in ‘governmental regulation and practices relating to technical
matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade, and to encourage the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning
maritime safety and efficiency of navigation’; ‘to encourage the removal of discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions’ to ensure availability of shipping to
support world commerce; exchange of information; and provision of other matters
for consideration by the IMO. The central concern in these purposes was maritime
safety and perhaps a measure of trade facilitation, at least indirectly in terms of
advocacy for non-discrimination. At the time there was no concern with pollution
prevention, security and technical assistance to developing countries, or even to use
regulation as a tool for proactive change. After all, most developing countries
achieved their independence in the 1950s and 1960s.
The IMO’s functions were consequently and equally limited, essentially and
cryptically formulated in Article 2 as ‘consultative and advisory.’ The powers
reflected that limitation, enabling the organization to function as a clearing house:
‘to consider and make recommendations’ on matters remitted by members and UN
bodies and international organizations; provide for the drafting of conventions,
agreements, and other instruments and recommend these to member states and
intergovernmental organizations and convene conferences; provide machinery for
consultation and information exchange. Even on restrictive shipping practices,
priority was given to direct negotiations by member states and only on failure of
agreement would the IMO consider the matter. It was an organization that clearly
was to be used when deemed needed and with very little room for forward thinking.
From time to time the membership would be reminded to consider issues only within
the organization’s limited terms of reference. This would change as a result of a
series of internal and external pressures triggering far-reaching developments in the
organization itself, in the shipping industry and generally in international relations.
Soon after its creation in 1948 and eventual operationalization in 1958, there was
discord over the IMO’s mandate and composition of its principal technical organ, the
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). Some states expressed concern with Article 1 of
the Convention because they were afraid that the organization would lead to
interference with their national maritime industries and legislation. This served to
reinforce the essentially technical and nautical concerns of the organization, including at its first meeting in 1959. New maritime states were emerging and challenging
the interests and power bases of traditional maritime states. Major new registries
emerged, especially Liberia and Panama, and these challenged the composition of
the MSC. While already among the top ten ship registers, both states were considered ‘flags of convenience’ (open registers) and neither was elected to the committee
because others felt these states did not really own the tonnage registered under their
flags. The traditional maritime states, ostensibly the ‘beneficial owners’, dominated
100
A. Chircop and D. Shan
constitutive instrument was amended, the original IMO purposes in Article 1 were
narrow, reflecting old concerns and was hardly forward-looking: ‘to provide machinery for cooperation’ in ‘governmental regulation and practices relating to technical
matters of all kinds affecting shipping engaged in international trade, and to encourage the general adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning
maritime safety and efficiency of navigation’; ‘to encourage the removal of discriminatory action and unnecessary restrictions’ to ensure availability of shipping to
support world commerce; exchange of information; and provision of other matters
for consideration by the IMO. The central concern in these purposes was maritime
safety and perhaps a measure of trade facilitation, at least indirectly in terms of
advocacy for non-discrimination. At the time there was no concern with pollution
prevention, security and technical assistance to developing countries, or even to use
regulation as a tool for proactive change. After all, most developing countries
achieved their independence in the 1950s and 1960s.
The IMO’s functions were consequently and equally limited, essentially and
cryptically formulated in Article 2 as ‘consultative and advisory.’ The powers
reflected that limitation, enabling the organization to function as a clearing house:
‘to consider and make recommendations’ on matters remitted by members and UN
bodies and international organizations; provide for the drafting of conventions,
agreements, and other instruments and recommend these to member states and
intergovernmental organizations and convene conferences; provide machinery for
consultation and information exchange. Even on restrictive shipping practices,
priority was given to direct negotiations by member states and only on failure of
agreement would the IMO consider the matter. It was an organization that clearly
was to be used when deemed needed and with very little room for forward thinking.
From time to time the membership would be reminded to consider issues only within
the organization’s limited terms of reference. This would change as a result of a
series of internal and external pressures triggering far-reaching developments in the
organization itself, in the shipping industry and generally in international relations.
Soon after its creation in 1948 and eventual operationalization in 1958, there was
discord over the IMO’s mandate and composition of its principal technical organ, the
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC). Some states expressed concern with Article 1 of
the Convention because they were afraid that the organization would lead to
interference with their national maritime industries and legislation. This served to
reinforce the essentially technical and nautical concerns of the organization, including at its first meeting in 1959. New maritime states were emerging and challenging
the interests and power bases of traditional maritime states. Major new registries
emerged, especially Liberia and Panama, and these challenged the composition of
the MSC. While already among the top ten ship registers, both states were considered ‘flags of convenience’ (open registers) and neither was elected to the committee
because others felt these states did not really own the tonnage registered under their
flags. The traditional maritime states, ostensibly the ‘beneficial owners’, dominated
100
A. Chircop and D. Shan