board. To this end, the crew ought to proceed to scrutinize them in order to separate
those injured or with contagious diseases from the other and the crew. However, it
has already been highlighted that neither the STCW Convention nor the Convention
for the Safety of Life (SOLAS) contain a mandatory drill dealing with this type of
procedure to handle multiple injuries and contagious persons (Iussich and Maglić
2018).
This section has gone through a number of occupational risks that may arise out
of the rescue of a large number of issues at sea. It might be a source of occupational
accidents, injuries and diseases that have to be taken into account by lawmakers and
employers. The ICS Guidance is an adequate instrument, but its value is
compromised by the fact that it is only a guidance that also contains controversial
statements, in particular the following one: ‘Fatigue may be an issue if not properly
managed after a rescue operation. Any short-term disruption to rest and work
patterns should be limited to that which is absolutely necessary’. The latter is not
going to help an exhausted and troubled crew to overcome a risky and possibly
traumatic experience.
6 Final Remarks
Psychological and physical risks as a result of the maritime migration challenge have
to be prevented and addressed. In this vein, the ICS Guidance includes a recommendation on crew welfare, but simply indicating that “the Company and ship’s
plans and procedures should address this possibility, with appropriate support and
monitoring of crew members”. While it is essential to remind the employer of its
responsibilities towards the crew, other actions have to be undertaken in view of the
maritime migration challenge.
The above-mentioned figures are a good indication that maritime migration will
continue to affect trade and fishing at sea. It is also the reason why port States have
grown reluctant to accept disembarkation of boat people and increased pressure upon
crews that try it despite the odds. And the disembarkation problem has escalated to
the point that even coordinated efforts such as the EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia
are sinking in view of involved States’ discrepancies over the reception of refugees
(ECSA 2019). Nevertheless, State burden-sharing is more necessary than ever and
probably the only means to put an end to loss of lives at sea. In this vein, the adoption
by the UN General Assembly of the New York Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants and the development of a Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing on
Refugees along with a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration are
a stepping stone on the right path (Appleby 2017).
Against this backdrop, the ECSA’s Secretary General Martin Dorsman (2019) has
pointed out that “Shipowners will certainly comply with the international conventions and honour their legal obligations to assist people in distress on the Mediterranean. However, this must not become part of the solution”. His words come after
Germany had announced its withdrawal from EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia and
Occupational Hazards in the Light of the Maritime Migration Challenge
91
those injured or with contagious diseases from the other and the crew. However, it
has already been highlighted that neither the STCW Convention nor the Convention
for the Safety of Life (SOLAS) contain a mandatory drill dealing with this type of
procedure to handle multiple injuries and contagious persons (Iussich and Maglić
2018).
This section has gone through a number of occupational risks that may arise out
of the rescue of a large number of issues at sea. It might be a source of occupational
accidents, injuries and diseases that have to be taken into account by lawmakers and
employers. The ICS Guidance is an adequate instrument, but its value is
compromised by the fact that it is only a guidance that also contains controversial
statements, in particular the following one: ‘Fatigue may be an issue if not properly
managed after a rescue operation. Any short-term disruption to rest and work
patterns should be limited to that which is absolutely necessary’. The latter is not
going to help an exhausted and troubled crew to overcome a risky and possibly
traumatic experience.
6 Final Remarks
Psychological and physical risks as a result of the maritime migration challenge have
to be prevented and addressed. In this vein, the ICS Guidance includes a recommendation on crew welfare, but simply indicating that “the Company and ship’s
plans and procedures should address this possibility, with appropriate support and
monitoring of crew members”. While it is essential to remind the employer of its
responsibilities towards the crew, other actions have to be undertaken in view of the
maritime migration challenge.
The above-mentioned figures are a good indication that maritime migration will
continue to affect trade and fishing at sea. It is also the reason why port States have
grown reluctant to accept disembarkation of boat people and increased pressure upon
crews that try it despite the odds. And the disembarkation problem has escalated to
the point that even coordinated efforts such as the EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia
are sinking in view of involved States’ discrepancies over the reception of refugees
(ECSA 2019). Nevertheless, State burden-sharing is more necessary than ever and
probably the only means to put an end to loss of lives at sea. In this vein, the adoption
by the UN General Assembly of the New York Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants and the development of a Global Compact on Responsibility Sharing on
Refugees along with a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration are
a stepping stone on the right path (Appleby 2017).
Against this backdrop, the ECSA’s Secretary General Martin Dorsman (2019) has
pointed out that “Shipowners will certainly comply with the international conventions and honour their legal obligations to assist people in distress on the Mediterranean. However, this must not become part of the solution”. His words come after
Germany had announced its withdrawal from EUNAVFOR Operation Sophia and
Occupational Hazards in the Light of the Maritime Migration Challenge
91